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CHAPTER 6 - CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY DELIMITATION BETWEEN 
MEDITERRANEAN STATES 
6.1 The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf under Conventional 
International Law
Before one can consider continental shelf boundaries in the
Mediterranean Sea, it is first necessary to examine the domestic
legislation of each State with respect to its outer continental shelf
limit.
Under Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention, to which nine
Mediterranean States are parties,' the outer limit of the continental
shelf is defined either by the 200 metre isobath, or "beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources" of the seabed and subsoil areas
adjacent to the coast. 2
 At UNCLOS I, both France and Lebanon proposed
deletion of the exploitability test, whilst Yugoslavia proposed that
the outer limit of the continental shelf should not exceed 100 miles
from the outer limits of the territorial sea. 3 Neither proposal was
accepted, but it quickly became clear that with technological progress,
if left unattended to, the exploitability criterion would result in the
world's oceans being divided up between coastal States, and thus it was
necessary to place a definitive limit upon the extent of coastal State
continental shelf jurisdiction.
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Nevertheless, much of the intense debate at UNCLOS III concerning
the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles was
irrelevant for the Mediterranean, where no State's continental shelf,
except possibly in parts Tunisia's, extends for that distance.
However, this fact alone made many Mediterranean States concerned to
limit continental shelf jurisdiction worldwide to 200 miles, s once it
became clear that the acceptance of a 200 mile E.E.Z. would result in a
continental shelf of at least 200 miles. Thus, as Jagota explains, the
rationale behind Article 76 of the 1982 Convention is that since every
State is entitled to an E.E.Z. of 200 miles in which it has sovereign
rights over both the living and non-living resources, so each State
should be entitled to a 200 mile continental shelf.s
6.2 The Legislation of Mediterranean States with Respect to the Outer 
Limits of the Continental Shelf 
One of the most striking features about Mediterranean States'
offshore legislation is that no State claims a continental shelf
extending up to or beyond 200 miles offshore.	 As Table 14 shows,
whilst half of the Mediterranean's coastal States (nine) define the
outer limits of their continental shelf according to Article 1 of the
Continental Shelf Convention, three States make undefined continental
shelf claims, and a further six make no explicit claim to a continental
shelf at all.
Table 14 - The Outer Limits of Mediterranean States' Continental 
.0
Shelves as defined in their Domestic Legislation 
200 metre isobath or to where water depth permits exploitation of 

















L In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of 31 May 1972, Cyprus
claimed a continental shelf beyond 200 metres depth if it was part of
the natural prolongation of its land territory. However, in its
Continental Shelf Law No. 8 of 5 April 1974, 7 it dropped the reference
to the 200 metre isobath and referred only to "where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources"
of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond the adjacent
territorial waters.°
2. The Israeli legislation refers only to the exploitability criterion.
Israel's Submarine Areas Law 5713 of 10 February 1953, defines the
Israeli continental shelf as:
"... the sea floor and underground of the submarine areas adjacent
to the shores of Israel but outside Israel [sic.] territorial
waters, to the extent that the depth of the superjacent water
permits the exploitation of the natural resourceá situate in such
areas."
The probable reason for this is that off Israel's Mediterranean coast
the 200 metre isobath is nowhere greater than 20 miles offshore and
averages about 11 miles. 10
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3. A claim by Libya to a continental shelf can be inferred from its
Petroleum Law of 1955, although no outer limits are prescribed therein.
On the other hand, the outer limit of Libya's continental shelf is
undefined. Article 4(1) of Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955 provides that:
"This law shall extend to the sea bed and subsoil which lie
beneath the territorial waters and the high seas contiguous
thereto under the control and jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
of Libya. Any such sea bed and subsoil adjacent to any zone shall
for the purposes of this law be deemed to be part of that zone.""
4. In the absence of guidance in their domestic legislation, the
adherence of France and Spain to the Continental Shelf Convention would
suggest a continental shelf defined by the 200 metre isobath or the
exploitability criterion. However, France was opposed to the criterion
of exploitability in Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention, and
refused to sign it. In 1965, France acceded to the Convention, but
only under pressure of events, and with 2 declarations and 3
reservations. 12
5. By Article 22 of the Law on the Coastal Sea and Continental Shelf of
23 July 1987, Yugoslavia defined its continental shelf as comprising
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the
outer limit of the territorial sea to lines fixed by international
agreements, perhaps in recognition of its continental shelf boundary
agreement with Italy.12
Sources: (i) R.W. Smith "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction"
Limits in the Seas No. 36 (6th Revision).	 (United States Department of
State, Office of Ocean Law and Policy, Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 3 January 1990);
(ii) Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Law of the Sea 
Bulletin No. 11 (July 1988), pp. 54-56.
Seen in a world context, however, Mediterranean State practice
does not appear to be unusual at present: as of May 1990, of the 77
States defining the outer limits to their continental shelf claims,
only 31 claimed a continental shelf extending at least 200 miles
offshore,	 whilst 46 used the 200 metre isobath and/or the
exploitability criterion. ' A	 Nevertheless, it is possible to adduce
reasons why Mediterranean States in particular should display a
reluctance to embrace the now universally accepted 200 mile limit.
The first reason is physical, in that generally Mediterranean
continental shelves are short in lateral extent and steeply shelving,
and thus the 200 metre isobath lies well within 200 miles offshore.
Indeed, seventy-seven per cent of the Mediterranean's seabed lies
beyond the 200 metre isobath.' s Secondly, as discussed in detail in
Appendix 1, the hydrocarbon potential of the Mediterranean Sea even
within the 200 metre isobath is low. Although the deep waters beyond
the 200 metre isobath have been explored by some Mediterranean States,
there has been little or no production of hydrocarbons from these
areas, and, in general, water depth is prohibitive of exploitation
beyond the 200 metre limit. Consequently, Mediterranean States have no
need, at present, to extend their continental shelf limits to 200
miles.
However, perhaps most pertinently, Mediterranean States appear
reluctant to extend their offshore jurisdiction to 200 miles, because
such claims threaten to initiate boundary conflicts with those States
which lie opposite them and within 400 miles of their coasts. Sixty-
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five per cent of the Mediterranean's seabed lies within 40 miles of
land, 16 and with every State claiming offshore Jurisdiction to 200
miles, no part of the Mediterranean's seabed would lie beyond the
Jurisdiction of one of its coastal States.	 Thus, whilst the waters
beyond the 200 metre isobath remain of little interest for hydrocarbon
exploration, it would appear that Mediterranean States do not wish to
annex them for their possible future potential, if in so doing they are
likely to prompt swift counter-claims by neighbouring opposite States,
in turn requiring complex negotiations to settle boundaries through
what are presently "economic deserts,"
Nevertheless, given that continental shelf boundaries have been
delimited in the Mediterranean, and will be so in the future, it is
necessary to examine the rules governing delimitation.
6.3 Continental Shelf Boundary Delimitation under International Law 
(a) The Truman Proclamation 
The delimitation of seabed areas between States was not an issue
until the 1940s, when the U.S, issued the now famous Truman
Proclamation on the Continental Shelf (1945). This provided that:
"In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of
another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary
shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned
in accordance with equitable principles."
-473-
This introduced a novel criterion of delimitation, consonant with the
establishment of a new zone of offshore jurisdiction, and has had far
'
reaching significance for the subsequent delimitation of all maritime
boundaries.	 However, surprisingly, the delimitation of continental
shelf boundaries in accordance with equitable principles did not
attract much support in the formulation of the Continental Shelf
Convention at UNCLOS I.
(b) The Work of the I.L.C. (1951-1956) and UNCLOS I (1958) 
Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and
Related Subjects, adopted by the I.L.C. in 1951, provided that:
"Two or more States to whose territories the same continental
shelf is contiguous should establish boundaries in the area of the
continental shelf by agreement. 	 Failing agreement, the parties
are under the obligation to have the boundaries fixed by
arbitration."'
In the attached commentary, it was noted that in the case of adjacent
States it was not feasible to lay down any general rule to be followed;
indeed, no general rule existed concerning territorial sea boundary
delimitation in such a situation.
	
Therefore, it was likely that
difficulties might arise, in which case if States were unable to reach
a prompt agreement, they should be under an obligation to submit the
dispute to arbitration ex aequo et bona
	 On the other hand, with
respect to opposite States, "the boundary between their continental
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shelves would generally coincide with some median line between the two
coasts;" where the coastal configuration was such as to give rise to
difficulties in drawing such a line, then these difficulties should be
referred to arbitration.'e
As discussed above, in 1953, a Committee of Experts examined
several different methods of delimiting territorial sea boundaries,
favouring a median line in the case of opposite States and an
equidistance line for adjacent State delimitation. 	 Significantly, it
further indicated that its suggested methods of delimitation were
chosen with a view to their additional applicability to the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between neighbouring
States. 19 Hence, the equidistance method was adopted for both opposite
and adjacent State delimitation in a rigid formula.2°
However, in the I.L.C. debates of 1953, it was noted that States
ought to have an opportunity to settle disputes by agreement, 2 ' and
that provision ought to be made for "special cases where the
application of the normal rule would lead to manifest hardship."2m As
a result, these concerns were incorporated in a text produced by
Francois, in which, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
boundary was "as a general rule the median/equidistance line. 22
 Thus,
although the I.L.C. decided to adopt the recommendations of the
Committee of Experts insofar as the territorial sea was_concerned, it
preferred to include its recommendations "in a simpler and more elastic
way" 24
 as regards the continental shelf.28
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This principle was retained until the I.L.C.'s final report of
1956, in which draft Article 72 read:
"1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite to
each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to
such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf
shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of
the principle of equidistance from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two countries is
measured,
The commentary to this Article noted that the I.L.C. had adopted the
same principles for continental shelf delimitation as for territorial
sea delimitation, adding that:
"As in the case of the boundaries of the territorial sea,
provision must be made for departures necessitated by an
exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as for the
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presence of islands or navigable channels. 	 This case may arise
fairly often, so that the rule adopted is fairly elastic."2,7
At UNCLOS I, several amendments were proposed to the delimitation
criteria set down by the I.L.C. 	 Iran proposed that islands located
within an enclosed sea between States with opposite coasts should be
ignored and the continental shelf boundary be delimited from the
coastlines of the States concerned. 	 Venezuela suggested that the
boundary should be settled by agreement or other means recognised in
international law. However, most interestingly from the Mediterranean
point of view, Yugoslavia proposed deletion of the references to
special circumstances29 and historic title, because in its view, they
introduced an element of uncertainty and would thus , give rise to
disputes. 29	 Nevertheless, UNCLOS I eventually decided to accept
Article 72 in its entirety, and this became Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Equidistance was subsequently used as the basis of a number of
continental shelf boundary agreements, until in 1969, the Federal
Republic of Germany challenged the applicability of Article 6 under
customary international law in what became known as the North Sea
Cases.	 The I.C.I.'s ruling in these cases was to change fundamentally
the history of maritime boundary delimitation.
(c) The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) 
The basis of the disputes between the Federal Republic of Germany
and Denmark, and the Federal Republic and the Netherlands, concerned
the application of the equidistance line rule of Article 6(2) to the
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the three
States. The Federal Republic was not a party to the Continental Shelf
Convention, and hence not bound by Article 6. 3°	 Consequently, it
challenged the customary law status of the rule contained therein, on
the basis that the concave configuration of the German coast would
result in equidistance line boundaries that would unjustly restrict its
entitlement to continental shelf area, and which "would not lead to an
equitable apportionment."'
The I.C.J., however, rejected all the German arguments based on a
"just and equitable share," stating that its task was "the delimitation
and not the apportionment of the areas concerned," 32 but upheld the
Federal Republic's view that Article 6(2) did not reflect an existing
rule of customary international law in being at the time the 1958
Convention was concluded.	 Moreover, the Court found that it had not
become such by subsequent State practice.	 Consequently, the line of
equidistance was not an obligatory method of delimitation: rather,
delimitation should be effected in accordance with equitable
principles, taking account of all the relevant circumstances so as to
leave each State with as much continental shelf as possible
constituting "a natural prolongation of its land territory into and
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under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the
land territory of the other."3='
Thus although the Court recognised that the equidistance method
had the "combination of practical convenience and certainty of
application," these factors were insufficient in themselves:
"... to convert what is a method into a rule of law, making the
acceptance of the results of using that method obligatory in all
cases in which the parties do not agree otherwise, or in which
'special circumstances' cannot be shown to exist."34
Indeed,
	 the Court noted that under certain circumstances, the
equidistance line could produce results which were "extraordinary,
unnatural or unreasonable:" for example, where an equidistance line
magnified a slight coastal irregularity; 3E or, as in the present case,
where the claims of Parties converged so as to shelf-lock the
intervening State, 3	 In these situations, equity demanded that
equidistance not be rigorously applied as the one method of
delimitation, but that various methods be used concurrently, provided
that by applying equitable principles, a reasonable result was arrived
at.	 Equidistance might be an equitable method of delimitation in
certain geographical circumstances,	 but "no single method of
delimitation was likely to prove satisfactory in all circUmstances."7
Perhaps most significantly, the Court found that the idea that
equidistance was inherent in the continental shelf concept was not
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supported either by the Truman Proclamation or in the deliberations of
the I.L.C. The Truman Proclamation - which the I.C.J. held to have "a
special status" as "the starting point of positive law on the
continental shelf," and "as having propounded the rules of law in this
field" 39 - provided that delimitation should be by agreement and in
accordance with equitable principles, two concepts which, in the
Court's view, had "underlain all the subsequent history of the
subject; "3 whilst in the I.L.C., the Court held that equidistance "was
never given any special prominence at all, and certainly no priority,"
either as a mandatory rule or as having a priori character of inherent
necessity.	 Indeed, the Court felt that the I.L.C. had consistently
expressed reservations about the inequity of the rigid application of
an equidistance method of delimitation under certain geographical
conditions.
	 It believed that the Committee of Experts had considered
equidistance to be the most suitable method for the delimitation of
both territorial sea and continental shelf boundaries, despite the fact
that it recognised that in "a number of cases this may not lead to an
equitable solution,"	 because "the experts were actuated by
considerations not of legal theory but of practical convenience and
cartography. ',4,
Thus, the Court concluded that "at no time was the notion of
equidistance as an inherent 	 necessity of continental	 shelf
entertained." That no one single method of delimitation was likely to
prove satisfactory in all circumstances was a fact recognised by the
I.L.C. when it drafted the "special circumstances" exception. However,
even with this exception and the priority accorded agreement, the
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I.C.J. believed that the I.L.C. continued to doubt "whether the
equidistance principle would in all cases prove equitable," and had
therefore proposed it in an "almost impromptu, and certainly contingent
manner," 41	and "with considerable hesitation,	 somewhat on an
experimental basis." 42 Therefore, in the I.C.I.'s view, delimitation
should be carried out by agreement (or by reference to arbitration) and
should be effected according to equitable principles.43
The Court also reached the same conclusion having considered both
positive law and the effect of State practice upon the formation of
international custom.	 The Court found that the Continental Shelf
Convention did not crystallise equidistance as an emergent rule of
customary international law by including it in Article 6, but rather
that the rule was a "purely conventional" one. 44 	Of particular
importance in this respect was that States were permitted to express
reservations to Article 6; the Court decided that any articles to which
reservations could be made could not be regarded as "declaratory of
previously existing or emergent rules of law."46
This was also significant when the Court came to consider whether,
since 1958, equidistance had developed as a customary rule as a result
of State practice.	 The Court considered that to be recognised as a
customary rule, the equidistance provision should be of "norm-creating
character," and be supported by extensive and "virtually Uniform" State
practice, showing "a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation" was involved." Instead, the Court found that Article 6
did not have a norm-creating character, because under its provisions
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the rule of equidistance was only to apply in the absence of agreement,
and was qualified by special circumstances. A7	In addition, in the
Court's view there had not been a widespread or representative
accession to the Convention, sufficient to create the existence of the
acceptance of the equidistance principle as a rule of customary
international law,
As to State practice, the Court found that this was insufficient
to establish equidistance as a rule of law in adjacent State
delimitation concluding that:
... if the Geneva Convention was not in its origins or inception
declaratory of a mandatory rule of customary international law
enjoining the use of the equidistance principle for the
delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent States,
neither has its subsequent effect been constitutive of such a
rule; and that State practice up-to-date has equally been
insufficient for the purpose."As
Instead, the basic principles, which had from the outset reflected
the opinio juris, were that "delimitation must be the object of
agreement between the States concerned, and that such agreement must be
arrived at in accordance with equitable principles," s° which the Court
identified as being:
(i) that parties should enter into "meaningful" negotiations with a
view to reaching an agreement;
(ii) that all circumstances should be taken into account for equitable
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principles to apply, and that "for this purpose the equidistance method
can be used, but other methods exist and may be employed, alone or in
combination, according to the areas involved;" and
(iii) that the continental shelf must be the natural prolongation of
its land territory and must not encroach upon what is the natural
prolongation of the territory of another State.s'
Finally, the Court emphasised that it was necessary "to seek not
one method of delimitation but one goal," s2
 namely that delimitation
should be by agreement in accordance with equitable principles.
Therefore, the method or methods to be used were those which guaranteed
an equitable result.
(d) Delimitation and UNCLOS III 
Although the Court confined its remarks, in the main, to adjacent
States' delimitation, it did make passing references to opposite
States' delimitation, distinguishing between the two situations by
suggesting that a median line delimitation was more appropriate in the
latter.	 Specifically, the Court noted that whereas a lateral
equidistance line often left to one of the States concerned areas that
were a natural prolongation of the territory of the other:
"The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States,
can be claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its
territory.	 These prolongations meet and overlap, and can
therefore only be delimited by means of a median line; and
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ignoring the presence of islets, rocks, and minor coastal
projections, the disproportionately distorting effect of which can
,
be eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal
division of the areas concerned,"6
This is in accord with Article 6(1) of the Continental Shelf
Convention, which makes it clear that equidistance has a presumptive
role in opposite States' delimitation: the boundary "is the median
line" in the absence of agreement or special circumstances. s4 Only in
the absence of agreement or unless another line is justified by special
circumstances, shall the boundary "be determined by the application of
the principle of equidistance."
Nevertheless, following the I.C.J's decision in the North Sea
Cases, the rule of equidistance - qualified by special circumstances -
could no longer be held to apply automatically to the delimitation of
continental shelf boundaries between States, regardless of the
geographical situation.	 Instead, the I.C.J.'s Judgement provided the
genesis for a bitter debate at UNCLOS III concerning the appropriate
legal principles and rules to govern both continental shelf and E.E.Z.
boundary delimitation.
It also brought into focus the question of the virtue of
specifying particular rules or principles in a multilateral treaty such
as a Law of the Sea Convention, where such a convention could at best
only	 enunciate	 very general
	 principles	 of	 delimitation,	 or
alternatively provide peaceful procedures for the settlement of
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disputes.	 Consequently, it was acknowledged at an early point in the
discussions that to attempt to provide specific solutions for every
kind of delimitation problem would simply lead to disputes arising out
of each State's self-interest. E'
	 Thus, some States took the view that
delimitation should be based on a rule allowing for maximum
flexibility, in order to encompass the great diversity of geographical
situations encountered worldwide, ss advocating that:
"Delimitation is by nature a bilateral or limited multilateral
problem, and is therefore, best solved through agreement among the
parties affected."67
However, despite the validity of these observations, the large
majority of States refused to accept that delimitation should succeed
or fail upon the ability to reach agreement.
	 Thus, whilst upholding
agreement as the primary rule of delimitation, they sought to avoid the
creation of a legal vacuum by establishing specific rules by which
courts and tribunals could settle disputes. The problem was what these
rules or principles should be, because after the North Sea Judgement
States were provided with two means by which they could object to the
automatic application of the equidistance principle in the delimitation
of-. their continental shelf boundaries with neighbouring States. 	 The
first was to invoke the special circumstances exception of Article 6 of
the Continental Shelf Convention.	 But as the proof for special
circumstances lay with the claimant State, and because there was no
certainty that such a claim would be upheld if the case went to court,
many States preferred to take the second option, and to uphold the
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general rule of delimitation enunciated by the I.C.I. in 1969: namely,
• nn••
that delimitation should be effected in accordance with equitable
principles, taking account of all the relevant circumstances.	 As a
result, at UNCLOS III, there occurred a major division between a group
of 24 States favouring delimitation on the basis of equidistance
qualified by special circumstances, and a group of 30 States favouring
delimitation on the basis of equitable principles, taking into account
all the relevant circumstances.
Following the North Sea Judgement, the matter was first discussed,
however,	 at the United Nations Seabed Committee, which met prior to
UNCLOS III.	 Sub-Committee II received ten proposals concerning
delimitation, five of which upheld the equidistance principle of the
Geneva Convention. Three proposals supported delimitation on the basis
of equitable principles, whilst China simply provided that delimitation
should be by agreement, and Algeria et al that delimitation should be
carried out in accordance with international law. s8	From these
proposals, Sub-Committee II derived variants which might have formed
the basis of draft articles, but it proved impossible to consider all
of these before UNCLOS III was convened.
	 As a result, the variants
plus the ten proposals were carried over to UNCLOS III, where they were
considered with the new proposals submitted at Caracas in 1974.s9
At UNCLOS III, sixteen proposals were received by the Second
Committee, ten of which favoured delimitation on the basis'of equitable
principles, and six of which supported equidistance. 	 These sixteen
proposals were combined with those submitted to the U.N. Seabed
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Committee to form a document entitled "Main Trends," which contained
textual variants for the delimitation of boundaries for each of the
maritime zones.	 However, with the publication of the Informal Single
Negotiating Text (ISNT) in May 1975, this document was discarded.6°
Article 61 (E.E.Z.) and Article 70 (continental shelf) of the ISNT
- like each of the successive negotiating texts - contained identical
provisions for both E.E.Z. and continental shelf delimitation, but
unlike Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention made no
distinction between opposite and adjacent State boundary situations.
Instead, they repeated attempts to find a compromise between the two
contending legal viewpoints of equidistance and equitable principles,
by accommodating both within the same text.	 Hence, drawing upon the
I.C.S. Judgement in the North Sea Cases, and combining it with Article
6, (omitting the reference to "special circumstances"), Articles 61(1)
and 70(1) read:
"The delimitation of the E.E.Z./continental shelf between adjacent
or opposite States shall be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, the
median or equidistance line, and taking account of all relevant
circumstances."61
Superficially, this compromise text appears to be both logical and
practical. It affirms the view of the I.C.I. that the primary rule of
delimitation is that it be carried out according to equitable
principles, and indicates that equidistance is but one method of
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delimitation to be used in appropriate circumstances, rather than a
principle or rule with universal applicability.
	 Neither group of
States was, however, satisfied with such a compromise.
	 Instead, the
only common opinion was that the articles were unacceptable, and yet
the text remained unchanged in the three successive negotiating texts:
the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) (May 1976), 62 the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (July 1977), 63 and the ICNT/Rev. 1
(April 1979).64
However, this lack of revision did not signify reluctant
acquiescence, but rather it evidenced the difficulty of drafting an
alternative text acceptable to both groups of States. The equidistance
group complained that the equidistance line was characterised in the
articles as a method rather than as a principle of delimitation and,
therefore,	 that the articles gave more weight to equitable
princ1ples; 6s whereas the equitable principles group repudiated the
elevation of equidistance to a principle of law, G6 maintaining that the
equidistance line was only "appropriate" when it was in accordance with
equitable principles. 7	The debates at UNCLOS III were thus
characterised by a division of opinion as to whether the articles under
discussion gave too much, or too little, prominence to the equidistance
method of del1mitation, 69
 so that by the Geneva Session of 1978, the
delimitation of maritime boundaries had become one of seven so-called
"hard-core" issues.
Subsequent discussions took place in Negotiating Group 7 (NG7),
and focussed upon the delimitation articles produced by each of the two
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interest groups, neither of which made reference to the other group's
favoured criterion.
	 The article submitted by the equidistance group
proposed that:
"The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf
between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement
employing, as a general principle, the median or equidistance
line, taking into account any special circumstances where this is
justified."69
In its view, equidistance was more than just a principle of
international law: it was a straightforward standard based on facts
rather than on philosophical notions of equity. Delimitation according
to equitable principles, on the other hand, was vague and subjective,
and necessitated recourse to third-party arbitration.
By contrast, relying upon the Judgements of the I.C.J. in the
North Sea and Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Cases and the Court of
Arbitration in the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977), the equitable
principles group submitted the following article to the effect that
delimitation according to equitable principles adequately represented
the appropriate rule of international law:
"The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [dr continental
shelf] between adjacent and/or opposite States shall be effected
by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles taking into
account all relevant circumstances and employing any methods,
where appropriate, to lead to an equitable solution."70
Explicitly rejecting the use of the equidistance line as an automatic
or mechanical method of delimitation because, in Adede's words, "it
would encourage mechanical injustice," 7 ' the group maintained that
equidistance could not be elevated to the status of a basic principle
of international law.
However, despite their major differences, both groups of States
were agreed that delimitation ought to be effected by agreement, and
that the texts should contain a reference to all the relevant or
special circumstances to be taken into account in the process of
delimitation: the problem remained how to accommodate a reference both
to equitable principles and to the equidistance line, which would
satisfy both groups of States.72
This task fell to Judge Manner, Chairman of NG7, and he produced a
series of proposals aimed at finding a consensus amongst the States
concerned. His first informal proposal attempted to reconcile the two
groups by placing the emphasis upon the achievement of an "equitable
solution," thereby avoiding use of the term "equitable principles."73
However, the equitable principles group complained inter alla that the
reference to the equidistance line gave that method - a privileged
position, and in so doing shifted the burden of proof to the party
seeking to apply equitable principles. The equidistance group, on the
other hand, found the text an unacceptable basis for compromise because
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inter ails the reference to an equitable solution gave pre-eminence to
equitable principles.
Chairman Manner, therefore, produced a second informal proposal,
which both reintroduced the term equitable principles and referred to
equidistance as a principle of delimitation. 74 Predictably, this too
was rejected, so that by the end of the Conference's Eighth Session in
August 1979, the positions of the two groups of States remained largely
unchanged,'" with both groups also maintaining their opposition to the
ICNT text."
Therefore, conceding that the ICNT text did not form a basis for
consensus, Chairman Manner introduced a further text of his own, which
was subsequently included in the second revision of the ICNT (ICNT/Rev.
2, April 1980), despite bitter opposition from the equitable principles
group. 77 The offending text provided that:
"The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement in
conformity with international law. Such an agreement shall be in
accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or
equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all
circumstances prevailing in the area concerned."'"
It was welcomed by the equidistance group, which, believing that
previous negotiating texts had been tilted in favour of equitable
principles, accepted the ICNT/Rev. 2 text as a basis for negotiation."
-491-
However, the equitable principles group refused to accept the new
text as a basis for negotiations, e° although they ultimately continued
in a body called "Consultations on Delimitation," on which sat
representatives of ten States from each of the two opposing groups.
These negotiations focussed on the elements of the problem rather than
on any particular formula, but were no more successful in elicting any
agreement.	 Consequently, the ICNT/Rev. 2 text was retained in the
Draft Convention (Informal Text) of August 1980.91
Yet further unsuccessful negotiations occurred during the
Conference's Tenth Session (9 March-24 April 1981) before a
breakthrough was achieved through the personal intervention of the
President of the Conference, Ambassador Tommy Koh, e2 whose compromise
text was published on 28 August 1981, the last day of the Resumed Tenth
Session:
"1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of rustice, e2 in order to achieve an equitable solution."
The representatives of both Ireland and Spain, leaders of the
respective groups, indicated that this text enjoyed their support,
and this quickly encouraged a number of other States, (e.g Syria), to
voice their approval. On the other hand, a sizeable number of States,
(including Libya, Egypt and Israel), expressed reservations about its
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content (or lack of it),' without preventing it being included in the
formal Draft Convention. Consequently, the President's text appears in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention SS Articles 74(1) (E.E.Z.) and 83(1)
(continental shelf).	 However, its purported relevance to maritime
boundary delimitation is questionable.
Troy argues that although the Convention is not yet in force, "it
has been signed by 159 States and is the best available evidence of
what States accept as the international law applicable to maritime
boundary delimitation."
	 However, whilst this may be so, it is very
poor evidence indeed, for Article 83 of the 1982 Convention is a
"blanket' rule into which any content can be poured not only by the
interested States' direct agreement but also by judicial or arbitral
pronouncement."7
The acceptance of the President's text may have been greeted with
"an observable sigh of relief and a broad satisfaction over the
compromise," 99 but it was not long before the reservations about the
text became an almost universal condemnation of the text as inadequate,
unhelpful and as generating uncertainty where the objective was for
clear, unambiguous legal norms. Indeed, the U.S. representative at the
Conference stated that far from being satisfactory, delegations on both
sides privately viewed the text with embarrassment, whilst commentators
have affirmed his view that the text might introduce confusion into the
law.99
Oxman, for example, states that:
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H ... one might have expected more than a text that says nothing of
significance while, worse still, trying to give a contrary
Impression by introducing unnecessary language and avoiding
recognised terminology associated with the jurisprudence and
scholarship on the subject;"9°
whilst Brown mourns the fact that:
... the international community is now saddled with a formula
which is all that a legal rule should not be - excessively vague
and imprecise and drafted by reference to even more vague and
controversial concepts."'
Elsewhere he is even more forthright in his criticism: the delimitation
articles are described as a "masterpiece of vagueness, a creature of
compromise proposed to enable the Conference to escape from a difficult
negotiating impasse."92
Jagota takes a more positive view, although with some
qualifications:
... the controversy between the equity group and the equidistance
group regarding the appropriate balancing of the basic elements of
delimitation criteria has been resolved by making 6 reference to
the applicable international law combined with the goal of
delimitation, namely an equitable solution.	 In general, the new
formalisation should protect the interests of either group as well
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as any party to a concrete case of delimitation. It may, however,
be contended that this reference to international law and
,
equitable solution is too vague, and that the precise factors to
be taken into account in delimitation and the value or effect to
be given to them have not been specified or clarified.
	 To that
extent, it may be argued that the new proposal would not act as a
practical guide either to negotiators or to teachers or
researchers or even to arbitrators or judges concerned with
delimitation questions.
... however, the solution proposed by President Tommy Koh and
accepted by a large section of the Conference, although not
perfect, is workable."'"
Perhaps the most balanced view, however, is that of Evensen, who
writes:
"Articles 74 and 83 have merits in fulfilling their function as a
compromise formula making no reference to either the equidistance
principle or the equity principle.	 They have, however, become
perhaps so vague that they do not give much guidance to parties in
the drawing up of concrete lines of delimitation. 	 On the other
hand, factual as well as legal and political circumstances vary
fundamentally from case to case. Consequently, flexibility in the
governing legal principles may be a necessity."94
Nevertheless, whatever the views on the text of Articles 74(1) and
83(1), there is no doubt that they represent a compromise between the
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two polar positions expressed at UNCLOS III. -What, however, is their
practical effect?
Ioannou states that the reference to the "equitable solution"
appears to do little more than "refresh memories," for:
"All parties to all agreements try to achieve equitable solutions.
Agreements are by their very nature what is equitable for both."9s
Thus he finds Articles 74 and 83 "redundant or superfluous." 96
 In
similar vein, Rozakis states that the reference to an equitable
solution "blurs the issue of delimitation," because the term is open to
a wide range of interpretations. He, therefore, concludes:
"The concept as presented here is almost useless: being open to
all interpretations it paves the way for the negotiating party to
dispute the delimitation which the other party proposes and,
generally, it allows parties to found their claims on this general
concept; on the other hand, from the moment that a solution is
reached, no one will be able to control whether it was reached on
an equitable basis or not."97
Insofar as individual States are concerned, Venezuela feared that
the absence of delimitation criteria would mean that Articles 74 and 83
would be interpreted like Article 15 concerning the delimitation of
territorial sea boundaries, 99 i.e. that equidistance would be upheld as
the primary rule.
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Other States, however, took the opposite view: for example,
Romania accepted the compromise formula, "on the understanding that the
basic factors should be agreement between the States concerned and
equitable pr1nciples," 99 whilst Algeria stated that:
"The effect of the reference to international law as referred to
in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
was to give pre-eminence to the principles of equity, something
which was logical and natural in order to achieve the 'equitable
solution' expressly mentioned in articles 74 and 83."100
Similarly, on signing the 1982 Convention, Ireland, leader of the
equitable principles group, stated that it was satisfied that:
“	 the relevant principles of international law thus referred to
[Article 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J.3 are as identified by the
International Court of Justice in its decision on the North Sea
cases in 1969 and as confirmed by subsequent judicial and arbitral
decisions. "'°
In other words, Ireland interpreted Articles 74 and 83 as upholding
delimitation according to equitable principles.
Therefore, it is clear that the acceptance of Articles 74 and 83
has had absolutely no effect on the individual positions expressed by
States at UNCLOS III. 	 As the statements of Romania and Algeria show,
States will continue to interpret these articles in a manner
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corresponding to their negotiating position at UNCLOS III, a point that
was raised in the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Boundary Case. Herein,
Judges Ruda, BedJaoui, and de Arechaga observed that the formula
contained within Article 83 was "as uninstructive as it is all-
embracing," 02 whilst the I.C.J. itself stated that:
"The Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as to
the method to be followed to achieve it.	 It restricts itself to
setting a standard, and it is left to the States themselves, or to
the courts, to endow this standard with specific content."103
However, the fact that Article 83 omitted "any indication of a
specific criterion which could give guidance" is nothing more than
could be expected, given that neither group of contending States sought
to accommodate the other's view in a convention based on consensus and
compromise.	 Instead, the texts of the delimitation articles underwent
several revisions without either side displaying a willingness to make
concessions to the other.	 That this was so is perfectly
understandable: the intransigent positions adopted by each group
reflected the effects an obligatory rule of equidistance would have for
each individual State in the delimitation of its maritime boundaries.
Thus, in general terms, those States which stood to lose large or
significant areas of sea or seabed through the application of
equidistance to a particular boundary situation, favoured delimitation
on the basis of equitable principles. On the other hand, those States
for whom delimitation by means of equidistance was seemingly
unproblematic or geographically advantageous, supported the retention
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of the Article 6 rule of equidistance. Consequently, the outcome could
,
only be a vague provision capable of interpretation according to self-
interest.
(e) The Contribution of Mediterranean States to the Delimitation Debate 
at UNCLOS III 
The views of Mediterranean States as to the appropriate rules of
maritime boundary delimitation are discussed in relation to each
State's national legislation in the succeeding chapter, but it is
appropriate here to examine the contribution made by Mediterranean
States to the delimitation debate at UNCLOS III.
Table 15 shows that thirteen of the Mediterranean's States played
a significant part in the delimitation debate at UNCLOS III: six States
co-sponsored the formula proposed by the equitable principles group,
and seven others were members of the group of States which supported
the equidistance principle.
	 Indeed, Spain was the leader of the
latter.
	 However, even before UNCLOS III was convened, certain
Mediterranean States had placed proposals on the delimitation of
maritime boundaries before the U.N. Seabed Committee, which met between
1971 and 1973.
The Greek, Cypriot and Maltese proposals all emphasised the
equidistance principle embodied in the relevant Geneva Conventions,'"
but Turkey preferred to stress equitable principles, although it made
the significant qualification that:
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Table 15 - Mediterranean States' Membership of the Groups of States 
Supporting Delimitation by Means of Equidistance 
or Equitable Principles 
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"In the absence of special circumstances, due regard should be
given to the principles of median line or equidistance in
delimitation of respective boundaries. "105
In addition, Algeria and Tunisia were co-sponsors of an article
submitted by fourteen African States, which stated that:
"The delimitation of the economic zone between adjacent and
opposite States shall be carried out in accordance with
international law. Disputes arising therefrom shall be settled in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and any other
relevant regional arrangements. "1°6
The similarity between this rather simplistic and non-specific
provision with that finally adopted by the international community is
striking.
Consequently, Mediterranean States were already playing an active
part in the delimitation debate by the time UNCLOS III opened in
December 1973, where the above proposals were amongst those carried
over to UNCLOS III and discussed in the Second Committee.	 This
received sixteen proposals relating to delimitation, several of which
were from Mediterranean States.	 Three from Greece advocated
equidistance,	 although	 omitting	 any	 reference	 to	 "special
circumstances,"'" whilst an equal number from Turkey emphasised
equitable principles. For example, Turkey provided that:
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"2. In the course of negotiations, the States shall take into
•n••
account all the relevant factors, including, inter alia, the
geomorphological and geological structure of the shelf up to the
outer limit of the continental margin, and special circumstances
such as the general configuration of the respective coasts, the
existence of islands, islets or rocks of one State on the
continental shelf of the other.
Where the coasts of two or more States are adjacent or opposite to
each other, the delimitation of the respective economic zones
shall be determined by agreement among them in accordance with
equitable principles taking into account all the relevant factors
including,	 inter alla,	 of the certain circumstances,	 the
geomorphological and geological structure of the sea-bed involved,
and special circumstances such as the general configuration of the
respective coasts, and the existence of islands, islets or rocks
within the area."'"
In addition, Algeria, France and Tunisia (in combination with
Kenya) submitted strikingly similar proposals supporting equitable
principles, "the median or equidistance line not being necessarily the
only method of delimitation."'"
The subsequent agreement to accept the compromise formula of
Article 74(1) appears to have placated the majority of Mediterranean
States, for only two reacted by issuing immediate public statements.
Mention has already been made of the Algerian reaction, with the only
other Mediterranean State to express a view being Turkey, whose
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representative stated (with direct applicability to the Aegean
situation) that:
"With regard to articles 74 and 83 of the draft Convention, ...,
Turkey was not bound by any convention or agreement and no
international custom in the matter could be invoked as binding
international rules in respect of Turkey. His country's view was
that those issues in	 [serai]-enclosed seas could only be
settled by agreements reached directly between the parties
concerned on the basis of equity, and it therefore maintained its
right to formulate reservations 	 on articles 74 and 83.""°
However, Article 309 of the draft Convention expressly forbade
States from issuing reservations to Articles 74 and 83. 	 Turkey,
therefore, attempted to have Article 309 deleted, 111 and to allow
States to make reservations "compatible with the aim and object of the
future Convention," noting that:
"...the general principles expressed in the draft Convention gave
little scope in certain cases for resolving individual problems,
which might assume alarming dimensions, perhaps even on the level
of international relations world-wide.
	 Some of those principles,
for example, were not at all likely to lead to equitable solutions
in the cases of smaller seas.""2
Accordingly, in the absence of a consensus on this point, Turkey
pressed for a vote on its amendment, but this was heavily defeated. "2
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Consequently, Turkey voted against adoption of the draft Convention,
explaining that the defeat of its amendment did not allow it to deal
with the difficulties which it had with some of the Convention's
provisions	 which	 Jeopardised	 Turkey's	 vital	 and	 legitimate
interests. "4
Nevertheless, Turkey observed that Articles 74 and 83 were:
11 ... the result of prolonged negotiations and reflect a compromise
between the divergent positions of the States. 	 As such they
should be interpreted in the light of developments in
international law with regard to the delimitation of the
continental shelf or economic zone.""s
In this respect, relying on the dicta of the I.C.J. in the Tunisia-
Libya Continental Shelf Case, Turkey added that it was clear:
u ... that the term 'equitable solution' in articles 74 and 83
comprises the idea of applying equitable principles by taking into
account all relevant circumstance with a view to achieving an
equitable result. "1
Moreover, the phrase "on the basis of international law, as referred to
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice" did
not, in Turkey's opinion, "have a different connotation from the
concepts of 'equitable principles' or 'equitable solution.'" 117 Thus,
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relying on past judicial practice, Turkey held that this phrase did not
change the fact that in delimitation, equity was the rule of law:
"On the other hand, the reference to international law does not
leave the door open to introducing the equidistance method or to
the median-line method as a rule of international law, nor does it
lead to a presumption in favour of equidistance or median line in
relation to other methods. ""e
The delimitation of the E.E.Z. and continental shelf in semi-enclosed
seas could only be settled "through agreements to be reached directly
between the parties concerned on the basis of equity.""e
6.4 Continental Shelf Boundary Delimitation in the Mediterranean Sea 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the main controversy in
continental shelf boundary delimitation concerns the applicable
principles of international law.	 Two sets of rules govern the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between States: those of
conventional and customary international law. 	 Conventional rules are
binding upon States only where each of the States involved in the
delimitation is party to the relevant convention.	 Hence, parties to
the Continental Shelf Convention are bound to apply the rules of
Article 6. Where, however, one or more States have not expressed a
willingness to be bound by conventional rules, then the delimitation is
to be decided upon customary international law, the rules of which are
derived from State practice and judicial decisions.
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In this respect, the emphasis upon equitable principles in the
Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf has been extensively
followed in State practice, and been given pride of place in the
evolution of the rules of maritime boundary delimitation. 120	 As a
result, it has come to be accepted as expressing the customary
international law on continental shelf boundary delimitation.
However, whether under conventional or customary international
law, the primary rule of continental shelf boundary delimitation is
agreement, whereby the boundary may follow any course decided upon by
the Parties, using any one method, or combination of methods, they
wish. Thus, it is not surprising that an analysis of continental shelf
boundary agreements worldwide shows that a variety of delimitation
methods have been employed in boundary agreements.	 Some States have
adopted median or equidistance line delimitations, whether true or
simpified; whilst others have adopted equidistance-based delimitations
modified to take account of special circumstances in the boundary
region. Other States have adopted negotiated boundary lines, including
parallels of latitude or meridians of longitude; 121 or boundaries
partly constructed on proportionality calculations based on the lengths
of the relevant coasts, such as in the 1974 agreement between France
and Spain in the Bay of Biscay. In addition, some States have agreed
not to agree upon a boundary separating their respective continental
shelves, but have preferred to establish a zone of jOint economic
exploitation. 122
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Of the four negotiated continental shelf boundary agreements in
the Mediterranean all have been decided on the basis of customary
'
international law, with one or more of the States concerned not being a
party to the Continental Shelf Convention.	 Moreover, only the
agreement between Italy and Greece has not had as one of its main foci,
the effect of islands in continental shelf boundary delimitation.
Therefore, before considering these continental shelf boundary
agreements, it is important to consider both the entitlement of islands
to a continental shelf, and the delimitation effect of islands upon
continental shelf boundaries between neighbouring States.
(a) Islands and Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
(1) Under the Territorial Sea Convention 
Under Article 10 of the Territorial Sea Convention, an island "is
a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide," which is entitled to its own territorial sea.
This definition,	 therefore,	 expressly excludes both artificial
installations and low-tide elevations from being islands in the legal
sense. 123 However, because there is no mention of any minimum size
requirement, any "rock" which is above water at high tide qualifies as
an "island" entitled to its own territorial sea. Likewise, there is no
requirement that an island be capable of effective occupation or
habitation, Lauterpacht's attempt to introduce this requirement during
the I.L.C. debates having been rebutted by Francois, who noted that
"any rock could be used as a radio station or a weather observation
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post" and that "in that sense, all rocks were capable of effective
occupation and control,
(ii) Under the Continental Shelf Convention 
Under the Continental Shelf Convention, the definition of an
island is assumed, in the absence of specific guidance, to be the same
as that for territorial sea purposes. 12s Insofar as entitlement is
concerned, the I.L.C. stated that the term "continental shelf" was also
applicable to the submarine areas contiguous to islands, 12 and this
was confirmed by Article 1(b) of the Continental Shelf Convention,
which made it clear that islands are as entitled to a continental shelf
as continental land masses.
Article 1(b) also reflects the customary international law on
island entitlement. 	 In the North Sea Cases, the I.C.J. upheld Article
1 as reflecting or crystallising "received or at least emergent rules
of customary international law," based on the Court's view that a
coastal State had an inherent right to the shelf which lay in front of
its coastline, arising from the physical fact of its existence as the
natural prolongation of the landmass. 127 Thus States, whether parties
or non-parties to the Continental Shelf Convention, and whether "island
States," or "continental" States with offshore islands, have asserted
rights to a continental shelf for islands.12s
However, the fact that the Continental Shelf Convention did not
distinguish between islands and continental land masses with respect to
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continental shelf jurisdiction, meant that potentially every island,
irrespective of its size, location, habitability, or political status,
,
was entitled to a continental shelf extending to a depth of 200 metres,
or beyond that isobath where exploitation of the shelf's resources was
possible.	 This provision had two major effects. Firstly, it focussed
attention upon all types of islands as potential generators of large
areas of maritime jurisdiction, and in so doing multiplied or
exacerbated disputes concerning the sovereignty of particular
islands; 129 and, secondly, where equidistance was upheld as the
preferred method of delimitation, the fact that use of certain
advantageously located islands could be used as basepoints in the
generation of a continental shelf, complicated boundary negotiations.
At UNCLOS I, both Italy and Iran made proposals which would give
islands no effect in continental shelf boundary delimitation in the
"special case" of islands on a continuous continental shelf.
	 Italy,
mindful of the effect of offshore islands on its boundary delimitations
with Yugoslavia and Tunisia, proposed that:
"Where in the proximity of the coasts which are opposite to each
other there are other islands belonging to the said continuous
continental shelf, in the absence of agreement, the boundary is
the median line every point of which is equidistant from the low-
water line along the coast of the said States, unless some other
method of drawing the said median line is justified by special
circumstances."
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Similarly, Iran proposed that islands should be ignored for the
purposes of delimiting a median line boundary
"Where an island or islands exist in a region which constitutes a
continuous continental shelf, the boundary shall be the median
line and shall be measured from the low-water mark along the
coasts of the countries concerned, provided, however, that where
special circumstances so warrant, the median line shall be
measured from the high-water mark along the coastline of the
countries concerned. "'s'
But both proposals were heavily defeated, with the result that the
Continental Shelf Convention contained no special rules pertaining to
islands in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between
States."'
However, Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention provided
that, in the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line was
Justified by "special circumstances," the equidistance/median line
would form the boundary between the respective continental shelves of
two or more States. In its commentary on this article, the I.L.C.
referred to "any exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as the
presence of Islands or of navigable channels" as being amongst those
exceptional "special circumstances" that might Justify a departure from
the equidistance line, 1:33 whilst Francois particularly instanced "where
a small island group opposite one State belonged to another." 134 Thus,
it is clear that although the "special circumstances" concept was not
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confined exclusively to islands, they were clearly envisaged as being
covered by the exception; but it is also evident that not all islands
were to be regarded as "special circumstances," for to do so would
render meaningless the general rule of equidistance, and damage the
inherent right of an island to its own continental shelf.138
There are, therefore, three methods of dealing with islands in
continental shelf boundary delimitation under Article 6.' 38 Firstly,
islands may be discounted completely, and an equidistance line drawn
between the mainland coasts, although O'Connell argues that this:
"I ... would annul the basic distinction between apportionment and
delimitation; islands cannot be deprived of their entitlement to
continental shelves merely because their presence gives rise to a
question of boundary making.
	 That is a process of delimitation,
and not one of determining whether islands generate continental
shelf rights."137
Alternatively, an equidistance line may be drawn giving full effect to
islands.	 However, this may be thought to be creative of inequity in
many geographical circumstances.
Finally, islands may be regarded as "special circumstances," their
effect upon the delimitation being dependent upon one or S'everal of the
following factors: size, location, population, political status and
economic significance.	 For example, at UNCLOS I, Kennedy, the U.K.
delegate at UNCLOS I, recommended that:
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... for purposes of drawing a [continental shelf] boundary,
islands should be treated on their merits, very small islands or
sand cays on a continuous continental shelf and outside the belts
of the territorial sea being neglected as base-points for
measurement and having only their own appropriate territorial
sea."39
Ely, on the other hand, suggested that islets that were denied
recognition as basepoints because of the inequitable effect they had on
a boundary delimitation, should nevertheless receive a continental
shelf area coterminous with the then 12 mile contiguous zone, where
they had a substantial population, or economic, historical, cultural or
social importance. '9
However, O'Connell makes it clear that it is neither size nor
location nor any other island characteristic which makes an island a
special circumstance, but rather it is whether the attribution of full
effect is equitable in the light of all the relevant circumstances. '4°
Thus the question is not how much shelf an island is entitled to -
because, as the Continental Shelf Convention makes clear, the
entitlement of islands to a continental shelf is absolute, irrespective
of size or location - but rather, what are the equitable limits to that
entitlement in light of the relevant circumstances pertaining to a
delimitation.
In this respect, Bowett suggests that the deliberations of the
I.L.C. and the debates in the Fourth Committee of UNCLOS I, appeared to
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contemplate that small islands might not be given full effect in an
equidistance/median line delimitation; instead, they might either be
ignored or given a lesser effect "so as to avoid an excessively-
complicated median line, with a concession on one side being
compensated for wherever possible by an equal concession on the
other." 141
	Such a modification was not to be automatic, but could
only occur where a State could demonstrate that a departure from the
general rule of equidistance was justified by special circumstances,
i.e.	 where it was considered that strict application of the
equidistance line would have inequitable effects, 142 for, as the Court
of Arbitration put it in 1977:
"... the role of the 'special circumstances' condition in Article
6 is to ensure an equitable delimitation."'43
Thus, where dependent islands belonging to one State have been so
geographically located vis-à-vis a neighbouring State as to influence
the likely course of the boundary to be delimited - by enabling the
favourably endowed State to be able to lay claim to a larger area of
seabed than if the equidistance line were delimited from its mainland
coast - they have been generally regarded as falling under the "special
circumstances" provision of Article 6. 	 Consequently, the entitlement
of these islands to a full continental shelf has been subordinated to
the supposed inequity of according them such treatment; in order to
justify their being given either reduced continental shelf areas, or
less than full weight in the delimitation, the use of either option
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depending primarily upon their location with respect to the coasts of
the delimiting parties.
Against this background, the practice of Mediterranean States
must, therefore, be viewed as contributing to this interpretation of
the special circumstances provision of Article 6, notwithstanding that
this Article was inapplicable to any of the boundary delimitations
discussed below.
(b) Mediterranean Continental Shelf Boundary Agreements 
(i) Italy-Yugoslavia 
The continental shelf boundary agreement between Italy and
Yugoslavia was signed on 8 January 1968, and came into effect on 21
January 1970.	 Only Yugoslavia is a party to the Continental Shelf
Convention, thus the agreement was concluded on the basis of customary
international law.
Italy and Yugoslavia are adjacent States, in that they share a
common land boundary, but their continental shelf boundary is
throughout its length a boundary between geographically opposite States
(Figure 23).	 Boundary negotiations were complicated by the Yugoslav
islands of Jabuka, Pelagruz and Kajola, and the Italfan island of
Pianosa, all distant from their respective mainland coasts, and in the
case of certain of the Yugoslav islands, on or near the median line
between the two States. If all of these islands had been used as
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Agreed boundary
Median line from mainlands
Median line from islands
Figure 23 - The Italy-Yugoslavia continental shelf boundary.
Source: G. Francalanci Aspetti e problemi tecnici del nuovo diritto del 
mare 1958-1982 (3rd Edition). (AGIP Geodesia Cartografia
Fotointerpretazione, 1984)
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basepoints for continental shelf delimitation, 	 a median line
delimitation would have favoured Yugoslavia. 	 Instead, using the
terminology of Article 6 of the	 Continental Shelf Convention, these
islands appear to have been treated as "special circumstances"
necessitating	 a	 deviation
	 from the	 true	 equidistance	 line,
notwithstanding that neither State is a party to the Continental Shelf
Convention.	 Indeed, at UNCLOS I, Yugoslavia had twice proposed an
amendment to delete the reference to "special circumstances," 144 and,
in ratifying the Continental Shelf Convention, had issued a reservation
to the effect that it recognised no special circumstances which should
influence the delimitation of its continental shelf.'As
Nevertheless, by mutual consent, the islands of Jabuka and Pianosa
were given limited effect for delimitation purposes. A median line was
drawn between the two States' baselines, 14 	 ignoring the Italian
Tremeti islands, but deflected to take account of the Yugoslav islands
of Pelagruz and KaJola lying midway across the Adriatic Sea. These two
islands were granted twelve mile enclaves of seabed Jurisdiction
attached to the Yugoslavian shelf,(i.e. semi-enclaves), but on the
Italian side of a median line ignoring the islands, a concession which,
strictly speaking, was equivalent in legal terms to 10 miles of
territorial sea - the claim of Yugoslavia at that time - and two miles
of continental shelf.'47
Arangio-Ruiz suggests that the Italian island of Pianosa was
ignored in compensation for the limited effect given to Pelagruz."9
However, Bowett noted that by giving only slight effect to AndriJa and
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Jabuka, Yugoslavia conceded 1 680 square kildmetres of seabed, plus
1 400 square kilometres around Pelagruz and KaJola, whilst the Italians
only conceded 416 square kilometres on account of Pianosa: Hence, the
ratio of the concession was 7.4:1 in favour of Italy, which he regarded
as compensation for Yugoslavia's extensive use of offshore islands in
its straight baseline system. 149 This fact would, however, appear to
be irrelevant to the delimitation, but if taken into account, would
further emphasise the importance of boundary delimitation by agreement,
which this particular delimitation displays.
In this context, another interesting aspect of the agreement is
whether, under the continental shelf law of the time, the two States
were entitled to divide up the Adriatic seabed between them. According
to Judge Ammoun, because the average depth of the Adriatic is 800
metres, with a maximum depth of 1 589 metres, the parties divided a
continental shelf which lay beyond both the 200 metre isobath and the
then limit of exploitability. iso	 However, Sambrailo disagrees. 	 He
holds that the average depth of the whole Sea is 251 metres, with the
deepest areas (up to 1 233 metres) lying in the southern Adriatic, into
which the boundary between the two States did not encroach. Moreover,
in his view, the boundary did not aver from the 200 metre isobath,
although this claim is unsubstantiated.161
(ii) Italy-Tunisia 
A continental shelf boundary agreement between Italy and Tunisia
was signed on 28 August 1971, and entered into force on 6 December
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1978, 	 It was decided on the basis of customary international law,
neither State being a party to the Continental Shelf Convention,
although Brown states that the agreement is "a classic example of the
application of Article 6.' 11 " Like the aforementioned Italy-Yugoslavia
boundary, it was complicated by islands on or near the median line
between the two States in the Sicilian Channel; and, as in that
agreement, the solution to this problem was semi-enclaves combined with
a median line (Figure 24).
Proceeding westwards, the first segment of the boundary is a
median line between the Tunisian and Sardinian baselines, which
surprisingly gives full effect to the small Tunisian island of La
Galite.' sd	It lies well beyond Tunisia's territorial sea limit, and
although under both conventional and customary international law
islands are entitled to a continental shelf of their own, irrespective
of their size and location, it would not have been unusual for La
Galite to have been given less than full weight in the delimitation of
the continental shelf boundary.
In the Sicilian Channel, Italy had the advantage of offshore
islands, an advantage which Yugoslavia possessed with its islands in
the Adriatic Sea, but:
"Happily Italy has shown itself as generous towards Tunisia as






Figure 24 - The Italy-Tunisia continental shelf boundary.
Source: G. Francalanci Aspetti e problemi tecnici del nuovo diritto del 
mare 1958-1982 (3rd Edition). (AGIP Geodesia Cartografia
Fotointerpretazione, 1984)
The continental shelf boundary agreed upon generally follows a median
line between the baselines of the respective mainland coasts, except in
the vicinity of the four Italian islands of Pantellaria, Lampione,
Lampedusa and Linosa, which lie on or near the median line drawn
between mainlands.' ss Under the terms of the agreement, each of these
islands with the exception of Lampione was allocated a 13 mile enclave
attached to the main Sicilian shelf, 1S7
Several authors have commented that given an Italian territorial
sea of 12 miles, this amounted at most to a grant of but 1 mile of
continental shelf jurisdiction, of symbolic rather than practical
value, whilst Lampione was given only a 12 mile belt of jurisdiction,
and thus no continental shelf area at all. ' se However, whilst this is
true in relation to the date of ratification in 1978, it should be
remembered that at the time the agreement was signed Italy's
territorial sea claim was only 6 miles, a claim which was not extended
until 1974.	 Thus, the original agreement gave effect to both Italy's
territorial sea claim and its 12 mile contiguous zone in respect of the
islands.
Hodgson, nevertheless, attempted (inconclusively) to relate this
attribution of shelf rights to some relationship based upon the
islands' relative distances from the Italian and Tunisian coasts, 's
but fortunately Moussa provides a Tunisian account of the boundary
negotiations' s° which sheds light on the matter; and as it is highly
unusual for the details of the negotiations of an agreed boundary
settlement to be made public, they deserve complete coverage here.
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Initially, the negotiations focussed on two differences of
opinion.	 The first concerned the seabed area to be delimited; the
second, the right of the Pelagie Islands to full continental shelf
rights. Insofar as the delimitation area was concerned, Italy was only
willing to accept that a State might exercise continental shelf rights
up to the 200 metre isobath,	 rather than to the limit of
exploitability.	 This was despite the fact that the dual criterion of
the 200 metre isobath and the limit of exploitability found in Article
1 of the Continental Shelf Convention had been adopted by Italy in its
own domestic continental shelf legislation. 1 	It was also in
contradiction both of Italian exploration of its continental shelf in
water depths of 350 metres, and of the 1968 continental shelf boundary
agreement with Yugoslavia, which traversed depths of over 1 200 metres.
Not surprisingly, Tunisia refused to limit the delimitation area in
this way.
With respect to the Pelagie Islands, Italy accepted that they lay
on the African continental shelf, but concentrated on their right to a
continental shelf.	 Tunisia, however, denied the Islands should have
full continental shelf rights, as this would lead to an inequitable
result.	 Referring to Italy's continental shelf agreement with
Yugoslavia as a precedent, it held the Islands were "special
circumstances" under Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention, and refused to accept Italy's strict advoCation of the
equidistance principle:
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n ... the existence of three islets, one of which is uninhabited,
on the African continental shelf, the natural prolongation of
Tunisian territory under the sea, constitutes a peculiarity which
would, in the event of delimitation based on the criterion of
equidistance, result in a disproportionate deviation."62
Instead, Tunisia proposed a delimitation in which the Italian islands
were to be given 12 mile enclaves.
Therefore, Italy, recognising that the
with respect to the applicable law, advocated
solution, independent of all legal arguments.
to a strict median line boundary, and proposed
States were poles apart
researching a pragmatic
It renounced its claim
instead that the Pelagie
Islands should have 24 miles of territorial sea and a further 6 miles
of contiguous zone, (i.e. a 30 mile zone in all), pointing out that it
would be conceding 60 per cent of what would be defined as the
contested zone under a median line solution. Tunisia quickly rejected
this proposal, and asked Italy to consider the effect upon the area of
Italian continental shelf, if Tunisia were to increase her territorial
waters and contiguous zone to 30 nautical miles.	 It was willing to
recognise the entitlement of the Islands to a territorial sea and
continental shelf under international law, but was only prepared to
recognise a 12 mile territorial sea for the Islands, making reference
to the fisheries agreement between the two States, which fixed the
territorial sea at 6 miles and the contiguous zone at a further 6
miles.
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Italy did not accept such a solution so Tunisia took the
initiative of bringing forward the signature of its fisheries agreement
with Italy, which was due to expire in February 1971.	 This clearly
brought sufficient pressure to bear on Italy to settle the continental
shelf dispute, the continental shelf agreement being signed ten days
prior to the fisheries agreement in August of 1971.
Moussa comments that Tunisia was delighted with the continental
shelf agreement, as it had managed to secure a settlement that was
almost identical to the one it had proposed, and which Italy had
earlier rejected. 16.3 On the other hand, it would appear that Italy
settled the continental shelf dispute in such a "generous" manner,
simply to avoid any problems in renewing its fisheries agreement with
Tunisia, a conclusion that may be drawn from Italy's tardiness in
ratifying the continental shelf agreement, which finally occurred in
1978.'64
Several Italian commentators have been critical of this boundary
agreement, which was described by one as Italy's "most serious
diplomatic defeat since the end of the second world war." Arangio-
Ruiz, for example, suggests that although the four enclaved Italian
islands lie on "the wrong side of the median line" between the two
States' mainlands, the size of Pantellaria and the fact that the island
lies nearer to this median line than to Tunisia, justified:
"... if not the displacement of part of the [boundary] segment [in
this area]	 at least the fusion, by means of a straight tangent
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between the two semi-circles, of the shelves of the four islands
(Pantellaria on one side and the Pelagian on the other)."le's
He	 concludes,	 however,	 that	 weak	 negotiating	 or	 "political
considerations led to the acceptance of a less than balanced
solution...166
(iii) Italy-Greece 
On 12 November 1980, the continental shelf agreement signed by
Italy and Greece on 24 May 1977, entered into force. Despite the fact
that the delimitation was decided on the basis of customary
international law, only Greece being a party to the Continental Shelf
Convention, the agreement expressly refers to the application of the
median line principle.
	 It is, therefore, not surprising that the
delimited boundary evidences no major or significant departures from
the median line (Figure 25), although the "alternative concavities and
convexities of the respective coasts have been obviously compensated
[for] between the Parties." 167
	Alexander also suggests that only
partial effect was accorded to the Greek islands of Orthonoi and Nisi
Stamfani,	 to the north and south of the delimitation area,
respectively.16°
Significantly, like the aforementioned Italy-Tunisia agreement,
Italy and Greece had no reservations in delimiting a continental shelf
boundary through an area with water depths beyond both the 200 metre
isobath	 and the limits of current exploitation techniques, and
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Figure 25 - The Italy-Greece continental shelf boundary.
Source: G. Marston "Extension and Delimitation of National Sea
Boundaries in the Mediterranean" in G. Luciani (Ed.) The Mediterranean 
Region: Economic Interdependence and the Future of Society (sic.], pp.
75-125, at p. 110.	 (London and Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1984)
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therefore, beyond the outer continental shelf limit at the time,	 as
defined in conventional international law and the States' respective
legislation.	 Thus, the delimitation of the seabed of the Ionian
Abyssal Basin, irrespective of the fact that it reaches depths of
between two and four thousand metres, is an early indication that
between opposite States less than 400 miles apart, distance rather than
natural prolongation	 was the recognised basis of	 continental
shelf title justifying a delimitation beyond the physical limits of
each State's natural prolongation.169
(iv) Italy-Spain 
After two rounds of negotiations, 17c, Italy and Spain concluded an
agreement defining their respective continental shelves between
Sardinia and Majorca on 19 February 1974, 17 ' which entered into force
on 16 November 1978. As in the agreement between Italy and Greece, so
this agreement makes specific reference to the median line as the
applicable principle, despite the fact that only Spain is a party to
the Continental Shelf Convention and, 	 therefore,	 the boundary
delimitation was to be decided upon customary international law.
Of note is the fact that the delimitation was between dependent
islands, both of which were accorded full weight in the delimitation
(Figure 26).	 Moreover, as in the Italy-Greece agreement, the whole
seabed is divided between the States, irrespective of the bathymetry of
the region.
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Figure 26 - The Italy-Spain continental shelf boundary.
Source: G. Marston "Extension and Delimitation of National Sea
Boundaries in the Mediterranean" in G. Luciani (Ed.) The Mediterranean 
Region: Economic Interdependence and the Future of Society [sic.], pp.
75-125, at p. 108. (London and Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1984)
(v) Libya-Malta 
In addition to the four boundary agreements involving Italy, on 10
November 1986, Libya and Malta signed an agreement putting into effect
the I.C.J.'s Judgement in their continental shelf case. 172	This
entered into force on 14 December 1987.
The means by which this boundary was delimited is given detailed
consideration in the next chapter.
(vi) France-Monaco 
Although strictly not a continental shelf boundary, mention should
also be made of the maritime boundary agreement between France and
Monaco, which entered into force on 22 August 1985.
	
By Article 2 of
the agreement of 16 February 1984, "the limits of the maritime areas"
(believed to include both seabed and superJacent waters) appertaining
to Monaco were defined in such a way as to give Monaco a sliver of
maritime jurisdiction of its coast, largely for fisheries purposes
(Figure 27),172
6.5 Conclusions 
Of the five purely continental shelf boundary agreements in the
Mediterranean, Italy is a party to four, and is, therefore, to be
commended for its initiative in the potentially long process of
delimiting
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Figure 27 - The France-Monaco maritime boundaries.
Source: Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 90 (1986), pp.
308-311, at p. 311.
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relatively speedy and perhaps pragmatic use of the equidistance method
to settle its continental shelf boundaries has not occurred without
criticism, in particular, because as a non-party to the Continental
Shelf Convention, Italy has been under no obligation to negotiate, yet
alone to delimit, its boundaries on this basis. Thus, discussing these
agreements, Arangio-Ruiz comments:
"I do have the distinct impression - and I refer to more data than
just the texts of the agreements - that Italian negotiators have
not been as resolute, steady and timely as the cause of their
Country would, in my opinion, have required them to be. This was
due, I think, to the scarce attention paid to matters of
delimitation, not by technicians and diplomats, but T with one
felicitous exception - by our political leaders; not to mention
the media and the general public."'74
He, therefore, concludes that in the future "they should do better when
confronted with unjustified claims from the other side. ""s
These concerns were also echoed by certain members of the Italian
Parliament, afraid, in particular, that the delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary with Tunisia would have negative
repurcussions for Italian fishermen when it came to the future
delimitation of the E.E.Z. boundary, based on the assumption that the
two boundaries will coincide.' 76
 However, with Italy's support for the
equidistance method at UNCLOS III, and its de facto continental shelf
median line delimitation with Malta, it seems highly unlikely that
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Italy is about to change its tack and become aggressive in its boundary
claims, and in so doing jeopardise its success as a peaceful negotiator
in a turbulent region. Indeed, responding to criticism of the boundary
agreement with Tunisia, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated
that:
"... it will always be the agreement between the parties concerned
which constitutes the ideal solution to the problem."177
It is,	 therefore,	 in this respect that one should view the
delimitations that have taken place so far: the method of delimitation
is, in many ways, irrelevant, for under both conventional and customary
international law agreement is the primary rule of delimitation.
Insofar as the agreements themselves are concerned, these are
important in two other respects. Firstly, each makes special provision
for natural resources which straddle the boundary line: the parties are
to work together, after consulting the concession holders, with the aim
of reaching agreement on the manner in which the deposits are to be
exploited. "9	 (A similar provision is found in the Libya-Malta
agreement.)
	 Secondly, the States concerned have been careful not to
delimit boundaries which might impinge on seabed areas belonging to
neighbouring third States.
The latter is particularly significant, because the piecemeal
bilateral delimitation process could allow States to impinge on areas
which might be the subject of legitimate third State claims. Thus, the
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terminal point of the Italy-Yugoslavia boundary, 	 for example,
terminates around the latitude of the Albania/Yugoslavia land boundary.
Likewise, the agreement between Italy and Greece allows for the median
line between the two States to be extended to tripoints to be agreed
with Albania to the north and Libya to the south. 179	 In the same way,
the western terminus of the Italy-Tunisia boundary will, at some time
in the future, be extended to a point to be agreed with Spain and
Algeria, whilst to the east it will eventually join up with the
terminus of the Tunisia-Libya boundary. The Italy-Spain boundary will
be prolonged to a tripoint with France to the north, and to its south
to a point to be agreed with Algeria (and possibly Tunisia).
However, the fact remains that despite these agreements much still
remains to be done if the Mediterranean is to be divided between its
littoral States.	 In this respect, from the above discussion, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that in terms of providing guidance
to States wishing to negotiate their continental shelf and E.E.Z.
boundaries, Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 Convention are virtually
meaningless and of no practical consequence whatsoever. 	 Indeed, the
fact that no continental shelf boundary has been delimited in the
Mediterranean in the post-Convention period without the need for
arbitration	 may	 reflect	 the	 elements	 of	 uncertainty	 and
unpredictability contained therein.
Consequently, in the absence of specific legal rules to govern the
delimitation of continental shelf or E.E.Z. boundaries, disputes
between States having opposing views on the appropriate means of
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effecting an "equitable solution" will remain, and as Jagota suggests,
se.
the reference to Article 38 of the I.C.J.'s Statute will place a
greater reliance on international custom as evidence of a general
principle accepted as law. 19°	 It should also mean that disputing
States, unable to agree upon their maritime boundaries, will need to
have recourse to third party arbitral procedures. 19 '	 The confidence
with which they approach such procedures will undoubtedly be influenced
by previous arbitral decisions, and it is, therefore, for this reason
that the next chapter concentrates on the I.C.I.'s interpretation and
application of customary international law in the two Mediterranean
continental shelf boundary cases.
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the dispute to a third-party for settlement.
CHAPTER 7 - ADJUDICATED CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARIES IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
7.1 Introduction 
In addition to the continental shelf boundaries delimited by
agreement, a further two disputes have been referred to the I.C.J. for
non-binding arbitration.	 The dispute between Tunisia and Libya was
heard by the I.C.J. in 1982, and that between Libya and Malta in 1985.
Both have been highly significant in the evolution of the international
law of maritime boundary delimitation, with effects felt well beyond
the shores of the Mediterranean.
However, as the details and legal effects of these cases have been
described and analysed with considerable depth elsewhere, what follows
is intended to give a factual summary of the most apposite points, with
pertinent analysis where appropriate.
7.2 The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case (1982) 
(a) Background to the Case 
Negotiations with a view to delimiting the Tunitia-Libya
continental shelf boundary began in 1968, shortly after the grant of
the first Libyan concessions.' Tunisia had issued its first offshore
permits in 1964, but it was not until 1974, after much drilling in the
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region, that the two States'	 concessions overlapped, 	 in areas
approximately 50 miles offshore. The western boundary of the relevant
Libyan concession was defined as a line at approximately 26 to the
meridian through Ras Ajdir, and overlapped with a 1972 Tunisian permit
bounded in the south-east by part of an equidistance line delimited
"pending an agreement" on the continental shelf boundary.2
Both States issued formal protests at the other's offshore
activities in 1976, but it was not until May 1977 that matters came to
a head, Libya having contracted an oil rig to drill in a disputed area
120 kilometres north of Aszawiyah, within what Tunisia regarded as its
territorial waters.
	
Libya, however, denied that it was violating
Tunisian territorial waters, and contended that the rig was operating
on the Libyan continental shelf in an area 45 kilometres east of what
it regarded as the boundary between the two States' continental
shelves.	 By a Note of 1 June 1977, Libya subsequently informed the
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States of its intention to
continue drilling in the disputed area, at which point the Arab League
intervened, and agreement was reached to refer the dispute to the
(b) Pleadings of the Parties 
In their pleadings, both States laid great store on the cbncept of
natural prolongation.	 However, their interpretation of the concept's
applicability was conflicting.
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Libya's principal argument was that the North African continental
shelf, (constituting the Pelagian Block), was geologically - and thus
legally - "a prolongation to the north of the continental land-mass,"
and that, therefore, a boundary due north of the land boundary at Ras
AJdir would reflect this prolongation. 4
 It supported this delimitation
by reference to:
(i) the broad geographical relationship of the two States as
neighbouring States facing north;
(ii) the geological unity of the African landmass and the submerged
shelf originating as part of the same tectonic plate, "the African
platform;" and
(iii) the seaward projection of the terminal point of the international
land boundary.
However, in its Counter-Memorial, Libya accepted that it would be
equitable to adjust the northern prolongation of the land boundary to
bear north-east opposite the point on the Tunisian coast where its
general direction changed markedly, some 97 miles north-west of Ras
AJdir.s
For its part, Tunisia, contrary to expectations, did not propose
an equidistance boundary, but rather a boundary much farther to the
east. G
	Instead, relying principally upon geomorphology and its
historic fishing rights, Tunisia proposed a sheaf of boundary lines
trending between 60° and 63° from Ras Aidir, based on geometric and
geomorphological factors, which it believed reflected the natural
prolongation of the two States.' Specifically, it contended that the
natural prolongation of the continent in the boundary area was
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eastward, and that the continental shelf area in didpute was "submerged
Tunisia." 9 To support this contention, it argued that:
(i) the physical contours of the seabed paralleled those' of the
Tunisian coast, thereby demonstrating that the seabed was a submerged
portion of the Tunisian landmass;
(ii) the natural prolongation of the shelf, slope and rise all trend
north-east;e
(iii) the marine areas in front of the Tunisian coast, consisting of
shoals and islets and shallow seas devoted to marine agriculture, were
"the natural prolongation of the land upon which man has settled."10
In addition, Tunisia held that the Tripolitanian Furrow, a submarine
depression running west-east north of Libya, and quite close to its
coast, constituted the "true natural submarine frontier" of the
northeastern natural prolongation of the Libyan continental shelf."
Tunisia also drew attention to the fact that it had established
sovereignty over maritime areas as far as the 50 metre isobath, and
east as far the zenith vertical (ZV) 45°, where its fishermen had since
time immemorial exploited fixed fisheries for sponge and octopus, 12 and
held that these historic rights over sedentary fisheries proved the
existence of its natural prolongation, upon which a delimitation should
not encroach."'
(c) The Task of the Court 
The continental shelf dispute between Tunisia and Libya was
referred to the I.C.I. by a Special Agreement of 10 June 1977.
	 Under
the terms of this Agreement, the Court was asked to indicate the
applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the
delimitation of the boundary; and to render its decision in accordance
with equitable principles,	 taking into account	 the relevant
circumstances characterising the area, as well as the new accepted
trends in UNCLOS III then in progress."'" The Court was not, therefore,
asked to delimit the actual boundary, but accepted the Tunisian view
that it was "to specify precisely the practical way" to apply the
equitable principles and rules, so as to enable the experts of the two
countries to delimit the boundary without any difficulties.'s
Subsequently, the Court further proceeded to follow the Tunisian
interpretation of its task by specifying the bearing of the
delimitation line in two sectors, and defining the point at which the
boundary should change direction. It acknowledged that the Parties did
not ask it to draw a line, but found that this did not prevent it from
indicating the boundary which its method of delimitation would suggest,
inferring that a relatively high degree of precision was required
because it was being asked to give a judgement rather than an advisory
opinion; ' s and because the Special Agreement contemplated an agreement
being concluded within three months of its decision, which would not
allow for protracted negotiations between the Parties." The Court
also found it necessary to indicate the line its method suggested for
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the purposes of applying proportionality, although the boundary it
indicated was to be purely illustrative and without prejudice to the
experts' task of drawing the actual delimitation line. le Nevertheless,
the Court stressed that the Parties were under an obligation to comply
with the Judgement, noting that there would be no need for negotiation
between them as to the factors to be taken into account in the
delimitation:
"The only task remaining will be the technical one making possible
the drafting of the treaty incorporating the result of the work by
the experts,
(d) The Applicable Law
Neither Tunisia nor Libya are parties to the Continental Shelf
Convention, hence the delimitation was to be decided on the basis of
customary international law, "in conformity with equitable principles,"
taking account of all the relevant circumstances, "it being understood
that a balance must be established between the various circumstances,
in order to arrive at an equitable result, without refashioning
nature.""
(e) The Court's Judgement 
The I.C.J. noted that in their pleadings both States had placed
considerable weight upon the "fundamental concept of the continental
shelf as being the natural prolongation of the land domain," sharing
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the view derived from the North Sea Cases that their delimitation had
to be effected:
“ ... by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and
taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as
to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its
land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other."2'
However, the Court regarded the natural prolongation arguments of
each State as irrelevant to the present delimitation. 	 Distinguishing
the geographical and other factual and legal circumstances of the North
Sea Cases from those in the present case, the Court felt that the pre-
eminent role attributed to the concept of natural prolongation in the
former had been warranted by the geographical situation, but that:
while the idea of the natural prolongation of the land
territory defined, in general terms, the physical object or
location of the rights of the coastal State, it would not
necessarily be sufficent, or even appropriate, in itself to
determine the precise extent of the rights of one State in
relation to those of a neighbouring State."22
Indeed, the Court stated that it had not regarded "an equitable
delimitation and a determination of the limits of
	 'natural




identification of natural prolongation might, where the geographical
circumstances were appropriate, have an important role to play in
defining an equitable delimitation.22
Having thus considered natural prolongation "in its proper
perspective," 24
 the Court then turned to the contentions of the
Parties.
With reference to Libya's geological argument the Court found
that, at least where it did not clearly demonstrate the existence of
two separate continental shelves, "historical" (or "deep") geology was
irrelevant:
... despite the confident assertions of the geologists on both
sides that a given area is 'an evident prolongation' or 'the real
prolongation' of the one or the other State, for legal purposes,
it is not possible to define the areas of continental shelf
appertaining to Tunisia and to Libya by reference solely or mainly
to geological considerations.	 The function of this Court is to
make use of geology only so far as required for the application of
international law. It is of the view that what must be taken into
account in the delimitation of shelf areas are the physical
circumstances as they are today; that Just as it is the
geographical configuration of the present-day coast, so also it is
the present-day sea-bed, which must be considered.	 It is the
out
come, not the evolution in the long-distant past, which is of
importance."2s
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The Court was similarly unimpressed by Tunisia's geomorphological
arguments:
"As for the features relied upon by Tunisia, the Court, while not
accepting that the relative size and importance of these features
can be reduced to such insubstantial proportions as counsel for
Libya suggest, is unable to find that any of them involve such a
marked disruption or discontinuance of the sea-bed as to
constitute an indisputable indication of the limits of two
separate	 continental	 shelves,	 or	 two	 separate	 natural
prolongations. ... [S]o substantial a feature as the Hurd Deep was
not attributed such a significance in the Franco-British
Arbitration of 1977 ... .	 The only feature of any substantial
relevance is the Tripolitanian Furrow; but that submarine valley
does not display any marked relief until it has run considerably
further to the east than the area relevant to the delimitation...
Nor does any geographical evidence as to the direction of any
'natural prolongation' assist in determining the boundaries
thereof, however relevant it may be as a circumstance to be taken
into account from the viewpoint of equity. "2
Thus, although the Court did not discount the fact that certain
geomorphological configurations of the seabed could be taken into
account in delimitation as relevant circumstances characterising the
area, it later concluded that, in this case, the Tripolitanian Furrow
was not to be amongst those relevant circumstances "to be balanced up
with a view to equitable delimitation."' The Court considered that
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because it largely lay beyond the relevant coastline of Libya, it would
be inappropriate to take it into account unless the feature truly ended
Libya's natural prolongation, which the Court found it did not.2s
Therefore, despite the fact that the major contentions advanced by
the Parties were concerned with the applicability of natural
prolongation, the Court rejected totally the relevance of this concept
to the delimitation. Instead, it concluded that:
"The submarine area of the Pelagian Block which constitutes the
natural prolongation of Libya substantially coincides with an area
which constitutes the natural submarine extension of Tunisia.
Which parts of the submarine area appertains to Libya and which to
Tunisia can therefore not be determined by criteria provided by a
determination of how far the natural prolongation of one of the
Parties extends in relation to the natural prolongation of the
other.	 In the present case, in which Libya and Tunisia both
derive continental shelf title from a natural prolongation common
to both territories, the ascertainment of the extent of the areas
of shelf appertaining to each State must be governed by criteria
of international law other than those taken from physical
features."2s
Consequently, beginning from the premise that:
"It is clear that what is reasonable and equitable in any given
case must depend on its particular circumstances,u30
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the	 identified those relevant circumstances to be taken into
account in achieving an equitable solution in the present case.
The first relevant circumstance identified by the Court was the
area relevant to the delimitation.	 This was defined as being the
coasts of the two Parties either side of the land boundary at Ras
Ajdir, and as far as the parallel of latitude passing through Ras
Kaboudia on the Tunisian coast, and the meridian passing through Ras
Tajoura on the Libyan coast, "the rights of third States being
reserved." 31 The Court regarded this area as encompassing those parts
of the continental shelf which could be considered as both lying off
either the Tunisian or Libyan coasts and as overlapping with the
submarine extension of the other Party; "32' hence, the coasts relevant to
the delimitation were not the entire coasts of each Party.3
The second relevant circumstance was "the general configuration of
the coasts of the Parties, in particular the marked change of direction
of the Tunisian coastline between Ras Ajdir and Ras Kaboudia."" This
was said by the	 "to modify the lateral adjacency of the two
States, even though it clearly does not go so far as to place them in a
position of legally opposite States."as
The existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands and the
surrounding low-tide elevations," and the intersection of the land
frontier and the coastline at Ras Ajdir, were also regarded as relevant
circumstances, the latter partly because there was no territorial sea
boundary between the States from which the present delimitation should
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commence."'	 In addition, both States accepted this as the coastal
terminus of the land boundary established in 1910, and it had also
served as the starting point for past attempts to establish by
unilateral claims what the Court characterised as "certain partial
maritime delimitations."	 Indeed, the Court paid considerable
attention to the four "alleged maritime limits resulting from the
conduct of the States."
Two of these the Court dismissed as irrelevant.
	 In the first
place, Tunisia claimed that since 1904, the ZV (Zenith Vertical) 45'
line, running northeast from Ras Mc:lir as far as the 50 metre isobath,
had been the boundary with Libya in respect of its immemorial historic
rights over sedentary and other fisheries.
	 However, the Court
concluded that this line had only been specified in Tunisian fisheries
regulations during the period 1951-1963; that it was a unilateral claim
not accepted by Libya; and that "taking all the stages of the Tunisian-
Libyan relations into account," it was unopposable to Libya, "even as a
mere inchoate maritime boundary." 	 Similarly, Libya drew attention to
a line running due north from Ras Aidir, which formed the boundary on a
map of its 1955 petroleum legislation, but the Court concluded that its
delimitation was based on a unilateral act, and therefore not opposable
to Tunisia:
"[T]he mere indication on the map of the line in question is not
sufficient even for the mere purpose of defining a formal claim at
the level of international relations to a maritime or continental
shelf boundary. "°
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The other two alleged limits were, however, found to be of
significance.
In 1913, Italy, in refusing to recognise the ZU 45 •
 line as a
delimitation of the Tunisian fishery zone, declared its boundary
between Libyan and Tunisian sponge banks as a line perpendicular to the
coast (i.e. at 26° east of north) at the land boundary. 	 Both Tunisia
and Libya admitted before the Court that this had resulted in a de
facto compromise (or provisional solution) utilising an eight mile
buffer zone centred on this line;' but the Court found this fell short
of proving the existence of a recognised maritime boundary between the
two Parties, 4'2 because French consent was based only on silence and the
absence of protest. Nevertheless, it added that:
n ... in view of the absence of agreed and clearly specified
maritime boundaries, the respect for the tacit modus vIvendl,
which was never formally contested by either side throughout a
long period of time, could warrant its acceptance as a historical
justification for the choice of the method for the delimitation of
the continental shelf between the two States, to the extent that
the historic rights claimed by Tunisia could not in any event be
opposable to Libya east of the modus vivendi line."43
However, the fourth line considered by the Court was ceitically
Important, and constituted "a circumstance of great relevance for the
delimitation.""	 This consisted of a de facto line drawn from Ras
AJdir on a bearing 26' east of north, (i.e. perpendicular to the
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coast), resulting from the manner in which both Parties had initially
granted concessions for offshore hydrocarbon exploration and
exploitation. Hence, the Court referred to a 1966 Tunisian concession
bounded to the east by a "stepped line" which "lay on a straight line
at a bearing of approximately 26° to the meridian," and noted that
Libyan concession No. 137 (1968), and subsequent concessions, were all
bounded to the west by the 26° line, following "the direction of the
Tunisian concessions."" Thus:
"The result was the appearance on the map of a de facto line
dividing concession areas which were the subject of active claims,
in the sense that exploration activities were authorised by one
Party, without interference, or (until 1976) protests by the
other."46
Moreover, having found that this line of adjoining concessions had
been respected for a number of years, the Court was also able to draw
attention to the "further relevant circumstance" that the 26° line
approximately corresponded to the line perpendicular to the coast at
the land border, which had in the past been observed as a de facto
maritime limit between their adjacent fisheries. Thus, the 26° line
was "neither arbitrary nor without precedent in the relations between
the two States."47
The other relevant circumstances identified by the	 or the
Parties, were found not to be pertinent to the delimitation.
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Both States had suggested that economic factors were relevant.
Tunisia invoked its relative poverty vis-A-vis Libya in terms of
natural resources, such as agriculture and minerals, and particularly
oil and gas, and its economic dependence upon those fishing resources
derived from its historic rights, not in an attempt to refashion
nature, but to avoid "widening the disparities created by nature."49
However, the Court ruled that economic considerations could not be
taken into account, because they were "virtually extraneous factors
since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or
calamity ... might at any time cause to tilt the scale one way or the
other."49 Nevertheless, probably swayed by its earlier dictum in the
North Sea Cases, the Court did admit the Libyan contention that "the
presence or absence of oil or gas in the oil-wells in the continental
shelf areas appertaining to either party," might, "depending on all the
factors, be an element to be taken into account in the process of
weighing all relevant factors to achieve an equitable result,"s°
although the Court did not indicate how it did, or would, determine the
extent of the reserves of oil and gas at the time of delimitation.'
The Court also denied the relevance to the delimitation of
Tunisia's claims to historic rights over the seabed and superJacent
waters up to the 50 metre isobath and as far east as the ZV 45° line.
The alleged existence of these rights raised the question as to whether
a coastal State could acquire, through occupation and exploitation,
historic title over continental shelf areas that may appertain to
another State ipso facto and ab lnitla	 The Court implied that it
could not by finding that Tunisia's historic rights were irrelevant to
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the delimitation, given that the boundary to be adopted would leave
Tunisia in full possession of the area over which its historic rights
were claimed, except between the 26° and 45° lines out to the 50 metre
isobath. s2 However, the Court avoided an explicit pronouncement on the
Issue, justifying its action in respect of this area by reference to
Its rejection of Tunisia's claim to a boundary utilising the ZV 45'
line.ss
(i) Methods of Delimitation 
The Court then turned its attention to methods of delimitation,
reaffirming the views it had expressed on the equidistance method in
the North Sea Cases. Hence, it stressed that although equidistance had
merits in cases where its application led to an equitable solution, it
was not a mandatory rule of customary international law, nor a method
having some privileged legal status in relation to other methods.
Rather both post-1969 State practice and the history of Article 83 of
the Draft Convention led the Court to conclude that equidistance might
be applied if it were to lead to an equitable solution, but if not,
then other methods were to be applied. sA Thus the Court emphasised
that a delimitation using an equidistance line could only result from a
consideration and evaluation of all the relevant circumstances. In the
present case, it was not required, as a first step, to examine the
effects of a delimitation by the equidistance method, or to reject that
method in favour of some other only if it considered the results of its
application to be inequitable. ss	 Rather,	 the "primordial
requirement" was to achieve "an overall equitable result," using
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whatever method or methods were appropriate, which did not include
those submitted by the States concerned.
Instead, the Court noted that in cases of delimitation over a
broad area, the use of one method to determine the whole course of the
boundary might be inequitable, and that several methods might be
necessary to minimise the distorting effects of particular features
that, while tolerable close to the shore, might be exaggerated to
unreasonable proportions at a greater distance offshore. Hence, based
on its view that the relevant circumstances characterising the area
called for the areas close to the coast to be treated differently from
the more seaward areas, the Court divided the area to be delimited into
two distinct sectors.ss
In the nearshore areas, the Court found that the practical method
to be applied was to delimit a line which approximated the 26 line
established de facto by the Parties. s7 The Court stressed that it was
not making a finding of tacit agreement between the States, nor was it
holding that that their conduct with respect to the 26' line debarred
them from pressing claims inconsistent with this conduct on some such
basis as estoppel.	 However, in order to consider what delimitation
method would ensure an equitable result, the I.C.S. held that it "must
take into account whatever indicia are available of the line or lines
which the parties themselves may have considered equitable or acted
upon as such - if only as an interim solution affecting part only of
the area to be delimited," noting that both States had independently
used this line, and that Libya had indicated that it might be
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acceptable to her as an agreed boundary, 66 Thus, in the Court's view,
neither Tunisia nor Libya had recognised that their independent conduct
in relation to the 26° line was a highly relevant circumstance to the
determination of the method of delimitation, and served "with the
support of other circumstances which the Parties themselves [had] taken
into account, to produce an equitable delimitation."66
In addition, the Court justified use of the 26 line as the
boundary in this sector, because "the factor of perpendicularity to the
coast and the concept of prolongation of the general direction of the
land boundary," corresponded with this line, and were "relevant
criteria to be taken into account in selecting a line of delimitation
calculated to ensure an equitable solution." 6° Moreover, approximately
the same line had been used in fisheries relations between the Parties
since 1919. 6' The Court decided, therefore, that the boundary line in
the nearshore area should follow the 26° line, beginning, in the
absence of a territorial sea boundary between the two States, at the
point where the outer limit of the territorial seas of the two Parties
was intersected by a straight line drawn from Ras Ajdir running on the
approximate bearing 26..62
The Court then had to decide at which point along the 26° line
other relevant circumstances would have to be taken into account in
order to establish the boundary in the seaward sector of the area to be
delimited. Consequently, having first determined that a perpendicular
to the coast was less suitable as a boundary line as one proceeded
offshore, because the relationship of the two States' coasts changed
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from one of adjacency to oppositeness, the Court found that the marked
change in direction of the Tunisian coastline was the most obvious
geographical feature to be taken into account if the delimitation was
to be equitable. 63 However, mindful of the fact that there could be
some debate amongst geographers as to the precise point at which the
change in direction occurs, and yet conscious of its duty to indicate a
method which would enable the experts to delimit the boundary without
difficulties, the	 "somewhat arbitrarily" 64 decided that the
point in question was the most westerly point on the shoreline of the
Gulf of Gabes, provisionally identified as 34° 10' 30" North.
	 Thus,
the 26 line was to terminate where it intersected with the parallel of
latitude drawn eastwards from this point.66
Thereafter, from this turning point seaward, the I.C.J. "somewhat
reluctantly" allowed equidistance to play a minor role in the
delimitation of the boundary line.'	 The Court found that it was "of
material significance," that an equidistance line, whether drawn on the
basis of Tunisia's straight baselines or not, would run on a bearing
markedly more east of north than 26°, 67 and, acknowledging that the
equidistance method's virtue - if also its weakness - was to take full
account of almost all coastal variations, recalled its opinion in the
North Sea Cases "that there was much less difficulty entailed in a
general application of the equidistance method in the case of coasts
opposite to one another, when the equidistance line becomes a median
line, then in the case of adjacent States." 66 This, in turn, led the
Court to conclude that:
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"The major change in direction undergone by the coast of Tunisia
seems to the Court to go some way, though not the whole way,
towards transforming the relationship of Libya and Tunisia from
that of adjacent States to that of opposite States, and thus to
produce a situation in which the position of an equidistance line
becomes a factor to be given more weight in the balancing of
equitable considerations than would otherwise be the case."6.9
However, this did not mean that the delimitation line in the seaward
sector was to be constructed on the basis of equidistance, but simply
that in this context the position of the equidistance line was a factor
which indicated the need for the boundary to travel in a more easterly
direction than 26°.	 Moreover, the method chosen had to attribute
sufficient weight to the general change in direction of the Tunisian
coast, and the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands.7°
As a result, the method chosen by the Court was as follows.
Firstly, a line was drawn from the most westerly point on the Gulf of
Gabês to Ras Kaboudia to represent the general direction of the
Tunisian coast, disregarding the Kerkennah Islands. This line lay at a
bearing of 42° to the meridian (Figure 28). 	 A further line was then
drawn from the same point of origin, seaward of the Kerkennah Islands,
making an angle of 62' to the meridian, but failing to take account of
the low-tide elevations seaward of the Islands, as the Court had
earlier intended.'"	 However, the Court felt that to allow the
continental shelf boundary to follow a bearing of 62' was, "in the
,
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Figure 28 - The Tunisia-Libya continental shelf boundary proposed by
the International Court of Justice.
Source: G.H. Blake "Offshore Political Geography: The Partitioning of
the Oceans" in A.D. Drysdale and G.H. Blake A Political Geography of 
the Middle East and North Africa, pp. 109-146, at p. 129.
	 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985)
circumstances of the case," to give too much weight to the Kerkennah
Islands, 72 and decided that they would be given sufficient effect by
according them half-weight in the delimitation. Accordingly, the Court
drew the bisector of the lines it had constructed, and ruled that the
delimitation line in the seaward sector should run parallel to this
line at 52° to the meridian. 73 No terminus was specified for this line
in recognition of the claims of third States and the need for further
delimitations in this area.
(ii) Proportionality 
Finally, the Court tested the equity of its proposed delimitation
using the criterion of proportionality, on the basis that amongst the
relevant circumstances to be taken into account in achieving an
equitable delimitation there must be "a reasonable degree of
proportionality ... between the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of the relevant part
of its coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines."74
Thus, critical to its calculations of proportionality between the
length of the relevant coasts and the areas attributed to each coastal
State was the Court's definition of the relevant area for delimitation.
The two States differed as to which coasts should be considered
for this purpose, and as to whether Tunisia's internal water areas
should be included in any proportionality calculations; but, as
discussed later, 7s the I.C.J. found it unnecessary to pass judgement on
Tunisia's historic rights as a justification for its straight
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baselines, given that in applying proportionality the whole seabed,
-
including internal waters and the territorial sea, were to be included
in the calculations.
However, in order to complete any proportionality calculations the
Court also had arbitrarily to determine the seaward limits of the area
to be delimited, given the known or potential claims of third States to
parts of the disputed area. 	 Consequently, it decided that it had no
alternative but to treat the whole of the area within the lines of
latitude and longitude joining Ras Kaboudia and Ras Tajoura as
appertaining to the Parties, which it claimed to be able to do without
prejudice to the claims of other States.7'
The Court then calculated the lengths of the respective relevant
coastlines to be in the ratio 69:31 in favour of Tunisia, or 66:34
following straight lines corresponding to their general direction (i.e.
their coastal fronts). 	 The ratio of the seabed area attributable to
each State as a result of the Court's delimitation was then found to be
60:40 in favour of Tunisia, from which the Court concluded that the
result met "the requirements of the test of proportionality as an
aspect of equity."77
(f) Analysis of the Delimitation 
(1) Equitable Principles and Natural Prolongation 
	 ,
Most of the criticism of the Judgement has focussed upon the
inability of the Court to clarify the means by which an equitable
delimitation of continental shelf areas is to be effected.
	 In
particular, the Court has been criticised for its failure to clarify
the meaning of equitable principles, and to distinguish clearly between
applying these amorphous principles and rendering a decision ex aequo
et bono.7
For example, Judge Gros was scathing in his criticism of the Court
for its application of the rule that equitable principles ought to be
used to achieve an equitable result:
"There is a profound gulf between an equitable solution to a
problem of continental shelf delimitation which is founded upon
the rules of law applicable to relevant facts accurately and fully
taken into account, and an equitable solution which is founded
upon subjective and sometimes divided assessment of the facts,
regardless of the law of delimitation, through an eclectic
approach to a result unrelated to the extant factors and without
any verification other than calculations prompted by chance or
coincidence. That is a solution not through equity, but through a
compromise sought at one and the same time between the claims of
the Parties and the opinions held within the Court."7'
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Feldman, however, believed the Court's approach to be "consistent
with, and no doubt influenced by," the emerging law of the sea, which,
by the terms of the Special Agreement, the Court was required to take
into account. e°	 Hence the reference to the "equitable solution" in
Article 83 of the Draft Convention may have prompted the Court to pay
more attention to the result than the means of achieving it.	 On the
other hand, Charney comments that the Judgement:
... reads as if the line was arbitrarily chosen and retroactively
justified on limited grounds. A study of the maps attached to the
Judgement makes it appear that the boundary line adopted by the
Court divides the area between the claims of the parties,
therefore suggesting that splitting the difference was the Court's
prime objective,
Similarly, Brown was concerned that the Court "appeared to be scouring
the Pelagian Sea in search of relevant circumstances, apparently
without aid of any objective yardstick by which to measure the
relevance of the circumstances concerned," e2 whilst Judge Gros opined
that:
"In seeking equality when the two States are not on the same
plane, proportionality in arbitrary calculations, and in ignoring
the relevant geographical peculiarities and their effecton the
delimitation, the Judgement has strayed into subjectivism,"
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However, Brown was willing to concede that the Court had provided
an acceptable solution to the dispute, even if it had done so in such a
quasi-legislative fashion as to blur the distinction between a binding
third-party judicial settlement and a settlement ex aequo et bono.94
His concern was that the unpredictability of the outcome from such
action9 might deter States from applying to the I.C.J. for resolution
of their maritime boundary disputes. 	 On the other hand, once it had
rejected the States' main contentions, the Court left itself with
little option but to pursue this course.
In its defence, there is little doubt that the scientific
arguments presented to the Court with respect to natural prolongation
"were speculative, contradictory, difficult to understand, and hard to
relate to the interest involved in the delimitation of maritime
boundaries. 'I6
	 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Court
dismissed them as irrelevant.
	 Indeed, as Judge De Arechaga's Separate
Opinion noted, "the criticism by each Party of the scientific arguments
presented by the other was far stronger and more convincing than their
affirmative contentions" and, therefore, in a sense they cancelled each
other out.Ev7
Logically, the Court should have determined the boundary on the
basis of natural prolongation, as both Parties suggested, but because
they disagreed on the type of natural prolongation' to be used -
geological versus geomorphological - the Court did not feel able to
favour one set of scientific evidence over the other. Nevertheless, it
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was perhaps more than fortuitous that the Court was able to conclude
that:
"...the area relevant for the delimitation constitutes a single
continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land
territory of both Parties, so that in the present case, no
criterion for delimitation of shelf areas can be derived from the
principle of natural prolongation as such,"9
However, although the Court did not consider it to be a relevant
circumstance, the fact that the "cut-off" effect (or principle of non-
encroachment) was taken into account meant that the concept of natural
prolongation was not completely ignored. 99 Recognising that either an
equidistance line or Libya's proposed due north boundary could lead to
such an effect, the Court avoided it by its utilisation of a
perpendicular to the coastline in the first sector, and by adjusting
the boundary in the seaward sector to take account of the change in
direction of the Tunisian coast.9°
(ii) Equidistance and the Lack of Method in the Court's Delimitation 
The I.C.J.'s rejection or, as Christie put it, "disregard" 91
 of
the equidistance method has also been strongly criticised, particularly
In the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Evensen, Gros and Oda. 	 The
emphasis on equidistance in these Opinions arose directly out of a
belief that although the Court provided principles and rules to be
applied by the Parties, it failed to indicate a cogent method of
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delimitation to be adopted by them, 92
 or perhaps more correctly, to
explain why other methods were rejected or were less equitable."
Judge Evensen stated that the Court should at least have shown how
a modified equidistance line would lead to an inequitable result,94
whilst Judge Gros believed that in order to arrive at an equitable
result the Court had an obligation to test the applicability of the
equidistance method, as well as other methods of delimitation, to see
whether the use of any geographical features would lead to
disproportionate effects.'" 	 Indeed, in Judge Gros's opinion, the
Court's first task was to delimit an equidistance line, in order to see
what "extraordinary, unnatural or unreasonable' result" use of this
method might lead to," despite the fact that many States at UNCLOS III
had been fervently opposed to using equidistance as the starting point
for delimitation, arguing against any pre-eminence or privileged status
for that method, a view confirmed by the majority opinion.97
However, the I.C,J. treated equidistance not as a principle or
method of delimitation, but rather as "factor" to be used in balancing
the equities in the determination of the bearing of the boundary in the
seaward sector,"
	 It played no part in the first sector of the
delimitation, where the Court used a method which totally disregarded
the coastal geography, which makes it difficult to see how the Court
could deny that it was refashioning geography.
(ii) The Delimitation in the First (Nearshore) Sector: The 26° Line 
In the nearshore sector of the delimitation, the Court has been
criticised for the emphasis which it placed on the conduct of the
Parties with respect to the 26° line. Evensen, for example, criticised
the Court for taking into account the mutual restraint exercised by the
Parties as an indication of what they considered to be an equitable
result, in spite of the fact that neither State had indicated a
willingness to be bound thereby. He argued that as an interim measure,
not even having force as a tacit agreement between them, such conduct
should not have prejudiced the final outcome of the delimitation.99
Similarly, in light of the Parties unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a
mutually acceptable boundary for themselves, Hodgson points out the
incongruity of the Court converting what it regarded as a de facto
boundary into a boundary de Jure. 1 °°	 Charney also comments that:
"The facts show that throughout the known history of the area the
offshore boundary has been in dispute. 	 The line that became
accepted as a modus vivendi was unilaterally described for limited
purposes by one State. While the parties generally respected the
line, it is clear that the boundary remained in dispute."'°'
Undoubtedly, the Court's ruling has potentially far reaching
consequences.	 Christie points out that States will now be discouraged
from establishing a peaceful modus vivendi pending resolution of their
dispute, for fear they might be held to its terms; 102 whilst in similar
vein, Feldman has stated that:
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-"It would be contrary to the public interest in the peaceful
resolution of international disputes if a State that exercised
restraint in its activities in an area claimed by another State
were punished by implying that it had consented to that claim. If
Tunisia had drilled even further to the east than the limits of
the concession area which bordered the Libyan concession area, and
In which both had drilled, there was a serious risk that
hostilities might result."03
Thus, in Feldman's opinion, this conduct alone could not have Justified
the method adopted by the Court, and yet, although the Court found
other relevant criteria supporting the 26° line, it was indeed this
conduct which was the determining factor in the first sector of the
delimitation.'"
Brown has also pointed out inconsistencies in the Court's finding
with respect to the grant of petroleum concessions in the period 1966-
1976, which prove that neither State envisaged the 26 line forming the
continental shelf boundary.
	 For example, in 1972, Tunisia had both
granted a concession by reference to an unspecified maritime boundary
between itself and Libya, and made a continental shelf claim which
extended as far as the ZV 45° line.
	 Furthermore, in 1974, it adopted
as the south-eastern boundary of its concessions "the equidistance line
... determined in conformity with the principles of international law
pending an agreement between Tunisia and Libya defining the limit of
their respective Jurisdictions over the continental shelf."'°'
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As for Libya, it had emphasised that the de facto 26° line between
the respective States' concessions had been "at no time accepted by
Libya as the legal line of delimitation;" instead, it had claimed that
its sovereign rights extended as far west as the meridian of Ras
Aidir. 106 Moreover, the concession granted by Libya in 1974, which had
led to overlapping claims and submission of the dispute to the I.C.J.,
actually followed the 26 line!'07
Of the other factors which the Court found favoured the 26* line,
it must be said that its coincidence with a perpendicular to the coast
was somewhat fortuitous. 10
	
Indeed, as Judge Gros pointed out:
".., what the Court has been able to adopt is • not a genuine
perpendicular, which would necessarily have to begin by delimiting
the two Parties' territorial waters - competence for which is not
conferred by the Special Agreement and is formally refused by the
Parties - but an angle of 26°. So there has been no employment of
the coastal-perpendicular method - neither line nor coastline is
relied on. There is Just an illusion to a coincidence between an
undrawn	 line	 and	 an	 approximate	 angle	 nothing is
demonstrated."'°e
Judge Gros also questioned the relevance attached by the Court to
the "unilateral claim of one State [Tunisia] to surveillance of its
sedentary fisheries," concluding that such "an outdated demarcation"
could not have any influence on the continental shelf boundary.110
However, sedentary fisheries fall under the legal regime of the
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continental shelf, despite the Court's curious statement that Tunisia's
historic rights and titles might be more nearly related to the E.E.Z.
concept.' 11
	Therefore, a boundary separating one State's sedentary
fisheries from another is pertinent to continental shelf delimitation,
especially so,
	 if the Court can find that the existence and
exploitation of oil wells are relevant circumstances." 2	What is
questionable is whether a pre-independence modus vivendi can have legal
force, given that this de facto boundary was apparently established
between France and Italy in 1919: although it was found by the Court
not to be a recognised maritime boundary, it ended up being treated as
if it was one.'2
Also in this sector, Hodgson has criticised the Court's treatment
of the Island of Djerba, the presence of which in the delimitation area
it first found "in principle" to be a circumstance calling for
consideration, and then summarily disregarded "in fact," on the ground
that the 26° line prevailed over its effect."'" He argued that as a
large, populuous, and economically important island, lying close to the
Tunisian mainland, Djerba should have been given full effect in the
delimitation,"	 although he gave no indication how this could have
been achieved in the absence of a delimitation utilising the
equidistance method.
(iv) The Delimitation in the Second (Seaward) Sector 
In respect of the second (seaward) sector of the delimitation,
Herman has been critical of the Court's decision to change the bearing
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of its boundary line by reference to the change in direction of the
,-
Tunisian coastline, because, in his opinion, it was based upon the sole
consideration of the configuration of the Tunisian coastline, rather
upon the consideration of the geographical configuration of both
States' coasts.	 He argued that the essence of delimitation is the
relationship of the coasts of the States both to each other, and to the
area to be delimited, and that therefore:
"To look at the configuration of one Party's coastline only would
be tantamount to considering the geographical situation 'in
abstracto.""s
Consequently, in his view, the Court failed to judge the distorting
effect of the Kerkennah Islands and the Tunisian coastline upon a
boundary drawn by reference to the coasts of both Parties.117
As to the treatment of the Kerkennah Islands, in his Separate
Opinion, Judge Schwebel stated that the I.C.J. had not discharged "the
burden of demonstrating why granting full effect to the Kerkennahs
would result in giving them 'excessive weight,"" 9 a point reiterated
in the opinions of the dissenting judges and other commentators."'
Hodgson argued that the Kerkennah Islands' substantial size, long-
established fishing activities, and close proximity to the Tunisian
mainland, (from which they are separated by shallow waters), all
supported the view that they should be accorded full effect in the
delimitation.	 Granting them only half-effect was "an unwarranted
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refashioning of the geography of the Tunisian coastline, the equity of
which is surely questionable."12°
However, Judge Gros used similar criteria to argue that the
Kerkennahs were not entitled to full effect. Also, Judge Oda would not
give the Kerkennahs any effect in constructing his modified
equidistance line, because the islands projected far out to sea (they
lie 11 miles offshore); and this, combined with their distance from the
land frontier, caused them to have a disproportionate effect on the
equidistance line.'2'
The Court's treatment of the Kerkennah Islands, and the complete
absence of any justification for it, nevertheless, contrasts markedly
with the Anglo-French Arbitration, in which the Court clearly explained
the reasons why it felt it necessary to accord the Scilly Isles half-
weight in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary in the
Western Approaches.	 In that case, equity called for "an appropriate
abatement of the disproportionate effects of a considerable projection
on to the Atlantic continental shelf of a somewhat attenuated portion
of the coast of the United Kingdom." 22 According the Scilly Islands
half weight was, therefore, found to be an appropriate way of deviating
the boundary so as to reflect the relationship of both States' coasts
to the delimitation area.
By contrast, in the present case, the boundary in the second
sector was determined not by selecting one of several methods
applicable to the delimitation, but merely by using a "half effect"
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approach which "relied wholly on Tunisian geography." 123
 Moreover, in
the Anglo-French Arbitration the boundary was formed by the line
bisecting the area formed by two equidistance lines, one drawn using
Ushant and the Scilly Isles, the other using Ushant and Land's End,
ignoring the Scilly Isles; 1'd in the present case, the boundary was to
parallel the bisector of the angle formed by lines following the
general direction, first, of the seaward coasts of the Kerkennah
Islands, and second, of the Tunisian mainland.
	
Notwithstanding these
differences in applying the half-effect method, one is, therefore, left
with the impression that, in the absence of explanation, the Court
appeared simply to latch onto the half-effect technique because it was
reflected in State practice, rather than because it had any inherent
benefits in dealing with the effect of islands such as the Kerkennahs.
(v) Proportionality 
Mention must also be made of the Court's novel use of
proportionality.
In the North Sea Cases, the role of proportionality was to
establish "the necessary balance" between straight-coasted States and
those with "markedly concave or convex coasts," or reduce "very
irregular coastlines to their truer proportions." 12s It was used as a
test of the equity of using an equidistance line, (or any other method
of delimitation), but not as a principle of delimitation in its own
right.	 It was apposite, because, as the Court in the Anglo-French
Arbitration recognised, in the situation pertaining in the North Sea,
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where three States lay along aconcave coastline, the boundaries
between their continental shelves would converge to meet the median
line with the U.K.
	
This, therefore, provided a finite seaspace in
which the States' shelf areas could be calculated in relation to their
coastal lengths.129
However, when used as a means of assessing the equitable effects
of a given boundary line, proportionality is inappropriate where open-
ended maritime areas are concerned, for there is no means of defining
the seaward limits of the shelf areas to be related to the appropriate
relevant coastal lengths. 127
	
As a result, in the Anglo-French
Arbitration, the Court indicated that proportionality as applied in the
North Sea Cases could not be applied in all situations; instead, its
rede in the Anglo-French Arbitration was a broader one:
... not linked to any specific geographical feature ... [but]
rather a factor to be taken into account in appreciating the
effects of geographical features on the equitable or inequitable
character of a delimitation, and in particular of a delimitation
by application of the equidistance method."29
Thus, in the open-ended Western Approaches sector of the delimitation,
although proportionality was applied as a test of the equity of the
equidistance line, it was used to correct what the Court of Arbitration
regarded as the disproportionate effects of the Scilly Isles on an
equidistance line delimitation.	 This, therefore, did not involve any
nice calculations of proportionality because, in the Court's view,
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proportionality was not in itself a source of title to the continental
shelf, but rather a criterion by which to evaluate the equity of a
particular geographical situation.'29
In the present case, the Court has been rightly criticised for the
arbitrary way in which it defined the seaward limits of the
delimitation area, parts of which were claimed by third States. Third
State interests, and the existence of diverging coastlines, did not
appear to allow the Court to define the delimitation area for the
purposes of applying the North Sea Cases' concept of proportionality:
hence proportionality could only be used as a means of abating the
disproportionate effect of a particular geographical feature on the
boundary favoured by the Court. 	 However, with little justification
beyond "cartographical convenience," 3° the Court defined seaward
limits to the delimitation area, and compared the areas allocated to
each State by its delimitation method with the lengths of its
previously defined relevant coastlines, to conclude that its result was
proved equitable.' 31 The Court thus approved its own delimitation by
illegitimate means.	 Moreover, the margin of difference between the
ratio of coastal lengths and the ratio of seabed areas is large enough
to make questionable the Court's conclusions as to the equity of its
delimitation.132
Perhaps, however, of greater concern was the fact that the Court
used proportionality more as a method of delimitation, than as a
verifying factor, thereby going against the Court of Arbitration's
finding that it was "disproportion rather than any general principle of
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proportionality which is the relevant criterion or factor,"' 3	 Judges
Oda and De Arechaga each stressed that proportionality was a "test" to
be applied "ex post facto to the results obtained through the
appreciation of the relevant circumstances, and not a relevant
circumstance or independent factor in itself," 134
 whilst Judge Oda
rightly observed that:
"The concept of proportionality as between the areas and the
lengths of coast is not meant to determine any concrete line of
demarcation for the delimitation of the area, for the number of
lines capable of producing the same proportion is obviously
Moreover, as was pointed out in the Anglo-French Arbitration:
... the equitable delimitation of the continental shelf is not
... a question of apportioning - sharing out - the continental
shelf amongst the States abutting upon it.	 Nor is it a question
of simply assigning to them areas of the shelf in proportion to
the length of their coastlines; for to do this would be to
substitute for the delimitation of boundaries a distributive
apportionment of shares ... Proportionality, therefore, is to be
used as a criterion or factor relevant in evaluating the equities
of certain geographical situations, not as a general principle
providing an independent source of rights to areas of continental
shelf."'"
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Proportionality calculations should, therefore, never have been
attempted in a situation where the seaward limits of the proposed
boundary were indeterminable. In the absence of such limits, they are
worthless as a test of the equity of the proposed line, given that, as
a result of future delimitations, they may bear no resemblance to the
actual limits of the areas attributed to each State by the Court's
method of delimitation.	 It thus stands to reason that the use of
proportionality is even more corrupt when it is used as a principle or
method of delimitation in its own right, in particular when the limits
to the delimitation area are arbitrarily set.
(g) The Effect of the Delimitation upon Third States: The Maltese 
Application to Intervene. 1981 
A final point to be considered is the effect of the delimitation
upon third States.
On 28 January 1981, Malta applied for permission to intervene in
the Case, pursuant to Article 62(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J., which
allows a State to apply to intervene in a case should it consider that
it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the
decision.	 Both Tunisia and Libya opposed Malta's request, which was
unanimously denied by the I.C.J. on 14 April 1981. 	 However, the
attempted intervention points up some of the problems of the piecemeal
delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean, 	 the
geographically constricted space of which makes it difficult to draw
boundaries between two States without impinging on the rights of
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others. It also shows some of the difficulties of having more than two
parties to any one case.
In its intervention request, Malta contended that its legal
interests might be affected both by the Court's evaluation of certain
geographical and geomorphological features of the seabed area bordered
by the three States, and by its assessment of their legal relevance as
factors in the delimitation of continental shelf areas adjacent to the
Maltese continental shelf.	 In particular, Malta was concerned as to
the way in which equidistance, either as a method or principle of
delimitation, would give effect to such factors, and thereby prejudice
Maltese rights in its future delimitations with the States concerned,
given that it believed its shelf boundaries with Libya and Tunisia
would meet at a single point. ' 37	 Bearing in mind its ongoing
negotiations with Libya, it was also concerned as to whether it was
legitimate for a State to invoke the concept of coastline
proportionality as a method of delimiting continental shelf boundaries
with other States;'" and further, that any ruling by the Court on the
Tunisian straight baselines and historic bays could affect that
delimitation,	 not least because of its potential effects on
calculations of proportionality.'" However, Malta emphasised that the
object of its intervention was to exercise its right to submit its
views on questions which concerned it, and to make its claims known to
the Court. It did not wish to intervene as a party, and stressedthat
it was not asking the Court to rule on its continental shelf boundaries
with Tunisia and Libya. '°
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The request was opposed, however, by both Tunisia and Libya, on
the basis that it did not comply with Article 81(2) of the I.C.J.'s
Statute.	 They claimed that Malta's legal interest lay more with the
reasoning of the Court than in its actual decision, and furthermore,
that there was no jurisdictional link between the Parties and the
intervening State, although the need for such was denied by Malta.""
In its Judgement, the I.C.J. accepted that Malta's legal interest
was in the delimitation of the Tunisia-Libya boundary:
11 ... Malta in its request is asking the Court to give a decision
in the case between Tunisia and Libya which in some measure would
prejudge the merits of Malta's own claims against Tunisia and
against Libya in its separate disputes with each of those
States,
However, because it refused to submit to its jurisdiction its claims
against Tunisia and Libya, Malta's legal interest could not be affected
by the Court's subsequent decision in the case between those States. 14
In its opinion, Malta was seeking permission for a limited form of
intervention without assuming the obligations of a party to the case,
therefore precluding the fact that as a party the decision of the Court
would be binding on its relations with Tunisia and Libya.'" This was
clearly unpalatable to the Court:
"What Malta ... seeks to secure by its application is the
opportunity to argue in the present case in favour of a decision
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in which the Court would refrain from adopting and applying
particular criteria that it might otherwise consider appropriate
for the delimitation of the continental shelf of Libya and
Tunisia. In short, it seeks an opportunity to submit arguments to
the Court with possible prejudicial effects on the interests
either of Libya or of Tunisia in their mutual relations with one
another, To allow such a form of 'intervention' would, in the
particular circumstances of the present case, also leave the
Parties quite uncertain as to whether and how far they should
consider their own separate legal interests vis-à-vis Malta as in
effect constituting part of the subject-matter of the present
case. A State seeking to intervene under Article 62 of the
Statute is, in the view of the Court, not entitled to place the
parties to the case in such a position, and this is the more so
since it would not be submitting its own claims to decision nor be
exposing itself to counterclaims.ms
However, the Court did reassure Malta that its interests would be
protected by Article 59 of its Statute, which would limit the effects
of its reasoning and decision to the factual situation existing between
Tunisia and Libya.
Hence, in the Tunisia-Libya Judgement, the Court gave effect to
this promise most clearly in defining the relevant area for
delimitation, by acknowledging that the north and north-eastern parts
of the Pelagian Block were also areas over which other States had laid
claim, or could in the future:
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"...the presence of the territories of other States, including the
Pelagian Islands, and Pantellaria, belonging to the Pelagian Block
and abutting on the Pelagian Sea must not be lost sight of."14
Thus, recognising that it had no jurisdiction to deal with this
problem, and that it could not prejudge the future solution to it,1A7
the Court found itself unable to determine how far north-eastwards its
proposed delimitation line should extend, because this would ultimately
depend upon the delimitations with third States,
However, in considering for the purpose of proportionality, that
the whole of the area relevant to the delimitation was being divided by
the boundary line between Tunisia and Libya, third State rights were to
some extent ignored by the Court, because it was impossible, other than
arbitrarily, to define the area relevant to the delimitation given the
indeterminate claims of other States in the area.'9
7.3 Review of the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Judgement (1985) 
The Special Agreement referring the dispute between Tunisia and
Libya to the I.C.J. provided that, following delivery of the Judgement,
the Parties should meet to apply those principles and rules identified
by the Court in order to determine the line of delimitation, with a
view to the conclusion of a treaty.
	
There would be no need for
negotiation between the Parties as to the factors to be taken into
account in the delimitation, because:
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"The only task remaining will be the technical one making possible
the drafting of the treaty incorporating the result of the work by
the experts."'s°
However, if within three months of the Judgement, (renewable by mutual
agreement), no such treaty was concluded, the two Parties were to go
back to the Court for any explanations or clarifications which would
make delimitation easier, it being agreed that the two States should
comply with both the Court's Judgement and its clarifications and
explanations.161
Hence, in July 1984, Tunisia instituted proceedings seeking a
revision of the Court's decision, "the interpretation of that Judgment,
and the correction of what was regarded by Tunisia as an error in
it."' s° Specifically, Tunisia contended that the first sector of the
delimitation line was incorrectly based upon an assumption of the
common alignment of Tunisian and Libyan petroleum concessions, due to
the fact that Libya had not made available to the Court or to Tunisia,
a Council of Ministers' Resolution of 28 March 1968, which determined
the "real course" of the northwestern boundary of Libyan Petroleum
Concession No, 137. 1s° The discovery of this decisive document thus
called, under Article 61 of the Court's Statute, for the I.C.T. to
revise its Judgement for this sector,
Tunisia also argued that the westernmost point of the Gulf of
Gabes, from which the second segment of the boundary line was to
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commence, was not located at 34° 10' 30" N, as cited by the Court, but
5.2 miles south of this latitude at 34* 05' 20" N. 5S
However, the Court unanimously rejected all of Tunisia's
contentions, for the reasons set out below.
(a) The First (Nearshore) Sector 
In the first (nearshore) sector, the boundary was defined thus:
"... the starting point for the line of delimitation is the point
where the outer limit of the territorial sea of the Parties is
intersected by a straight line drawn from the land frontier point
at Ras Ajdir through the point 33° 55' N, 12° E, which runs at a
bearing of approximately 26° east of north, corresponding to the
angle followed by the north-western boundary of Libyan petroleum
concessions numbers NC 76, 137, NC 41 and NC 53, which was aligned
on the south-eastern boundary of [the] Tunisian petroleum
concession ... [of] (21 October 1966); from the intersection point
so determined,	 the line of delimitation between the two
continental shelves is to run northeast through the point 33' 55'
N, 12* E, thus on that same bearing, to the point of intersection
with the parallel passing through the most westerly point of the
Tunisian coastline between Ras Kaboudia and Ras tOdir, ..., the
most westerly point on the shoreline (low-water mark) of the Gulf
of Gabes."'ss
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However, in Tunisia's pleading, a detailed examination of the "new
fact" of the 1968 Libyan Council of Ministers' Resolution evidenced
that the "real course" of Libyan Concession No. 137 did not strictly
follow the 26' line, but varied from it by between 1* and 11/2.
	 In
addition, the stepped eastern boundary of the 1966 Tunisian permit did
not coincide with the western boundary of Concession No. 137 as claimed
by Libya, but rather differed from it by between 2° and 21/2°.1s7
Tunisia contended, therefore, that a delimitation line passing through
the point 33° 55' N, 12° E:
would allocate to Libya areas of continental shelf lying
within the Tunisian permit of 1966, contrary to what has been
clearly decided by the Court, whose entire decision is based on
the alignment between the permits and concessions granted by the
two Parties and on the resultant absence of any overlapping claims
up to 1974 and in the nearest offshore areas, up to 50 miles from
the coast."
For its part, Libya did not dispute the findings of the Tunisian
expert, but denied that it had misled the Court.
	 It argued that its
descriptions of concession No. 137's boundaries were accurate, if not
precise, and appropriate to the scale of maps used.
	 In their
pleadings, neither State had shown any interest in the precise course
of either this or the 1966 Tunisian concession's boundary, nor used
large-scale maps of the area to portray them:
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"That there was a generally common boundary between these
Concessions, following a direction of appro
—
ximately 25 as viewed
from Ras Aidir, was the extent of the descriptive detail given to
the Court by Libya and portrayed on its small-scale maps and, as
such, correct. "9
Instead, Libya concentrated on the admissability of the Tunisian
application for revision, arguing that it failed to comply with the
conditions set out in Article 61 of the I.C.J. Statute. 	 Specifically,
Libya contended that the Tunisian application was inadmissable because:
(i) the Council of Ministers' Resolution was known to Tunisia either at
the time of the 1982 Judgement, or at a time earlier than six months
before Tunisia's application for revision;
(ii) if the Resolution was unknown to Tunisia, its ignorance resulted
from Tunisian negligence; and
(iii) Tunisia had failed to show that the Resolution was "a decisive
factor" in the Court's decision.'"
Dealing with these contentions, the Court accepted that the actual
co-ordinates of Libyan Concession No. 137 constituted a "new fact," but
held that Tunisia should have been aware of the existence of an overlap
between the States' concessions, since the south-eastern tips of the
Tunisian concession not only overlapped the actual north-western
boundary of Concession No. 137, but also the 26° line which Libya
implied was its boundary, and which lay further to the east. 161 In the
Court's view, the co-ordinates of the concession boundary were readily
accessible to Tunisia in various sources, and thus although they were
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perhaps never officially communicated by Libya to Tunisia, it was in
Tunisia's interests to have ascertained them, 	 which it could
legitimately have done. Hence, ignorance of the "new fact" was due to
Tunisian negligence, and the request for revision inadmissable under
Article 61(1) of the Court's Statute.'6:2
The subsidiary request for interpretation of the Judgement was
found by the Court to be "closely bound up with the question of which
aspects of the case were to be regarded as constituting a 'decisive
factor' in that Judgment and which were not;" and specifically, as to
whether the fact of the concession coordinates was "of such a nature as
to be a decisive factor." 63 	Thus, although strictly speaking the
Court had no need to examine the decisiveness of the alleged "new
fact," it believed it would be helpful to do so.
According to Tunisia, the Court's definition of the delimitation
line in the first sector was based on three distinct factors, namely
that it was a straight line drawn:
(i) from the Ras Aidir land boundary through the point 33' 55' N, 12*
E;
(ii) at a bearing of approximately 26° east of north; and
(iii) corresponding to the angle formed by aligning the boundary of the
Libyan concessions on the boundary of the 1966 Tunisian petroleum
concession.
Of these, the latter was the most important criterion, for this was the
essential element on which the equitable character of the delimitation
depended.'" Therefore, given the new information, a line drawn from
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Ras &Nil- through the point 33° 55' N, 12 E, would not correspond with
a line drawn by aligning the Libyan concessions on the Tunisian
permits.
However, the Court observed that Tunisia had confused the
definition of "the determining line" with the definition of "the
delimitation line," concentrating on the former. 	 The "determining
line" had been defined for the purpose of establishing the starting
point of the delimitation line. 	 It was that line drawn from Ras Ajdir
through the point 33° 55' N, 12° E, which, "by way of explanation, but
not of definition," ran at the approximate bearing of 26° east of
north, corresponding to the angle formed by the alignment of the Libyan
and Tunisian petroleum concessions. 1S
The "delimitation line," on the other hand, was to join the point
33 0 55' N, 12' E to the point of intersection of the two Parties
territorial seas with the line drawn from Ras Ajdir;
"The considerations which led the Court to arrive at the choice of
that line are reflected in the operative clause only in so far as
they are indicated as an explanation of the 'determining line;'
they are not mentioned at all as part of the description of the
delimitation line itself.	 The role of the Parties' experts was
consequently limited to establishing with accuracy, ..., the two
points defined by the Court, and drawing a straight line between
them, which involves agreement between the experts ... They are
not required to concern themselves with any relationship between
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that line and the boundaries of the Libyan concessions or the
Tunisian permit."66
The I.C.J. then considered Tunisia's contention that knowledge of
the precise coordinates of Concession No. 137 would have led it to give
a different decision, 17 and agreed that the factual situation as
described in its Judgement would have been different in two respects.
Firstly, there would have been a slight degree of overlapping between
Tunisian and Libyan concessions as soon as Concession No. 137 was
granted in 1968; and secondly, the western boundary of successive
Libyan concessions would not have followed a consistent line at 26'
from Ras Aidir, but begun one mile further to the east of Ras Aidir.169
However,	 the Tunisian argument	 was,	 nevertheless,	 an "over-
simplification" of the Court's reasoning," because the line resulting
from the grant of petroleum concessions was "by no means the sole
consideration taken into account by the Court," but rather one of
several. 1S	 Specifically, in the first sector, "the factor of
perpendicularity to the coast and the concept of prolongation of the
general direction of the land boundary" were relevant circumstances "in
selecting a line of delimitation calculated to ensure an equitable
solution.""° Thus, concluded the I.C.J.;
"Any 'new fact' discovered in connection with the conduct of the
Parties in the grant of petroleum concessions IS therefore not
necessarily to be regarded as a decisive factor."171
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The Court also drew attention to Tunisia's narrow interpretation
of the term "aligned." The I.C.J. had known that the Tunisian boundary
was a stepped line and the Libyan boundary a straight line and,
therefore, its use of the term did not mean "that the boundaries of the
relevant concessions formed a perfect match in the sense that there was
neither any overlap of the concessions nor any sea-bed areas left open
between the two boundaries." Both Parties had told the Court that the
general direction of the Tunisian boundary was at 26 from Ras Ajdir,
and it was with this general direction, rather than with specific
coordinates, that the Libyan concession was said by the Court to be
"aligned. "172
Consequently, if the coordinates of Concession No. 137 had been
given to the Court, although its Judgement might not have been
identically worded, 17 	 its reasoning would have been "wholly
unaffected" by the new evidence. "4	 Both Parties had chosen
independently to use as boundary of their concessions a line
corresponding with whatever degree of approximation to a line drawn
from Ras Ajdir at 26° to the meridian, ''s thereby indicating that it
was equitable. The fact that the north-western boundary of Concession
137 ran at 24' 57' to the meridian was, therefore, not significant:
II ... what matters is that its most seaward point lies at 26° from
Ras Ajdir, which have [sic.] to be the starting paint for any
agreed delimitation of maritime areas between the Parties. 	 The
only straight delimitation line from Ras Ajdir which would have
been consistent with the choice by Libya of the point 33 0 55' N,
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12° E as the north-western corner of its concession (No. 137],
would be a line at some 26° to the meridian."7
Consequently, the Court found that knowledge of the specific co-
ordinates of Libyan Concession No. 137 did not constitute a decisive
factor which would have changed its decision in the first sector, and
thus unanimously concluded that the Tunisian application for revision
of the 1982 Judgement was inadmissable."7 The subsidiary request for
interpretation was also rejected for the same reasons.
Finally, in the nearshore sector, Tunisia sought the rectification
of an error in the Court's Judgement, based upon its view that its
"ratio decidendi" was that the delimitation line should run at the
angle formed by aligning the Libyan concessions on the 1966 Tunisian
permit.	 This meant, in Tunisia's view, that Libyan Concession No. 137
had to be aligned on the southeastern boundary of the Tunisian permit,
which could only be achieved "by drawing a straight line from the
frontier point of Ras Ajdir through point 33° 50' 17" N and 11° 59' 53"
E, which is the most easterly point of the Tunisian permit." 	 Thus,
Tunisia sought to correct this error by substituting the co-ordinates
of that point for the co-ordinates "mistakenly mentioned by the Court
on the basis of the inexact indications given by Libya in its
pleadings." This would also mean, that the States' experts would not
need to calculate the point through which the delimitation line must
pass.'"
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However, the Court reminded Tunisia that it had already found that
the choice of the point 33° 55' N, 12 E was "not the result of the
application of a criterion whereby the delimitation line had to avoid
encroachment on the Tunisian permit, or a more general criterion of
overlapping," but that:
"that point, taken from the description by Libya of the position
of its Concession No. 137, was chosen as a convenient concrete
means of defining the 26° line from Ras Aidir which appeared to
the Court, from the balancing-up of relevant considerations, to be
the appropriate method of effecting an equitable delimitation, and
is integral to the whole construction."179
Hence, the I.C.I. found Tunisia's application for a correction of an
error to be based upon a misreading of the Judgement, and without
foundation.le°
(b) The Second (Seaward) Sector 
In respect of the second (seaward) sector, Tunisia sought
interpretation of the turning point on the Court's delimitation line,
defined in the Judgement as "the most westerly point on the shoreline
(low-water mark) of the Gulf of Gabes," and used to reflect the change
in direction of the Tunisian coast. 	 The I.C.J. had stated that the
precise coordinates of this point were for the experts to determine,
but added that it appeared that it would be at approximately 34' 10'
30" N. ' Q '	 Tunisia reported, however, that the Libyan experts had
•
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insisted that because the Court's Judgement had specified the
coordinates of 34 0
 10' 30" N with some precisiOn, the two States'
experts "should confine themselves to a strict application of that
Judgment," despite the fact that no co-ordinates, even approximate,
were indicated in the operative part of the Judgement. 12	 It,
therefore, sought the Court's interpretation as to the binding
character of the coordinates it had specified.'93
In particular, Tunisia sought interpretation because its expert
calculated the most westerly point on the Gulf of Gabes shoreline to be
either 34° 05' 20" N or 34 05' 30" N, depending on the geodetic system
used. A point in the region 34' 10' N was inappropriate, because there
a tidal channel ran into the mouth of a wadi, although it acknowledged
that such a point lay at a far more westerly longitude than the
aforementioned points. 	 However, Libya, rejected the two points
identified by Tunisia, because it regarded the task of the experts as
"technical but of a very narrow scope, since the Court had already made
its own preliminary, yet very precise, calculation." In its view, the
determination of the actual point by the experts was therefore "a
matter perhaps of seconds, not minutes or degrees. 111E4
The Court focussed its attention on the reasons why the Tunisian
expert had rejected the point at 34° 10' N, noting that he regarded the
tidal channel as a localized feature entirely independent of the
general morphology of the Gulf, and which could not reasonably be
considered as marking the point where the general direction of the
coastline changed direction, "that being the criterion chosen by the
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Court to determine the latitude at which the bearing of the maritime
delimitation line should be modified." 1e8
 This objection was, however,
dismissed by the I.C.J., which drew attention to the fact 'that in its
Judgement, it had specifically stated that the delimitation line should
not "change direction in relation to the point at which the coastline
changes direction," because geographers would not necessarily agree on
the point where this took place.	 In particular, the Court had
acknowledged that as the point could not be objectively determined, it
would leave room for extensive, perhaps unresolvable, disagreement
between the States' experts, and would therefore not be appropriate as
an indication of the practical method to be adopted so as to enable the
experts to delimit the boundary without difficulty. 	 Instead, it had
decided that an appropriate coastal reference point for reflecting the
change in the delimitation, and one which had the advantage of being
objectively determined geographically, was the most westerly point on
the shoreline of the Gulf of Gabes. 16 The I.C.J. further explained
that it conceived of this as meaning that point further west than any
other point on the shoreline, and not "the most westerly point which
could reasonably be considered as marking the point where the general
direction of the coastline changes." The change in coastal direction
was merely to be reflected but not defined by the "appropriate
point, " 97 a decision which would appear to lack the precision required
for maritime boundary delimitation.
Indeed, playing down the importance of the actual change in
coastal direction would seem to weaken the Court's view that the fact
of the change of geography at a specific point necessitated a change of
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direction in the delimitation line in relation to that point. lee It is
also hard to see how a point can reflect the change in coastal
direction without being the point at which the coast changes direction,
notwithstanding the difficulties identified by the Court in its
determination.
However, the Court had also to consider the second contention put
forward by Tunisia, which stated that:
"For the purpose of [the] determination [of the latitude where the
coast changes direction], the low-water line must be considered as
closed by the continuity existing on either side of the low-tide
elevation which splits the channel in two where it meets the sea.
Despite the insignificant size of the channels, this closure may,
if one so wishes, be interpreted as an estuary closing line
replacing at this spot the physical low-water line in conformity
with the law governing the definition of baselines."99
The Court, however, agreed with Libya that the presence of the wadi was
irrelevant, because it believed that "the task assigned to the experts
was not to identify baselines but, quite specifically, to identify the
most westerly point on the low-water mark." 19° It firmly rejected any
suggestion that it had intended to apply Article 13 of the Territorial
Sea Convention to exclude from its definition of the 1"most westerly
point" a point lying in the mouth of a wadi, and stressed that the most
westerly point on the low-water mark of the Gulf of Gabes was what it
said it was, and not a point on any straight baseline, otherwise it
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-would have been defined as such.
	 Indeed, the fact that Tunisia had
drawn a straight baseline across the Gulf of Gabès meant the Court was
"well aware that Tunisia was not claiming to draw straight baselines
between comparatively minor features," since it regarded the whole of
the Gulf as internal waters,
As to the significance to be attached to the reference to the
coordinates 34° 10' 33" N, the Court stressed that this was a
definition of an approximate position based on the examination of the
small-scale maps presented to it by the Parties, who were to determine
its precise coordinates. 199 However, the Court had found it necessary
to have "some reasonably accurate idea" of the latitude of the most
westerly point "in order to assess properly the effect on the
delimitation of the change in direction of the line which it had found
to be appropriate," i.e. it could not have assessed the effect to be
attributed to the Kerkennah Islands, or employed the proportionality
test without this information. ' 99	 Hence, the Court had adopted the
point 34 0 10' 33" N as "a working definition of the point it had in
mind," but this was not binding on the Parties, as shown both by its
reference to the point lying at "approximately" 34 0
 10' 33" N, and by
the fact that it did not repeat the coordinates in the operative part
of its Judgement.
	
The only statement with binding force in the
operative part of the Judgement with respect to this sector was that
specifying the effect to be given the Kerkennah Islands , 19A and
consequently it could not find that the most westerly point on the Gulf
of Gabés was 34° 05' 20" N as contended by Tunisia.19s
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Moreover it would be inconsistent with its original Judgement for
the Court to specify what the actual coordinates of this point were as
this had been left to the States' experts to decide, although if the
most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes was to lay in a channel
leading up to a wadi, "that geographical circumstance should be
accepted as it is." However, if:
n ... the cartographic and other material available does not
suffice to establish the exact position of the most westerly point
on the low-water mark within the channel, then it will be for the
Parties, with the assistance of the experts, to decide whether to
adopt in this respect the indications given by the existing maps,
or whether to proceed to a special survey in 1oco."96
This statement related to the fact that Tunisia had argued
(without Libyan opposition) that there was "cause to order an expert
survey for the purpose of ascertaining the exact co-ordinates of the
most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes. " 197	 On legal grounds,
however, the Court found that it could not agree to Tunisia's request,
as the determination of the exact coordinates of the most westerly
point of the Gulf of Gabes was unnecessary for the Court to give
Judgement on the matters submitted to it. ' 9 The Court still preferred
the States' experts to determine the precise coordinates, although this
did not prevent them from agreeing to come back to the Court with a
Joint request that it order an expert survey to establish this point
with precision. However, it implied that this would be unnecessary:
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"At all events, this point is susceptible of geographical
determination, despite the circumstance that it may lie in the
mouth of a wadi."'
Indeed, the operative part of its Judgement stressed that the
determination of the precise coordinates of the westernmost point on
the Gulf of Gabes was to be made "regardless of whether or not such
point might be regarded by the experts as marking a change in direction
of the coastline."200
(c) Future Prospects 
The Court's Judgement concluded with some strong words concerning
the failure of the Parties to fulfil their obligation to enter into
meaningful negotiations with a view to concluding a delimitation treaty
based upon its 1982 decision:
"...the obligation still rests upon both Parties to carry out the
Special Agreement to the very end, and to have the 1982 Judgment
implemented so that the dispute is finally disposed of. Thus the
Parties must ensure that their experts and representatives engage
in a sincere exercise involving a geniune effort to determine the
precise co-ordinates of the most westerly point on the shoreline
(low-water mark) of the Gulf of Gabes, in the 'light of the
indications furnished in the present Judgment, with a view to the
conclusion of the delimitation treaty."201
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Nevertheless, to date, little progress would appear to have been made.
This is perhaps not surprising, because in reading the Court's
Judgement one is left with the impression that although its decisions
were the correct ones based on the original Judgement in 1982, the
wording of the latter in respect of the methods to be employed in
constructing the delimitation line was imprecise enough as to make it
hard for the Parties' experts to effect the delimitation "without any
difficulties."
This was particularly the case in the second sector, where the
Court's desire to give effect to the change in Tunisian coastal
direction was hampered by the fact that it was unwilling or unable to
specify the precise point at which it believed the change in coastal
direction to occur.	 In mitigation, this was in part a problem of the
Special Agreement, in that the Court was not asked to delimit an actual
boundary line, but it was also partly the fault of the Court for its
decision to detail with precision the practical method for application
of the relevant principles and rules it identified. What resulted was
neither simply an indication of the relevant principles and rules to be
applied to the delimitation, nor the delimitation of an actual boundary
line, but something in between.	 This left the Parties' experts, in
particular on the Tunisian side, with considerable doubt as to the
binding force with which precise coordinates or descriPtive passages
were to be interpreted.
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The 1985 Judgement also drew attentio
,-
n to the fact that the
Court's decision was based upon the use of small-scale maps, totally
inadequate for the precise task of maritime boundary delimitation
before it.	 For example, in the first sector, the Court was, despite
its protestations,	 undoubtedly swayed by the Parties'
	
general
descriptions and small-scale maps of their concession boundaries.
These indicated some consensus on the 26° line as a boundary, 202 in a
way which it might not have occurred had precise coordinates or large-
scale maps been made available. 	 Consequently, in future cases, the
parties would be well-advised to produce precise descriptions and
large-scale maps of their concession boundaries, in order to avoid
giving the incorrect impression of the existence of an equitable de
facto maritime boundary.
With hindsight, the Court should also not have given such
considerable weight to the change in direction of the Tunisian coast
without requesting the opportunity to consult large-scale charts of the
area. On the other hand, Tunisia's objections to 34 10' 30" N as the
westernmost point on the Gulf of Gabês could have been avoided had it
originally submitted the expert advice upon which it subsequently
rejected this point, although admittedly it is difficult to see how
Tunisia could have foreseen that the Court would accord such
considerable weight to the change in coastal direction. However, given
that it did, there should have been no reference to coordinates once
the difficulties involved in ascertaining the point in question had
been acknowledged.
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Similarly, the adoption of a "working definition" for the most
westerly point on the Gulf of Gans does not put the Court's treatment
of the Kerkennah Islands in a very favourable light, as this point was
the basis of the half-effect given to the Islands in the
delimitat1on. 2°3
 If this point had subsequently not been found to lie
in the vicinity of 34° 10' 33" N, half-effect might not have been the
appropriate weight to accord the Kerkennah Islands. Moreover, had the
delimitation line been found not to turn along the latitude 34° 10' 33"
N, the already discredited use of proportionality in this delimitation
would have been further rendered both inappropriate and inaccurate as a
test of the equities of the Court's proposed boundary line.
Therefore, taken as a whole, these difficulties would seem to give
force to those who have argued the absence of a recognised method of
delimitation in the Judgement.	 Judge Oda's modifed equidistance line,
for example, would not have presented the subsequent problems with
which this delimitation has been bedevilled.
As to the future implementation of the 1982 Judgement, the Court
reiterated that under the terms of the Special Agreement the States had
undertaken "not only to conclude a treaty, but in doing so to apply the
principles and rules indicated by the Court." They were also to comply
with the Court's explanations and clarifications in the present case.
As a result, the experts of both States are bound to enter into
meaningful negotiations, with a view to concluding an agreement
implementing the 1982 Judgement, without revision or correction of
error, and complying with the Court's subsequent interpretations.
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However, the Court also acknowledged that Tunisia and Libya might still
reach an agreement upon a delimitation that did not correspond with its
Judgement, which would supersede the Special Agreement, (e.g. Libya
might accept that the westernmost point of the Gulf of Gabês lies
further south than the Court suggested), but that in the absence of
such an agreement,
	
the Court's Judgement was "definitive and
binding. 11204 However, neither appears particularly likely at present,
although the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two States,
In December 1987, 20s is a more positive sign.
7.4 The Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case (1985) 
(a) Background to the Case 
The second Mediterranean continental shelf boundary dispute heard
by the I.C.J. concerned Libya and Malta.
By a Note Verbale of 5 May 1965, Malta informed Libya that it
intended to delimit its continental shelf on the basis of a median
line; and in 1966, it duly enacted its Continental Shelf Act indicating
that where shelf boundaries with neighbouring States were necessary,
these should follow median lines. 2C 	 These actions presented immediate
problems for, before 1965, neither State had views on the delimitation
of their respective continental shelves. 	 Libya's 1955 petroleum
legislation had left the northern boundary of its continental shelf
undefined, according to its Memorial, in recognition that boundaries
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had to be agreed with other States," 7 wh.ilst Malta's Petroleum
(Production) Act (1958) was similarly silent.
However, negotiations did not commence until 1972, when Malta
submitted to Libya a draft agreement delimiting an equidistance line
between the two States stretching the length of the Libyan coast (from
34 27' N, 13° 27' E to 34' 48' N, 18° 04' 06" E). 209 In 1973, Libya
responded by submitting a draft agreement defining a boundary well to
the north of that proposed by Malta, which took into account the
difference in the length of the States' coasts, insofar as it related
to the delimitation of the area lying between the coordinates 13° 49'
511 E and 14° 53' 5" E. 2°' Malta totally rejected this proposal and
instead invited applications for production licences for sixteen blocks
to its south, four of which were defined by its proposed median line
boundary and hence in disputed waters. 2'0
In 1974, Malta proposed, and Libya accepted, that the dispute be
referred for arbitration, 2"	 However, at the same time, both States
issued licences for blocks in the disputed area, certain of which
overlapped. A series of protests and reservations ensued, during which
time Libya appeared to abandon its 1973 proposal based on
proportionality in favour of an indeterminate claim to areas even
further north. 21Z
An agreement to submit the dispute to the I.C.J. was reached in
October 1975, but there was disagreement as to the task of the Court.
Malta wished the I.C.J. to delimit the actual boundary, whereas Libya
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wanted the Court to specify the principles and rules applicable to the
delimitation of both the continental shelf and E.E.Z. 213 Nevertheless,
on 23 May 1976, a Special Agreement acceptable to both States was
signed.	 Malta ratified this Agreement in 1976, but it was not until
1982 that Libya was persuaded to do
In the intervening period, Malta's anxiety to settle the dispute
to enable exploration of its continental shelf was met with
intransigence on the part of Libya, partly because it was awaiting the
outcome of UNCLOS III, and partly because the submission to the
of its dispute with Tunisia had taken priority. 	 Malta blocked Libyan
attempts to revise the terms of the Special Agreement, whilst Libya
rejected a Maltese proposal which would have allowed each State to
explore the area up to a 10 mile buffer zone centred on its median line
boundary. 216
 Finally, diplomatic efforts having failed, Malta informed
Libya, by a Note Verbale of 21 November 1979, of its intentions to
start drilling on its shelf up to a buffer zone of 30 miles centred on
its original median line boundary, 21 even though this included areas
under dispute between the States.
Further unsuccessful negotiations followed until, in August 1980,
an oil rig operating 50 miles southeast of Malta on the Medina Bank, on
a permit issued by Malta, had its operations forcibly suspended by
Libyan warships. Libya contended that since the continental shelf area
was in dispute between the two States, no drilling activity should take
place pending either a negotiated settlement or the I.C.J.'s decision.
Malta, on the other hand, felt that any implicit understanding which
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might have arisen from the 1976 reference to the I.C.J. had lapsed in
the face of Libya's delay in ratifying the Special Agreement. 17
A further year of bilateral negotiations ensued, but aided by a
Special Representative of the U.N. Security Council, the two States
finally agreed to allow the dispute to be heard by the I.C.1.219
(b) The Task of the Court 
It is not surprising that the terms of the Special Agreement by
which the dispute was submitted to the Court bear a marked resemblance
to those by which the I.C.J. heard the dispute between Tunisia and
Libya, as it was signed before that in the Tunisia-Libya Case. 	 The
Court was asked to decide upon the principles and rules of
international law applicable to the delimitation, and to state how in
practice these could be applied in order that the two Parties might
"without difficulty" delimit their respective continental shelves by an
agreement. 91a It was not, however, asked to delimit the boundary line.
As such, this represented a compromise devised by the Parties to
overcome their differences of opinion as to what the Court's task
should be.	 Malta had wanted the Court to draw an actual "dividing
line," whereas Libya had preferred a mere indication of "rules and
principles," with the delimitation itself to be subject to'an agreement
between the States, 220 consistent with its contention that the actual
boundary was not capable of discovery, but should be found to lie
somewhere within "the Rift Zone," a series of deep troughs in the
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seabed which it held to mark the terminati .on of Malta's natural
prolongation.	 Where exactly the boundary was within the Rift Zone,
would be for the Parties to agree upon. 2 '? ' Malta, on the other hand,
interpreted the I.C.J.'s task as to indicate, "with some degree of
particularity the line of delimitation, "22 consistent with its
repeated	 advocation	 of	 a	 specific	 boundary	 line based	 on
equidistance.22:14
The Court, however, decided that, as in the Tunisia-Libya Case, if
it was required to state principles and rules enabling the Parties to
delimit the boundary "without difficulty," it would have to indicate
the appropriate method or methods by which this might be accomplished.
Therefore, taking the view that it was not "debarred by the terms of
•
the Special Agreement from indicating a line," not least because it
could not test the equity of its result without so doing, 22 the Court
found it necessary to show how the methods it put forward were to be
applied to the actual boundary line.
(c) The Relevant Law 
With respect to the relevant law, the States were agreed that the
delimitation should be governed by customary international law,
because:
(i) only Malta was a party to the Continental Shelf Convention;
(ii) although both States had signed it, the 1982 Convention was not
yet in force; and
(iii) they disagreed as to which of the 1982 Convention's provisions
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were binding as customary international law.
There was, therefore, agreement that delimitation was to be effected in
accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all relevant
circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result, but differences
as to how these principles were to be given expression. 22$
(d) The Italian Request for Intervention226
Before turning to the pleadings of the Parties, it is necessary
first to consider the effects of the 1983 Italian application to
intervene for although it was refused, the Court subsequently excluded
from its delimitation all those continental shelf areas to the
southeast and southwest of Malta to which Italy asserted claims, 22
In its application for intervention, Italy indicated that it
wished to participate in the proceedings to the degree necessary to
protect its "undeniable rights" over a substantial part of the
continental shelf at issue between Libya and Malta.
	 It stressed that
it was not asking the Court to decide on the merits of its claims, but
merely sought to inform the Court of its interests so that it could
take them into account.	 Indeed, Italy argued that its geographical
location made it a necessary party to the case, because without its
participation the Court had no jurisdiction over those continental
shelf areas to which Italy also laid claim, and would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to indicate how the principles and rules
It identified applied to the delimitation area.22e Therefore, Italy
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agreed to be bound by the Court's decision insofar as this affected the
legitimacy of its claims.'229
Not surprisingly, both Malta and Libya opposed the intervention on
the basis that the Italian claims were vague, that they had had not
been raised with the Parties prior to their seeking arbitration, and
that there was already provision for the protection of Italian
interests under Article 59 of the Court's Statute. 23° If Italy wished
to intervene to assert its rights against the Parties then this created
a new case requiring a jurisdictional link, which did not exist.
Consequently, if the Italian intervention was permitted, Libya and
Malta would be forced unfairly to negotiate their boundary on the basis
of the Court's judgement, whereas no such obligation would be imposed
on Italy.2r"
The Court subsequently found that it was being asked to determine
those areas of the continental shelf over which Italy had rights, in
order not to delimit it between the Parties. Therefore, although Italy
adamantly denied it, the real object of its intervention was to cause
the Court to adjudicate, without Libyan or Maltese consent, on the
dispute between Italy and one or both of the Parties as to the extent
of the Italian continental shelf. 232 The I.C.J. agreed with Libya and
Malta that there was no jurisdictional link with the present case-
and, "[Wary of the dangers of introducing a fresh dispute into the
case," declined to give permission for Italy to intervene. 24 However,
this did not mean that the Court would ignore the legal interests of
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Italy and other third States, but rather that it would take account of
them "in the same way as was done" in the Tunisia-Libya Case.3s
In fact, the Court subsequently went further - perhaps reflecting
the lack of unanimity in the Court's rejection of non-party
intervention	 - and confined its Judgement to an area in which
Italian claims would remain unaffected, namely between the meridians
13° 50' E and 15° 10' E.
	 It justified this decision by reference to
the Special Agreement, stating that it had been requested to decide the
areas which would appertain to the Parties and, therefore, it must
confine itself to those areas contested only by Malta and Libya.27
However, it also added that:
"in expressing a negative opinion on the Italian application [for
intervention], the two countries had shown their preference for a
restriction in the geographical scope of the Judgment which the
Court was to give,"23e
although it seems highly unlikely that the Parties either accepted or
would have accepted such a restriction as a result of their legitimate
objections to the Italian request for intervention. 239 Similarly, it
Is unlikely that they could have foreseen the necessity of pleading
that the Italian claims were "obviously unreasonable" or should be
disregarded by the Court, 2O
(e) Pleadings of the Parties 
The fundamental disgreement between the Parties concerned the
basis of coastal State title to the continental shelf, for it was from
this that their delimitation methods were derived.
Malta submitted that the relevant law required a median line
constructed from the appropriate baselines of the two States'
territorial seas: namely, Malta's straight baselines and the low-water
mark on the coast of Libya. 2A1	Not only did the application of the
equidistance principle provide an equitable solution to the dispute,
but it flowed naturally from the concept of distance as the basis of
coastal State title to the continental shelf, as it had emerged from
recent developments in the law of the sea, 242 In particular, Malta
drew attention to Article 76(1) of the 1982 Convention which, although
not yet in force, recognised the right of coastal States to a
continental shelf of at least 200 miles.	 From this, it argued that
distance had become the legal basis for determining both the seaward
limit of the continental shelf and boundaries between opposite and
adjacent States, whereas natural prolongation had:
"... become a purely spatial concept which operates independently
of all geomorphological or geological characteristics, only
resuming physical significance beyond 200 nautical miles from the
coast,	 since states possessing a more extensive natural
prolongation enjoy continental shelf rights to the edge of the
continental margin."2'3
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In addition, although its delimitation was not an issue, the fact that
the E.E.Z. concept, (which incorporates continental shelf rights up to
200 miles), was similarly defined in terms of distance, could not be
ignored.244
Consequently, Malta deduced that since, owing to their proximity,
neither itself nor Libya could claim a full 200 mile continental shelf
or E.E.Z., the median line principle naturally reflected the "distance"
entitlement of each State:
"The appropriateness of the equidistance method is confirmed by
the criterion of distance, of which it is but another form."245
Thus, for Malta, the natural prolongation of a State was defined in
terms of distance from the coast rather by the seabed's physical
features.2.46
Libya, on the other hand, questioned the applicability of
equidistance in the delimitation process, and in particular, its
application in a semi-enclosed sea like the Mediterranean. It disputed
distance as the basis of continental shelf title, and reminded the
Court that the E.E.Z. was not an issue in the case.	 Moreover, the
E.E.Z. had not so absorbed the continental shelf concept that some
basic differences between the two regimes did not rem 'ain. 247 Libya
recognised that distance had a role to play in Article 76, but it did
not necessarily follow that it was a rule of positive international
law. Instead, Libya maintained that under customary international law,
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as developed in the North Sea and Tunis}-a-Libya Cases, natural
prolongation alone gave a coastal State title to the continental shelf,
the natural prolongation of the landmass being a "geological fact"
involving geographical as well as geological and geomorphological
aspects. 248
Therefore, having established natural prolongation as the basis of
continental shelf title, Libya submitted that there existed "a
fundamental discontinuity" in the seabed and subsoil which divided the
continental shelf into two distinct natural prolongations, and which
marked the geological boundary between two tectonic plates. 249 This
fundamental discontinuity, or "Rift Zone," consisted of "a series of
deep troughs, running in a generally northwest-southwest direction,
and reaching over 1 000 metres in depth," 2 ° and defined the area in
which the continental shelf boundary should lie.21
Significantly, Libya also contended that equitable principles
required the Court to take into account the relative coastal lengths of
the two States in order to give effect to the degree of proportionality
between them, arguing that a delimitation within the Rift Zone would
meet the test of proportionality as applied in the Tunisia-Libya
Case.:262
(f) The Court's Judgement 
In its Judgement, the Court refused to view the concepts of
distance and natural prolongation as conflicting, 	 and instead
maintained that they were complementary, interrelated, and each
integral to the continental shelf.	 However, the I,C.J. was
surprisingly swayed by Malta's reference to the distance concept in
relation to the E,E.Z., and found it necessary to consider the
relationship between the continental shelf and the E.E.Z. in the light
of the 1982 Convention.	 It concluded that the continental shelf and
E.E.Z. were linked in international law:
"Since the rights enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf
would also be possessed by it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any
exclusive economic zone which it might proclaim, one of the
relevant circumstances to be taken into account for the
delimitation of the continental shelf of a State is the legally
permissible extent of the exclusive economic zone appertaining to
that same State.	 This does not mean that the concept of the
continental shelf has been absorbed by that of the exclusive
economic zone; it does however signify that greater importance
must be attributed to elements, such as distance from the coast,
which are common to both concepts."254
The Court went on to add that State practice evidenced that the
E.E.Z., "with its rules on entitlement by reason of distance," is a
part of international customary law, so that:
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"Although the institutions of the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zone are different and distinct, the rights
which the exclusive economic zone entails over the sea-bed of the
zone are defined by reference to the regime laid down for the
continental shelf,	 Although there can be no continental shelf
where there is no exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an
exclusive economic zone without a corresponding continental shelf.
It follows that, for judicial and practical reasons, the distance
criterion must now apply to the continental shelf as well as to
the exclusive economic zone; and this quite apart from the
provision as to distance in paragraph 1 of Article 76. 	 This is
not to suggest that the idea of natural prolongation is now
superseded by that of distance. What it does mean is that where
the continental margin does not extend as far as 200 miles from
the shore, natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical
origins had throughout history become more and more a complex and
juridical concept, is in part defined by distance from the shore,
irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and
subsoil.	 The concepts of natural prolongation and distance are
therefore not opposed but complementary; and both remain essential
elements in the judicial concept of the continental shelf. "2s5
Thus, according to the Court, a State could claim continental
shelf rights up to 200 miles offshore,	 irrespective of the
configuration of the seabed within that distance.	 This had great
significance for the present case, because as the States were less than
400 miles apart the Court had no need to consider the physical
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character of the seabed either for the purpose of verifying either
State's continental shelf entitlement, 	 or for the purpose of
delimitation.	 Instead,	 the Court ruled that because natural
prolongation "has no part to play in the establishment of title," there
was no reason for it to "be taken into account as a relevant
circumstance	 for	 the purposes of delimitation." .766	However,
recognising that this contradicted its finding in the North Sea and
Tunisia-Libya Cases where it had admitted that physical features of the
seabed could play an important role, the Court indicated that its
previous statements had been rendered ineffectual by the change in the
law in favour of distance-based title. 	 Consequently, the I.C.I. was
able to reject Libya's argument that the continental shelf boundary
should lie within the Rift Zone, although it added for good measure
that it found the evidence presented by both Parties to be too
conflicting as to justify use of the Rift Zone as a natural
boundary.
The Court also rejected Malta's argument for the primacy of
equidistance in giving effect to the distance principle.	 Malta had
been careful not to argue that the equidistance method was fundamental
or inherent in the continental shelf concept, or had a legally
obligatory character.	 Instead, it argued that because the Maltese and
Libyan coasts faced each other in a completely normal setting,
equidistance was required as the provisional point of departure in the
delimitation process, a view which it supported with a detailed
analysis of all bilateral agreements between opposite States, a large
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number of which used equidistance, providing "significant and reliable
evidence of normal standards of equity,"
Not surprisingly, however, the I.C.J. again denied equidistance
any mandatory character, even as a provisional step:
"That a coastal State may be entitled to continental shelf rights
by reason of distance from the coast, and irrespective of the
physical characteristics of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil,
does not entail that equidistance is the only appropriate method
of delimitation, even between opposite or quasi opposite coasts,
nor even the only permissible point of departure. The application
of equitable principles in the particular relevant circumstances
may still require the adoption of another method, or combination
of methods, of delimitation, even from the outset."259
Nevertheless, as will be seen later, in subsequently adopting a
provisional median line delimitation, the Court proceeded to use
equidistance as the point of departure for its delimitation.
However, before considering appropriate methods of delimitation,
the Court first had to turn its attention to the circumstances pleaded
as relevant by the Parties.
At the outset, the Court denied that any factors concerned with
the history of the dispute, the legislative enactments of the Parties,
or their exploratory activities on the disputed shelf, constituted
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relevant circumstances. These factors did not reflect any acquiescence
by either Party to the claims of the other, nor did they differ from
the position taken by the States before the Court.260
The I.C.J. also dismissed Libya's contention that the extent of a
coastal State's landmass was related to the extent of its natural
prolongation seawards, stating that the entitlement to offshore areas
derived from a State's coastline and not the extent of its landmass per
se. 2t'1
Malta fared no better in relation to the economic factors which it
considered the Court ought to take into account, which included the
unavailability of indigenous energy resources (in contrast to the
plentiful supplies available to Libya), its recognition by UNCTAD as a
developing island State, and its essential and established fishing
practices which traversed the median line. 	 The Court found each of
these circumstances irrelevant with respect to both continental shelf
title and delimitation. To give these circumstances weight would be to
deny the equitable principle that natural inequalities could not be
redressed by circumstances that brought about equality:
"The Court does not ... consider that a delimitation should be
influenced by the relative economic position of the two States in
question, in such a way that the area of continental shelf
regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two States would
be somewhat increased in order to compensate for its inferiority
in economic resources.	 Such considerations are totally unrelated
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to the underlying intention of the applicable rules of
International law,
Malta had, however, never sought to establish a boundary which was
closer to the Libyan coast. It had steadfastly advocated a median line
solution and its invocation of economic factors may only have been an
attempt to ensure that the boundary was not placed closer to the
Maltese coast due to the arguments put forward by Libya.
Both States accepted that under international law islands were
entitled to a continental shelf of their own, but Libya maintained that
any island, constituting a State or a part thereof, must be considered
as such, by which it meant that the possibility of giving it less than
full effect must be considered. 	 Malta, however, contended that while
dependent islands might be treated differently in delimitation
depending on factors such as size, geographical position, population or
economy, Island States should not be. 2's
	The I.C.I. partly agreed that
because Malta was an independent State "the relationship of its coasts
with the coasts of its neighbours is different from what it would be if
it were part of the territory of one of them" and, therefore, should
not be treated as if it was dependent on a mainland, but this did not
mean that Island States should have any special status, 24
Consequently, the Court also rejected the closely conhected idea
that the principle of the sovereign equality of States would support an
equidistance line delimitation, in order to ensure that the two States'
maritime extensions would be equal regardless of the length of their
-626-
respective coasts. 26' Instead, the I.C.J. stated that entitlement to a
continental shelf did not mean entitlement to equal shares.
Malta also pleaded that as a neutral State its security and
defence needs required that the continental shelf boundary should not
be near its coast, but that equidistance would give each State a
"comparable lateral control."	 However, although the Court accepted
that security was related to the continental shelf concept, it did not,
at first sight, appear to accept it as a determining factor in the
delimitation. Instead, it noted that its delimitation would not be "so
near to the coast of either party as to make questions of security a
particular consideration in the present case,
Finally,
	 Libya argued that proportionality was a relevant
circumstance. 7 The Court responded by stressing that its role was
limited to identifying and correcting distortions which certain
delimitation methods might cause when used in the context of certain
coastal configurations such as convexity and concavity, the view
enunciated in the Anglo-French Arbitration. 	 Therefore, echoing the
Court of Arbitration, and prompted by its view that Libya was putting
it forward as such, the I.C.J. stated that proportionality was not a
"general principle providing an independent source of rights."269
McDorman contends that Libya never explicitly pleaded the use of
proportionality in this manner, 26-4 but having read the Libyan pleadings
it is not difficult to see why the Court thought it had. 	 Thus, the




	 to use the ratio of coastal lengths as of itself
determinative of the seaward reach and area of continental shelf
proper to each party, 	 is to go far beyond the use of
proportionality as a test of equity, and as a corrective of the
unjustifiable difference of treatment resulting from some method
of drawing the boundary line.	 If such a use of proportionality
were right, it is difficult to see what room there would be left
for any other consideration; for it would be at once the principle
of entitlement to continental shelf rights and also the method of
putting that principle into operation."27°
Hence, the Court decided that proportionality was only to be used to
test the equity of the result.
The Court, therefore, paid far less attention to the circumstances
which it regarded as relevant, than those it did not.
	 Indeed, the
former were only explicitly identified in the operative part of the
Judgement, despite that fact that they were controlling factors in the
Court's determination of its methods of delimitation.
	 Specifically,
the following were identified as being relevant:
"(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, their
oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the
general geographical context;
(2) the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the
parties and the distance between them;
(3) the need to avoid in the delimitation any excessive
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disproportion between the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of the relevant
part of its coast, measured in the general direction of the
coastlines,
Applying equitable principles in the light of these relevant
circumstances, the Court decided that its delimitation would need to be
carried out in two stages. 	 First, it would determine a provisional
line of delimitation, "using a criterion and a method both of which are
clearly destined to play an important role in producing the final
result," and then it would "examine the provisional solution in the
light of the requirements derived from other criteria, which may call
for a correction of this initial result." 272	However, although the
logic of the Court's action was thus explained, it is clear that it
always contemplated such an adjustment in order to achieve an equitable
result.
In selecting the delimitation method to be employed, the Court
recognised the need to give expression to distance as the basis of
title, and to the geographical relationship of Malta and Libya as
opposite States.
	 Consequently, it selected the equidistance method
despite having earlier rejected the view that equidistance was the
natural point of departure to give expression to distance as the basis
of title.	 However, the Court
	 was willing to acknowledge that the
State practice appealed to by Malta did provide "impressive evidence"
that the equidistance method could provide an equitable solution in
many different situations, 73
 and that the equidistance method was
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especially prevalent in cases of delimitation between opposite States.
It also recalled the view it had enunciated in the North Sea Cases to
the effect that equidistance was a more equitable method of
delimitation between opposite as opposed to adjacent States. 274 Thus,
whilst denying that equidistance had any primacy over other methods,
even	 provisionally,	 the	 I.C.T.	 found	 that	 this	 delimitation
"exclusively between opposite coasts" justified a provisional median
line. 275
The Court then drew significance from the fact that equidistance
was not usually applied without qualifications, whether in State
practice or in conference diplomacy, to find that its median line
delimitation required adjustment. 76
 This was to take the form of a
northward transposition, an adjustment dictated by the circumstances
the Court identified as relevant, and by the fact that the States were
opposite each other, the provisional median line lying roughly parallel
to the Maltese and Libyan coasts. 277
	Applying the relevant
circumstances, the Court also appeared to give limited consideration to
Malta's security arguments by stating that the provisional median line
should not be shifted "so near to one coast as to bring into play other
factors such as security." 27e
	In addition,	 another relevant
circumstance was the fact that, ignoring Filfla, only two basepoints on
the Maltese coast, lying 11 kilometres apart, controlled the median
line envisaged by Malta.279
As to the other factors necessitating transposition of the median
line, the Court principally gave consideration to the disparity in the
-630-
two States' coastal lengths.	 Libya argued that equitable principles
required the Court to take into account the relative coastal lengths of
the two States,	 in order to give effect to the degree of
proportionality between them.	 Malta, on the other hand, attempted to
Justify its use of equidistance by suggesting that where a short coast
faces a long one, automatic proportionality is conferred by a median
line. Drawing a trapezium with the coast of Malta as its top, and the
coast of Libya as its base, Malta evidenced that a median line drawn
between the two coasts would allocate a far greater area to the State
with the longer coastline. 2e° The Court, however, was unconvinced that
this method would sufficiently correct the disproportion in coastal
lengths,' and found instead that the difference in coastal lengths
was so great "as to Justify the adjustment of the median line so as to
attribute a larger shelf area to Libya."2e2
The relevant Libyan coast between Ras Ajdir and Ras Zarruq was
found to be 192 miles long following its general direction, whereas the
length of the general direction of the Maltese coastline, following
straight baselines,	 but ignoring Filfla, was only 24 miles.e:3
Interestingly, however, the Court decided that the assessment of the
relative coastal lengths depended on the identification of the relevant
coasts "in broad terms," and did not need to be quantified because the
disparity between coastal lengths was so evident. Hence the adjustment
to the median line which the disparity in coastal lengths necessitated
was not to be a mathematical operation.2e4
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The Court also made it clear, lest it be accused of applying
proportionality twice, that there was a sharp distinction between
employing proportionality calculations "to check a result," and taking
note, "in the course of the delimitation process," of a very marked
difference in coastal lengths, in order to:
attribute the appropriate significance to that coastal
relationship, without seeking to define it in quantitative terms
which are only suited to the ex post assessment of relationships
of coast to area."
These "two operations" were, in the Court's view, "neither mutually
exclusive, nor so closely identified with each other that the one would
necessarily render the other superogatory."
A further factor justifying transposition of the provisional
median line was the general geographical context of the delimitation in
a semi-enclosed sea, where the presence of neighbouring States required
consideration.
	
Finding that "it is the coastal relationships in the
whole geographical context that are to be taken account of and
respected," 29 the I.C.J. appeared, with no apparent justification, to
decide that the delimitation was between the general coast of southern
Europe (i.e. Sicily) and the north African coast. As a result, seen in
this context, Malta appeared to the Court to be a minor geographical
feature of the European littoral, which required the adjustment of the
median line northward, despite the fact that Malta is too far detached
from the Sicilian coast as to appear an appendage of it, 297 and
-632-
notwithstanding the fact that Malta interrupts "any possible
relationship between the coasts of Libya and Italy."2'
Nevertheless, having decided that the relevant circumstances
dictated that the continental shelf boundary should lie nearer to Malta
than to Libya, the Court then had to decide how to transpose the
provisional median line northward. However, first, it had to determine
the northern limit beyond which it would be inequitable to move its
provisional boundary.
For this purpose, the Court, again unaccountably, considered the
general geographical context, but this time assumed that Malta was the
offshore archipelago of Italy, in effect making the delimitation
between Italy and Libya. 2e9
 Hence it found that a median line between
Sicily and Libya,'° ignoring Malta, intersected the 15' 10' E meridian
at latitude 34' 36' N, and designated this as the northernmost limit of
the proposed transposition.
	 However, the I.C.J. then decided that
because Malta was not part of Italy but an independent State, it could
not "be in a worse position because of its independence" and,
therefore, that the Libya-Malta boundary must lie south of the
hypothetical median line between Sicily and Libya, but north of the
Court's provisional median line, 29 ' which had intersected the 12° 10' E
meridian at approximately 34 12' N.
Consequently, the Court held - or rather arbitrarily decided 2 -
without recourse to a corrective formula "expressed in actual figures,"
that the factors identified pointed to an equitable result being
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obtained by dividing the intervening 24 minutes (miles) between the two
lines in the ratio 3:1 in favour of Libya.	 Thus, the provisional
median line was transposed 18 minutes northward, resulting in a
boundary intersecting the 15° 10' E meridian at 34 30' N (Figure 29),
which the Court held achieved "an equitable result in all the
circumstances,
Finally, the Court tested the equity of its result by applying
proportionality.	 However, contrary to the Tunisia-Libya Case, the
Court found itself unable to apply proportionality between relevant
coastal lengths and the areas allocated by its delimitation, because of
the difficulties in identifying the relevant coasts and delimitation
area:
... the geographical context is such that the identification of
the relevant circumstances and the relevant areas is so much at
large that virtually any variant could be chosen, leading to
widely different results; and ... the area to which the Judgment
will apply is limited by reason of the existence of claims of
third States.	 To apply the proportionality test simply to the
areas within these limits would be unrealistic."294
Nevertheless, the Court found that it could still make "a broad
assessment of the equitableness of the result, without seeking to
define the equities in arithmetical terms" and concluded that, in the
absence of "evident disproportion," the "test of proportionality as an
aspect of equity" was satisfied.295
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Figure 29 - The Libya-Malta continental shelf boundary.
Source: International Court of Justice "Case Concerning the Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985" Reports 
of Judgements. Advisory Opinions and Orders, pp. 18-323, at p. 44.
(The Hague, 1985)
(g) Analysis of the Judgement 
(i) The Italian Application to Intervene 
Analysis of this decision must begin by examining the limiting
effect which respect for Italian rights had on the delimitation,
recalling that in rejecting Italy's application to intervene the I.C.J.
had stated that:
"If in a case of this kind a Third State were permitted to
intervene so as to present claims and indicate the grounds
advanced as justifying them, then the subsequent judgment of the
Court could not be limited to noting them, but would, expressly or
implicitly, recognize their validity and extent.""6
However, having seemingly debarred itself from recognising the extent
and validity of the Italian claims, the Court then proceeded in its
Judgement to do just that by not delimiting the areas over which Italy
laid claim. It, therefore, gave effect to the Italian request that the
Court pronounce only on what genuinely appertained to Malta and Libya,
and refrain from allocating to them any areas of tpe continental shelf
over which Italy had rights.
Libya and Malta had both argued, based on the 	 refusal to
entertain the Italian intervention, that the Court should not be
inhibited by third State claims, since to exclude these areas "would in
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effect be deciding on such claims without jurisdiction to do so. "297
Instead, as Judge Schwebel stated in his Dissenting Opinion:
the Court virtually grants to Italy what Italy would have
achieved if its request to intervene had been granted and, once
granted, if Italy had established to the Court's satisfaction 'the
areas over which Italy has rights and those over which it has
none."2'8
Hence, Chircop and Gault conclude that the Italian intervention was
successful,	 the Court having accepted Italy's argument of the
impropriety of effecting a delimitation in an offshore area where a
third State also has jurisdictional claims.
However, although Italy's rights were respected without her having
to take on any responsibilities, given a similar situation it is
difficult to see what else the Court could have done if it was not to
prejudge the claims of third States.
	 It could have permitted the
Italian intervention, as Starke advocated,")° but it would then have
been faced with the difficulty of dealing with three rather than two
sets of pleadings, and thus the Court took the pragmatic option of
limiting its Judgement.
Judge Schwebel argued that the Court should have •delimited a
broader area, but reserved the rights of other States in the areas to
which they laid claim,"" an approach akin to that suggested by Libya
in its oral pleadings.	 Herein it advocated that east of 15* 10' E the
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Court indicate the boundary between itself and Malta by means of a
pecked line, thereby indicating that the delimitation was subject to
Italian claims:
"The advantage of this would be that Italy could then claim north
of the pecked line against Libya.	 In other words, the claims
could be entertained, logically and sequentially, on a bilateral
basis."3°2
Instead, by placing limitations on the geographical scope of its
Judgement, the Court has ensured that some of the boundary problems
between Malta and Libya will persist, in particular, because it has
given the States no guidance as to the course of the continental shelf
boundary through the disputed Medina Bank. Libya holds that the area
east of 15 10' is in dispute between only itself and Italy, but it
seems unlikely that Malta feels the same way. Consequently, the area
remains in dispute between the three States, "exactly the situation
Libya sought to avoid by its 'pecked-line' solution.""
(ii) The Equity of the Median Line 
A second point for discussion concerns the equity of an
equidistance-based solution. Judges Mosler and Oda both felt that the
median line would have been an equitable solution, 3" a view with which
the present author finds himself in sympathy, because:
(i) the sovereign equality of States combined with the distance
principle would seem to point to a median line delimitation; and
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(ii) any disparity in coastal lengths should be irrelevant to
delimitation, given that it is the coastline not its length which
endues a State with rights to its offshore seabed.
To take the second point first, in the North Sea Cases the I.C.J.
spoke of a median line effecting an equal division where the natural
prolongations of two States "meet and overlap." ."s
 However, subsequent
judgements, notably the Anglo-French Arbitration, appear to have taken
the view that this can only be the case where there is a similarity of
coastal lengths. The probable reason for this is that the extent of a
State's coastline is the geographical expression of territorial
sovereignty over the seabed, as conferred by the land via its seaward
projection.	 Moreover, the principle of non-encroachment upon another
State's natural prolongation means that a State must be entitled to
those areas in front of its coast,	 and thus, in delimitation, the
length of a State's coastline becomes of paramount importance to ensure
that this happens.'°6
However, because a 200 mile zone is formed by arcs of circles
obeying no laws of frontal extension, Malta, like Canada in the Gulf of
Maine Case, argued that with the new emphasis upon distance as the
basis of title, the idea of the "most natural" prolongation of the land
territory had been supplanted by a "radial" extension that projects
with equal force in all d1rections. 3°7 The courts did - not, however,
appear to accept this argument in either case.
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Nevertheless, the logic of the radial extension is powerful, as
under the distance principle there would appear no reason to restrict
the idea of the coastal front to a purely perpendicular relationship
between a coast and its offlying seabed areas. Consequently, whilst it
is accepted that the idea of the coastal front gives expression to
title to seabed areas through natural prolongation of the land, in the
light of the distance principle it is no longer tenable to hold that "a
substantial stretch of coast possesses a greater force in generating
title than a single point,°e
 because it is the existence of the
coast, not its length, which confers continental shelf rights.
	 To
delimit a boundary, as the I.C.J. has done in the Libya-Malta Case, on
the basis that a marked disparity in coastal lengths should be
reflected in the extent of respective offshore entitlements may be
equality "reckoned in the same plane" or "within the same order,"3cP9
but it is also a denial of the fact that all "coasts are presumed to
possess an equal capacity to generate an area of maritime
jurisdiction."31°
Under the distance principle, and as independent States, both
Libya and Malta should be entitled to a continental shelf of 200 miles.
However, because the States are less than 400 miles apart they may not
claim their full entitlement, in which case a median line delimitation
should have been an equitable means of maintaining their equal
entitlement to the continental shelf areas generated by their coasts,
i.e. in terms of seaward reach, rather than seabed areas. Instead, the
I.C.J. derived from the disparity in coastal lengths - a linear
measurement - a need for a proportionate restriction on the areal
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extent of the Maltese continental shelf, beyond that demonstrated by
Malta's trapezium as arising naturally where a short coast faces a long
coast.	 Thus, because the Court's means of achieving a proportionate
areal allocation was based on a restriction of the seaward reach of
Malta's continental shelf, it effectively denied Malta's entitlement to
full continental shelf rights on account of its comparatively short
coast.
In this context, the Court was probably swayed by the views that
it had expressed in the North Sea Cases regarding adjacency and
proximity.	 In those cases, Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that
Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention represented customary
international law,	 insofar as it stated that submarine areas
appertained to the coastal State ipso facto because of their adjacency.
Therefore, in their view, a continental shelf boundary should be
determined on the basis of the exclusive right of each State to the
continental shelf "adjacent" to its coast, leaving to each State "every
point of the continental shelf which lies nearer to its coast than to
the coast of the other Party," a delimitation which only the
equidistance method could effect. 3"
However, the I.C.I. flatly rejected the view that "adjacency"
could be identified with "proximity." 	 Specifically, the Court found
that there was "no necessary, and certainly no complete, identity
between the notions of adjacency and proximity," but rather that:
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11	 the notion of adjacency •.. only implies proximity in a
general sense, and does not imply any fundamental or inherent rule
the ultimate effect of which would be to prohibit any State
(otherwise than by agreement) from exercising continental shelf
rights in respect of areas closer to the coast of another
State."31
Hence, it is not surprising that the Court rejected the Maltese
contention that the distance principle had conferred primacy on the
equidistance principle:
"The introduction of this criterion of distance has not ... had
the effect of establishing a principle of 'absolute . proximity' or
of conferring upon the equidistance method of delimitation the
status of a general rule, or an obligatory method of delimitation,
or of a priority method, to be tested in every case —1'3'3
Nevertheless, as McDorman notes:
"There is much force in the argument that where distance is
involved, equidistance is prima facie the equitable means to
equally divide an area."'14
The fact that it was not applied in this case would appear - to have much
to do with the fact that Malta had always advocated such a
delimitation, whereas Libya had consistently claimed a boundary further
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to the north.	 The "split the difference" mentality therefore
prevailed.
The Court did, however, give some credence to the use of
equidistance in opposite States' delimitation by using it as the basis
for the provisional boundary, although Judge Oda contended that the
equidistance rule did not permit the median line to be so modified as
to make it a different line altogether."''
(iii) The Transposition of the Provisional Median Line 
Judge Schwebel argued that the relevant circumstances identified
by the Court did not justify its decision to transpose the median line
northwards,'' 	 whilst
	 Langeraar has criticised the I.C.J.
	 for
insufficient elucidation of its reasons for this action.'"
Nevertheless, having considered that the disparity in the two
States' coastal lengths did warrant transposition of its provisional
boundary, it is curious why the Court decided that the adjustment was
not to be a mathematical operation. It would appear that the Court was
afraid of being accused of using proportionality as a delimitation
principle,' but whilst the I.C.J.'s caution is admirable, if the
disparity in coastal lengths was really such an important circumstance
requiring effect the logic of not quantifying this relationship is
unclear.	 It would have made more sense for the Court to have
transposed the median line northwards in a manner that truly reflected
the significance of this relevant factor, rather than by some arbitrary
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ratio it dreamed up. 3 "'	 (On the other hand, the Judgement was
consistent with that of the I.C.T.'s Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case,
where proportionality of coastal lengths was used to 'adjust the
provisional median line, the degree of adjustment being independent of
any mathematical considerations. °)
For example, in their joint Separate Opinion, Judges Ruda,
BedJaoui, and De Arechaga noted that the ratio of relevant coastal
lengths was 8:1 in Libya's favour, but that the Court's delimitation
was the equivalent to delimiting the area in the ratio 2.38:1. 32' They
considered this to be insufficient from the point of view of equity,
and would have adjusted the provisional median line by 28', thereby
dividing the area in the ratio 3.54:1. 32'2
 This was close to half the
ratio of the relevant coasts, and	 would have resulted "in a line
dividing into two equal parts the disputed area."323
(iv) The Treatment of Malta as an Island State 
The Court's delimitation also disregarded the difference in
political status between the islands of Malta and Sicily.
Neither the Continental Shelf Convention nor the 1982 Convention
makes any distinction between dependent islands or island States with
respect to their continental shelf entitlement. 	 Indeed, .unlike the
Continental Shelf Convention, there is no provision regarding the
rights of islands to a continental shelf in the 1982 Convention: all
coastal States are entitled to a continental shelf extending at least
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200 miles offshore.	 On the other hand, State practice, judicial
decisions and even conventional international law, have made it clear
that it may be inequitable to attribute certain dependent islands full
continental shelf rights in delimitations with neighbouring States, but
no mention has been made of island States. 	 Therefore, Malta would
appear to be entitled to a continental shelf of the same magnitude as
any continental State, which the Court's Judgement seems to deny.
Malta did not claim that an island State should have any special
status in relation to continental shelf rights, but the Court noted
that:
... Malta being independent the relationship of its coasts with
the coasts of its neighbours is different from what it would be if
It were part of the territory of one of them. In other words, it
might well be that sea boundaries in this region would be
different if the islands of Malta did not constitute an
independent State, but formed the territory of one of the
surrounding countries."2A
This seemed to suggest that as an island State, Malta had to be
allocated shelf rights as if a continental State and not as the
dependency of such, but the Court went on to qualify this by stating
that:
"This aspect of the 
matter is related not solely to the
circumstances of Malta being a group of islands, and an
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independent state, but also to the position of the islands in the
wider geographical context, particularly their position in a semi-
enclosed sea,u2s
Consequently, Malta's geographical situation provided the Court with a
reason to Justify transposing its provisional boundary northwards,
Malta being treated as if it was no more than a coastal appendage of
Italy.
However, the Court does not explain why it should view Malta in
this context: the delimitation was not between Italy and Libya, but
between Malta and Libya, and thus the relevant area to be delimited
could not include any part of the seabed to the north of Malta.
Nevertheless, the Court again considered Malta as a coastal appendage
of Italy in using a median line between the Libyan and Sicilian coasts
to define the northern limit of the proposed transposition.
Several reasons make this treatment of Malta unjust. 	 Firstly,
Malta was not a dependent state of Italy, but an independent State with
an independent right to a continental shelf of its own. 	 Italy could
not claim any continental shelf to the south of Malta, but only to the
east and west, claims which had already been afforded protection by the
Court.	 Therefore, the fact that Malta separated the coasts of two
major continental States was irrelevant to the delimitation and should
not have been taken into account. In addition, the fact that Malta was
a small island State, seemingly entitled to a continental shelf out of
proportion to its landmass, did not Justify its geographical situation
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being used as a substitute for its lack of political affiliation to its
northern neighbour.	 If Malta was to receive a smaller continental
shelf than that which it claimed, the Court should have referred purely
to the relevant lengths of coast of the two States party to the
delimitation.	 Instead, the transposition of the median line was
Justified in relation to an area outside the confines of the
delimitation, whilst in the transposition methodology, the Court
attributed full continental shelf rights to the island of Sicily,
despite the fact that Sicily was a dependency of the continental
mainland.	 It also disregarded the difference in the length of the
coasts of Libya and Sicily.
Consequently, Judge Schwebel's remarks in this respect warrant
full quotation:
the fact that the median line between Malta and Libya is
south of a continental median line is a creative consideration of
no probative value, which is not easily reconcilable with
principles of the sovereign equality of States.	 Nature must be
taken as it is: the fact that Malta lies south of the general
direction of the northern seaboard of the region is no intrusion
•
	 It is perfectly true that the islands of Malta, in their
general geographical context, appear as a relatively small feature
in a semi-enclosed sea. But that is no reason for affording Malta
less of a continental shelf than its coasts - minor as they are -
generate.	 It is no reason for discounting the whole of the
islands of Malta - which together constitute that independent
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State - as if they were the anomalous depenaent islands of a large
mainland State.	 Naturally, Malta cannot be treated as if it lay
unapproached in a large ocean, with no other territory within 200
miles around its shores.
	
But neither can Libya (or any other
Mediterranean State) in that semi-enclosed sea be treated as if
its entitlement to a 200-mile shelf did not overlap the
entitlements of other States.	 Thus the general geographical
context operates neither for nor against either Malta or Libya:
rather what operates for each of them is the extent, configuration
and situation of its coastal fronts - relative, however, to those
of opposite and adjacent States. 	 Moreover, while the Court
invokes the general geographical context, in fact it sharply and
unjustifiably narrows that context by confining the area of its
consideration to the limits of Italian claims."'
(h) Implementation of the Judgement 
The terms of the Special Agreement left it to the States' experts
to determine the exact position of the Court's suggested boundary
line,"7 and despite the reservations expressed above Libya and Malta
subsequently negotiated an agreement putting into effect the Court's
Judgement on 10 November 1936. 32° The agreed boundary consists of ten
segments stretching from 34 40' 46" N, 13° 50' 00" E to 34' 29' 53" N,
15° 10' 00" 5 and, therefore, accords with that proposed by •he I.C.J.
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CHAPTER 8 - CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: FUTURE PROSPECTS 
8.1 Introduction 
Based upon the legislation of Mediterranean States, it would
appear that many continental shelf boundaries are not yet needed
because coastal State claims do not overlap, although this statement
must be made cautiously, given the number of States which do not define
their outer continental shelf limits. 	 Nevertheless, the fact that the
Mediterranean's waters are so deep means that even where exploitability
is the criterion of definition, the outer limits of most States'
continental shelves cannot reach those of their opposite neighbours;
but there are exceptions, most notably Greece and Turkey's overlapping
claims to the Aegean continental shelf.
However, when the 1982 Convention enters into force, there is good
reason to believe that this situation will change and that the
Mediterranean seabed will be subject to continental shelf claims. Two
lines of legal reasoning support this contention:
(i) because the continental shelf exists ipso facto and ab
(i.e. without the need for a claim by the coastal State l ), all States
will have continental shelves of 200 miles;
(ii) distance has replaced natural prolongation as the major criterion
for determining the limits of continental shelf jurisdiction for those
States whose physical shelf terminates before the 200 mile limit is
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reached.
	 This means that Mediterranean States will be entitled to a
200 mile shelf, because their legal entitlement will supersede any
claim based on geographical natural prolongation.
Clearly, this universal extension to 200 miles will require an
extensive boundary delimitation exercise, as only six continental shelf
boundaries (including the France-Monaco maritime boundary agreement)
have thus far been delimited.	 Table 16 summarises the current
position, and Table 17 sets out the various difficulties attending the
delimitation of the outstanding boundaries.
8.2 Political Problems 
The political obstacles to delimitation have already been covered
elsewhere2 and do not require detailed examination here, except to say
that where poor political relations are present the delimitation of any
maritime boundary will be problematic, irrespective of other legal or
geographical difficulties.
8.3 Legal Problems 
Differences of opinion in relation to the applicable legal rules
and principles governing delimitation were also addressed in relation
to territorial sea boundaries, but are more far reathing in regard to
the continental shelf, partly because Article 83 of the 1982 Convention

























Table 16 - Agreed, adJudicated, and potential bilateral Mediterranean 




















Morocco-Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)
Cyprus-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Cyprus-United Kingdom (Sovereign Base Areas)





Table 17 - Potential Difficulties in the Delimitation of Future 











Spain-Gibraltar / y S
Spain-France J 1 1 J Z F
Yugoslavia-Albania J 1 J Y P
Albania-Greece J J / y P
Turkey-Syria J Z G
Syria-Lebanon / J Z S
Lebanon-Israel J J Z S
Israel-Egypt / / Z F
Egypt-Libya 1 J I Z P
Tunisia-Algeria i J I Z F
Algeria-Morocco i J 1 J Z F
Morocco-Spain
(Ceuta and Melilla) / J I Z S
Cyprus-Turkish
Republic of
Northern Cyprus 1 J i Z S
Cyprus-U.K.
(Sovereign Base
Areas) / Y G
Opposite States
Spain-Morocco 1 J J 1 I Z S
Spain-Algeria J J J Z P
Italy-Algeria J 1 Z P
Italy-Malta r .1 1 Y G
Italy-Libya 1 J / Z P
Italy-Albania J J J Y F
Greece-Libya J J J Z P
Greece-Egypt J 1 J Z F
Turkey-Egypt J J Z F
Turkey-Cyprus 1 J
.1 Z P
Syria-Cyprus / i Z P
Lebanon-Cyprus 1 I J Z P
Israel-Cyprus J Y P
Egypt-Cyprus J 1 / Z P
Malta-Tunisia 1 J J Z P
Morocco-Gibraltar J ./ J / Z S
Opposite and Adjacent States
France-Italy J J 1 Z P






C - Historic bays and straight baselines
D - Coastal configuration
E - Islands
F - Third State claims
Likely delimitation method 
Y - Equidistance
Z - Equitable principles






effect	 of historic bays and straight baselines on delimitations are
potentially more significant.
(a) Delimitation Criteria 
The Mediterranean is a particularly problematic area for
continental shelf boundary delimitation, because only five States have
relevant provisions in their unilateral legislation. 	 Of these States,
Italy is not a party to the Continental Shelf Convention, whilst the
relevant Greek legislation predates its accession to that Convention.
Article 1 of the Italian Act No. 613 of 21 July 1967, provides
that:
"The outer boundary of the Italian continental shelf shall be
determined by agreement with the States whose coasts are opposite
those of the Italian State and which share the same continental
shelf."
There is, therefore, no provision for delimitation with adjacent
States, despite the fact that Italy shares common land boundaries with
France and Yugoslavia. However, the Article does go on to say that:
"Pending the entry into force of the agreements referred to ...,
non-exclusive prospecting and surveying licences and concessions
for producing oil and gas in the Italian continental shelf shall
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be issued only in respect of the Italian side of the median line
between the Italian coast and that of the opposite States. "A
Therefore, although the emphasis is upon agreement, it would appear
that the starting point for negotiations is the median line. Hence, it
is not surprising that Italy has subsequently delimited four
continental shelf boundaries on the basis of median lines.
The appropriate Greek legislation makes a general statement
concerning delimitation. Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 142/1969 states
that:
"Where the ... continental shelf is adjacent to the territory of
Greece and another State adjoining Greece or with coasts opposite
to the Greek coasts, the rules of international law shall be
applied in determining the limits of that continental shelf."s
Greece's subsequent accession to the Continental Shelf Convention on 6
November 1972 would seem to suggest that the rules of international law
referred to are those contained in the Continental Shelf Convention.
The two island States of Cyprus and Malta each uphold the
equidistance method prescribed in the Geneva Convention, and provide
for median line delimitations with opposite States. 	 Article 2 of
Cypriot Law No. 8 of 5 April 1974, reads:
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0 ... in relation to any State whose coasts lie opposite those of
the Republic, the outer boundary of the continental shelf shall,
unless otherwise agreed between the Republic and that State, in no
case extend beyond the median line."6
Similarly, the Maltese Continental Shelf Act No. XXXV of 22 July 1966,
provides that:
H	 where in relation to States of which the coast is opposite
that of Malta it is necessary to determine the boundaries of the
respective continental shelves, the boundary of the continental
shelf shall be that determined by agreement between Malta and such
other State or States or, in the absence of agreement, the median
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial waters
of Malta and of such other State or States is measured."'
However, for the majority of Mediterranean States it is necessary
to examine other sources to discover their likely negotiating position,
and hence whether a particular boundary situation is likely to be
complicated by differences of opinion as to the appropriate legal
criteria.	 This is an incomplete exercise though, because even where
States agree upon the legal criteria to be employed, there remains
considerable scope for disagreement and dispute. 	 For example, States
may agree to use equidistance, but disagree as to the weight to be
given particular geographical features. Likewise, as the Tunisia-Libya
Continental Shelf Case showed, agreement that delimitation should be
-675-
based upon equitable principles does not indicate that two States will
agree as to what those equitable principles are, or as to the relevant
circumstances to be taken into account.e
It would also be wrong to place too much emphasis upon a
negotiating position as an indicator of a State's policy in all of its
different boundary situations.	 For example, although France may have
supported delimitation on the basis of equitable principles at UNCLOS
III, it is not debarred from adopting an equidistance line delimitation
with another State if it wishes.
Nevertheless, bearing these points in mind, if, as has been
argued, States interpret Article 83 in whichever way they wish to, then
by relating negotiating positions at UNCLOS III to actual boundary
situations, it is possible to suggest which boundary delimitations are
likely to proceed with relative ease, and those which are likely to
prove problematic.
Table 15 summarised the negotiating position of Mediterranean
States at UNCLOS III, and showed that seven States were members of the
equidistance group, whilst six were members of the equitable principles
group.	 The remaining six States did not declare their interest. 	 Of
the latter, Tunisia is included because it was a member of neither
group.	 However, it co-sponsored draft articles supporting equitable
principles, and during the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case its
various boundary claims were each based upon equitable principles, with
none
	 utilising equidistance as	 their means of	 construction.
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Consequently, it may be assumed that Tunisia favours delimitation on
the basis of equitable principles, notwithstanding that it is a
signatory, (but not a party), to the Continental Shelf Convention, and
though for a time during its dispute with Libya it claimed an
equidistance line boundary.
Of the other five apparently non-committed States, Monaco has
already settled its maritime boundaries with France, whilst the
adherence of Albania and Israel to the Continental Shelf Convention
would appear to express support for the equidistance rule of Article
6• 9 This leaves Egypt and Lebanon, neither of which is a party to the
Continental Shelf Convention; in the absence of guidance in their
domestic legislation, it is, therefore, assumed that they would base
their delimitations upon equitable principles. 1°
On the basis that both negotiating States are parties to the
Continental Shelf Convention equidistance should form the basis of
agreement in six of the outstanding boundary situations (Table 18).
This number is reduced to three if one relies solely on the negotiating
positions adopted by States at UNCLOS III (Table 19), because neither
Albania nor Israel expressed a view.	 However, as both States are
parties to the Continental Shelf Convention, it may be assumed that a
further four boundary delimitations may utilise equidistance (Table
20), giving a total of seven in all.
Comparing Table 18 with Tables 19 and 20, the only boundary which
does not reappear is that concerning Spain and France. 	 However, to
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Table 18 - Boundaries which should be settled on.. the basis of 
equidistance both States being parties to the Continental Shelf
Convention 
Albania-Greece






Table 19 - Boundaries which should be settled on the basis of 
equidistance given State attitudes at UNCLOS III 











have made the assumption of an equidistance line delimitation was to
have ignored the fact that in acceding to the Continental Shelf
Convention France issued reservations to Article 6, to the effect that
it debarred automatic application of the equidistance principle to the
delimitation of seabed areas beyond the 200 metre isobath, unless they
be by special agreement; and that it would not recognise delimitations
using baselines drawn after 29 April 1958."	 Thus, it is not
surprising that at UNCLOS III France supported delimitation on the
basis of equitable principles.
On the other hand, Italy, who is not a party to the Continental
Shelf Convention, has delimited several of its maritime borders using
equidistance; and this practice, plus an avowed preference for
equidistance at UNCLOS III, suggests that its boundaries with Albania
and Malta will also be median lines.'2
With respect to delimitation according to equitable principles,
Table 21 indicates that on the basis of attitudes expressed at UNCLOS
III there are only two boundary situations in which the States involved
are agreed that their boundaries should be settled in this way. Four
further boundary situations may be added to this list, on the
assumption that Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia each favour equitable
principles (Table 22).
However, the greatest interest surrounds those boundary situations
in which the intransigent and opposing negotiating positions of UNCLOS
III are likely to reappear, with one State favouring use of the
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Table 21 - Boundaries which should be settled on the basis of e uitable











equidistance method and the other delimitation according to equitable
principles (Tables 23 and 24). 	 Nineteen boundaries are identified as
involving States with different legal attitudes and, therefore, as
having potential for dispute.	 Thus, taken as a whole, this analysis
would suggest that, on the basis of legal preferences alone, there are
more boundaries that are likely to.be
 the subject of long drawn out
disputes than there are boundaries where the States are in basic
agreement as to the principles and rules to be applied. 	 In less than
25 per cent of Mediterranean boundary situations is delimitation likely
to proceed with relative ease (1. e. through use of the equidistance
method).
Also of interest is the fact that boundary disputes appear more
likely to occur in opposite than adjacent State situations (Table 25).
Nearly 70 per cent of potentially contentious Mediterranean boundaries
are between opposite States. 	 Therefore, even allowing for the fact
that there are three more opposite boundary situations than there are
adjacent, the evidence would seem to support the view that opposite
State delimitation is more problematic. This would, therefore, appear
to contradict the I.C.I.'s view that a median line between opposite
States would normally result in an equitable delimitation.
	 However,
the long and narrow geographical configuration of the Mediterranean
Sea, combined with the fact that it is studded with islands and divided
by peninsulas, would appear to explain the greater diveltence of legal
opinion amongst geographically opposite States, although it should be
remembered that there are five agreements between opposite States, and
only one between adjacent States.
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Table 23 - Boundaries which ma be dis uted iiven o 11 osin attitudes a
UNCLOS III 







































Table 25 - Potential boundary agreements and disputes and the 
geographical relationship of negotiating States 
Boundaries likely to be settled on the basis of equidistance 
Adjacent States (4)
Albania-Greece
Cyprus-United Kingdom (Sovereign Base Areas)
Spain-Gibraltar
Yugoslavia-Albania
Boundaries likely to be settled on the basis of equitable principles 






Boundaries likely to be disputed 
Adjacent States (5)
Cyprus-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Israel-Egypt
Lebanon-Israel
Morocco-Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*
Spain-France
Opposite and Adjacent States (2)
France-Italy
Greece-Turkey
* This delimitation would also be as between opposite States were Spain
to make a continental shelf claim on behalf of Ceuta.
Source: Author's research.
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Table 25 would also seem to support the Lea that delimitation on
the basis of equitable principles is more likely to occur in adjacent
than opposite State situations.' However, agreement On the use of
equitable principles does not mean that there will not be practical
difficulties for, as Rothpfeffer has noted:
il ... how is a statement such as the promise of the prospect of
equitable delimitation to be interpreted by a neighbouring State
when no substantive rule exists against which it can be measured,
046 [since] Os. it is not possible to know what 'equitable
principles' means before the State using such a phrase has made
its concrete claims clear."''
Similarly, in discussing the Separate Opinions in the North Sea Cases,
Merrills pointed out that:
"When equity can be found by Judge Nervo to require the
negotiation of a new line to accord with equitable principles, by
Judge Bustamente to require implementations of the coastal front
concept and by Judge Ammoun to employ the equidistance principle
modified by special circumstances, there can be little confidence
in equity as a means of resolving international disputes."15
(b) Delimitation Methods 
Differences about the legal criteria to be applied to delimitation
are closely bound up with the issue of the appropriate method of
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delimitation in any given geographical situation. The courts have
consistently taken the view that the equidistance method should not
have any pre-eminence in delimitation, and with the emphasis upon the
achievement of an equitable solution, this has been enshrined in both
customary and conventional international law. Hence States are free to
agree upon whatever method or combination of methods they wish to
delimit their boundaries, although agreement upon legal criteria does
indicate agreement upon delimitation method.
A good example is provided by the negotiations between Italy and
France concerning their continental shelf boundary in the northern
Tyrrhenian Sea and the Gulf of Genoa. These commenced in 1972, 76 but
were suspended without result two years later following disagreement as
to the method to be employed in part of the boundary region, although a
territorial waters agreement for the Strait of Bonifacio was
successfully negotiated in 1986.'7
At the meetings held in May 1972 and March 1973, the States agreed
that any boundary would delimit both the territorial sea and
continental shelf throughout the boundary region, with an equidistance
line forming the basis of any agreement for the area to the north and
east of Corsica as far the Strait of Bonifacio, any deviations being
for "administrative reasons." 16 This provision was clarified in the
draft agreement submitted to the latter meeting, wherein it was stated
that some of the smaller islands off the Corsican (e.g. Giraglia,
Gorgona, and Capraia) and Italian mainland coasts were to be discounted
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for delimitation purposes. There was also be en agreed compensation of
area resulting from application of this method.'9
No principle, however, was laid down for discussions regarding the
Gulf of Genoa area to the west of Corsica and Sardinia, although France
rejected the use of equidistance, because of the general shape of the
western Mediterranean.	 It took the view that any delimitation should
take account of future continental shelf boundaries to be agreed
between Italy and Spain and between Spain and itself. Consequently, in
January 1974, it proposed that the boundary in part be based upon a
parallel of latitude which through an exchange of areas divided the
area into roughly equal parts.2°
Italy is reported to have expressed its "negative appreciation" of
this proposal, and to have rejected the French view that the
equidistance method would lead to inequitable results, believing that
an adjusted equidistance line could overcome any geographical
peculiarities. 2 '	 France, on the other hand, was concerned about
Italy's intention to proclaim straight baselines, and recalled its
reservation upon acceding to the Continental Shelf Convention to the
effect that it would not be bound by any boundary based on equidistance
drawn upon baselines established after 29 April 1958. 	 Indeed, France
appears to have rejected Italy's proposal that the coordinates of the
boundary provisionally agreed between the States for the Tyrrhenian Sea
be recalculated to take account of these baselines. 	 Hence, the
boundary negotiations foundered not simply because of differences over
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the methods to be applied, but also because of differences as to how
the same method should be employed.
By contrast, unless Italy and Malta insist on resolving all their
boundary problems by one agreement, there may be more reason to be
optimistic that a median line will form the continental shelf boundary
between the two States in the 80 kilometre wide Malta Channel (Strait
of Sicily), "where the delimitation seems more simple." 22 A de facto
boundary was established between the States by respective Italian and
Maltese Notes Verbale of 31 December 1965 and 29 April 1970, and
confirmed by an Italian Note Verbale of 16 March 1981. 23 This modus
vivendi takes the form of a median line, and was intended to allow each
State to prospect for oil in the intervening seabed, which, in general,
lies no deeper than 200 metres, and in which there was thought to be
good prospects of finding substantial hydrocarbon deposits.
Subsequent to its acceptance, in July 1970, Malta issued licences
for Block Al to the north-east of the islands, delimiting its northern
boundary by a single line which ran a few hundred metres south of the
median line, subject to minor alteration "in the light of any
settlement on the median line between Malta and Italy. H24 A few months
later, Italy delimited the south-east boundary of Zone C of its
concessions by drawing a single line parallel to the Maltese line and
running 1 000 metres from it. 26 A one kilometre neutral •corridor thus
separated the "delimited" continental shelves, and it is through this
corridor that the median line lies.
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Malta has attempted to persuade Italy to.convert this median line
into a formal boundary, and presented a draft agreement to that effect
in negotiations held between the States in June 1975. Apparently, it
was promised a quick response, but a Maltese Note Verbale of 25 August
1978 indicates impatience with Italy for its failure to reply.26
Therefore, it is against this background that, in 1980, Malta issued a
revised map of concessions, the northern boundary of which approximated
the median line between Malta and Sicily; however "due probably to the
use of a new map, it trespassed the line of equidistance and three
vertices were located for some hundred metres in areas included by
Italy in the zone that it had delimitated [sic.] in 1970." 27 Italy
responded in a Note Verbale of 16 March 1981, reserving its rights "to
check, by singling out the aforementioned prospecting areas, if they
are really located in the continental shelf zone appertaining to Malta,
under the mentioned understanding," and reminding Malta that the
provisional character of the line was without prejudice to future
discussions and "under reservation of possible correction."29
Subsequently, Malta allocated Block 3 of its concessions to IECO,
providing the following vague definition of their boundary, retained in
new production contracts for the same blocks offered in 1988:
"Starting from the point R (identified by coordinates 35° 55' N,
le 35' E) northwards to meet the delimitation line of the Maltese
continental shelf i.e. the median line between Italy and Malta,
thence along the said delimitation line to the intersection with
meridian 15° 05' E."29
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As to the status of the de facto median. line, in its pleadings
before the I.C.X., Malta claimed that:
"Whilst the dividing line adopted at the insistence of the Italian
Government was 'provisional', the ambit of adjustment envisaged
was clearly limited,"30
which implied that the boundary virtually had the status of a concrete
delimitation, although the passage quoted in support of this position
from the Italian Note Verbale of 1981 is by no means convincing in this
respect. 31	Nevertheless, given each State's support for the
equidistance method both in their domestic legislation and at UNCLOS
III, there seems little reason to suppose that a median line will not
form the established boundary in this area. 32 Indeed, if, as seems
unlikely, the dispute is submitted to third-party arbitration, there is
a strong possibility that the Court will consider the provisional
understanding to be a highly relevant circumstance which, given the
weight attached to the de facto boundary between adjoining oil
concessions in the Tunisia-Libya Case, could have a decisive effect on
Its decision.
However, such a boundary forms only part of the larger
delimitation necessary to delimit the States' continental shelves, and
it is perhaps for this reason that that the Italian Note Verbale of
March 1981 referred to "contingent technical reasons" as to why, since
1965, the States had failed to proceed to a negotiated agreement.33
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A further difficulty is that each State has enacted straight
baseline legislation of dubious validity. In a Note Verbale of 24 June
1981, Malta refused to recognise any of the Italian straight baselines,
but:
"Even if the creation of new straight baseline systems by the
parties might determine some changes in the possible equidistance
line, the problem does not seem insurmountable in the case of new
negotations [sic.] between the parties."34
8.4 Historic Bays and Straight Baselines in Mediterranean Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation 
In Part II, consideration was given to the delimitation of
internal waters, and although it was concluded that few bay enclosures
caused concern, it soon became apparent that this was because States
had used the vague language of the legal provisions relating to
historic bays and straight baselines to enclose subtantial areas as
internal waters. The legitimacy of particular baselines was dealt with
in detail, but the effect of those baselines on the delimitation of
boundaries	 between	 neighbouring
	 States	 was	 not	 considered.
Consequently, it is to these questions that we now turn.
(a) The Nature of the Problem 
As the point of origin for all offshore zones of jurisdiction,
baselines should have a crucial influence on boundary delimitation; and
in this respect, the use of straight baselines may simplify boundary
construction techniques. 36 However, they may also prove to be sources
of dispute where neighbouring States employ different methods of
baseline construction, given that the location of specific baselines
may have a critical effect upon boundary delimitation. 	 Disputes are
likely where a State's baseline orientation, or its distance from the
coast, are such as to be perceived as disadvantageous to a neighbouring
opposite or adjacent State in the drawing of their common boundary
line.	 For example, in its continental shelf dispute with Tunisia,
Libya claimed that to give effect to the straight baselines around the
Kerkennah Islands would be "inappropriate and inequitable," because of
their potential disadvantageous effect on the boundary to be drawn. 3S
Other	 situations	 like this are quite possible in the
Mediterranean, where disputes over even small areas of seabed or
seaspace are likely to provoke major disputes. Therefore, in order to
see what effect such claims may have, it is necessary to consider the
relevant law and the history of State practice.
(b)The Relevant Law 
Where the negotiating States are parties to the Territorial Sea
Convention, Article 12 is in force between them. 	 This states inter
alia that, failing agreement to the contrary, neither State may:
"... extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured ..." (italics added).
Thus, a territorial sea boundary must, where appropriate, take account
of any straight baselines, (or bay or river closing lines), utilised by
the coastal State to measure its territorial sea. 37 Indeed, as this
provision is repeated as Article 15 of the 1982 Convention, customary
international law would also appear to require the same.
The only possible exception is where one State has straight
baselines, and the other none, when it could be argued that the
existence of straight baselines was a "special circumstance" requiring
deviation from the strict median line. Nevertheless, in general terms,
the implication is clearly that straight baselines must be relied upon
in delimitation.
However,	 the position is less clear cut insofar as the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries is concerned. 	 Under
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, in the absence of
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agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special
circumstances, an equidistance boundary shall be drawn from "the
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured," but Article 74(1) of the
1982 Convention simply states that:
"The delimitation of the continental shelf shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
in order to achieve an equitable solution."
As this makes no reference to the points of origin for the boundary, it
would appear to indicate that under customary international law,
straight baselines do not have to be taken into account in the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between States. 	 This
contention is examined below.
(c) Potential Problem Areas 
Claims to historic bays and straight baselines represent potential
obstacles to delimitation in a number of Mediterranean boundary
situations, the extent of which are difficult to predict.
Egypt, for example, has claims both to straight baselines and
historic bays, but has yet to delimit any maritime boundaries with
neighbouring States.	 Its straight baselines, though of doubtful
validity, are unlikely to cause problems in any future boundary
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negotiations, because there has been no attempt to delimit large areas
of internal waters. Similar comments apply to its historic bay claims,
with the Gulf of Solum the most likely to cause difficulty because of
its proximity to the boundary with Libya. However, Libya will find it
hard to protest the Egyptian enclosure given its claim for the Gulf of
Sirte.
Indeed, despite Iran's references to "some legalistic trivialities
concerning the validity of the Libyan interpretation of its territorial
waters" and to "academic disagreements" as to their extent, 3° the
closure of the Gulf of Sirte has serious implications for the
delimitation of Libya's maritime boundaries with opposite States.
Although it did not become an issue in the Libya-Malta Continental
Shelf Case,	 (because of the geographical limits to the Court's
Judgement), the fact that the Gulf's closing line measures 296 miles,
and is up to 96 miles from the nearest coast, clearly has a
considerable effect on all of Libya's maritime claims. 	 Neither Italy
nor Greece, (nor Malta, should it be found necessary to extend its
existing boundary with Libya), are likely to accept any Libyan boundary
claim from a baseline which, in effect, puts the opposite coast of
Libya considerably nearer to their own coasts. 	 Indeed, it will be
particularly interesting to see how Libya intends to deal with this
substantial indentation in putting forward continental shelf or E.E.Z.
boundary claims with the aforementioned States, as the aegument of
relative coastal lengths is less appropriate in regard to either Italy
or Greece.	 It is not inconceivable that Libya might decide to claim
boundaries based on equidistance, despite its support for equitable
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principles at UNCLOS III, as this would allow it to control a very
large area of the Mediterranean. The Greek and ItaIran protests at the
enclosure of the Gulf probably reflect this concern, although the
Italian protest carries less weight given its doubtful enclosure of the
Gulf of Taranto.
Straight baselines are also potential complications in future
continental shelf and E.E.Z. delimitations, particularly when there is
doubt as to the legality of any claim. 	 For example, it has already
been seen that the negotiations between France and Italy foundered
partly as a result of French objections to the straight baselines drawn
by Italy along the coast of the Gulf of Genoa and to enclose the
Archipelago of Tuscany. 	 None of these baseline segments appear to
comply with the rules for straight baselines, although, in practice, it
is doubtful whether they would prove to be of significance in any
boundary delimitation, even were equidistance to be the chosen method.
Similar comments would seem to apply to the effect of straight
baselines on the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary between
Italy and Albania, negotiations for which began in 1985. 39 Italy has
only a few straight baselines bearing on the delimitation, whilst the
Albanian coast is masked by straight baselines along its entire length.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that either State will contest the use
of the other's baselines, for neither can be seen to disavow the claims
of the other without drawing attention to the validity of 	 own
claims.
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Likewise, although Spain and Morocco have drawn straight baselines
along the entire length of their coasts without paying too much heed to
the appropriate rules of law, they will either be used in the
delimitation without objection, or be ignored. The final decision will
probably depend upon the method of delimitation agreed upon, thereby
illustrating that the degree to which straight baselines affect a
delimitation will depend upon the method of delimitation employed. For
example, both Morocco and Algeria have straight baselines which impinge
upon their delimitation area, but these may have no effect upon the
boundary line, unless the delimitation method agreed upon is crucially
dependent upon the baselines for its construction (i.e. equidistance).
A similar situation pertains between Spain and Algeria. This point is
given further consideration below.
(d) Mediterranean State Practice 
The four continental shelf boundaries delimited by Italy have each
been equidistance-based, despite the fact that, in the North Sea Cases,
the I.C.J. found that Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention was
not declaratory of customary international law.	 Moreover, in each
delimitation, at least one of the two States has had straight
baselines.
	
Consequently, it should be possible to examine these
agreements to see whether customary international law requires straight
baselines to be used in delimiting continental shelf boundaries, in
particular where equidistance is the chosen method of delimitation.
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Italy and Spain's 1974 agreement delimiting g' median line boundary
between Sardinia and Menorca uses points on the respective islands and
offlying islets, but ignores each State's straight baselines because it
pre-dates their promulgation in 1977.	 However, as the agreement did
not enter into force until November 1978, each State had the
opportunity to request an amendment to take account of their new
legislation, a request neither chose to make, presumably because of
mutual satisfaction with the agreement as it stood. On the other hand,
if one compares the basepoints used in delimiting the boundary with
those used as turning points in the States' straight baseline sytems,
one is immediately struck by the fact that they are virtually
identical.	 Hence utilisation of the straight baselines in the
delimitation would have made little or no difference to the boundary's
location.
A similar situation existed in respect of the continental shelf
boundary agreement between Italy and Tunisia, Article I of which reads:
"The boundary .., shall be the median line, every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadths of the Italian and Tunisian territorial seas are
measured, taking into account islands, islets and low-tide
elevations with the exception of Lampione, Lampedusa, Linosa and
Pantellaria."40
The precise course of the boundary was determined by a joint Technical
Commission, whose work was detailed in an Annex to the agreement.
Significantly, this stated that the attached map and document:
u ... were drawn up in application of the Agreement of August 20,
1971 and form an integral part thereof, notwithstanding any other
legislative or regulatory provision regarding the definition of
baselines enacted after the aforementioned date."'"
Consequently, neither the Italian straight baselines <proclaimed in
1977), nor the Tunisian baselines (proclaimed in 1973), were used as
basepoints	 in	 the	 delimitation	 of	 the	 equidistance	 line,
notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was not ratified until
December 1978.	 Moreover, the fact that the Gulfs of Tunis and Gabés
were not included as part of Tunisia's internal waters until it
proclaimed straight baselines in 1973, (although it is arguable whether
they may be considered as such before that date), means that these
historic bays had no effect upon the boundary's construction.
Use of the Italian straight baselines would appear, however, to
have made little or no difference to the boundary as delimited.
The situation was different in respect of the other two
agreements, as only one State had straight baselines at the time of the
agreement.
	
Hodgson has suggested that the construction of an
equidistant boundary between straight baselines and random points is
problematic, not least because it results in a sinuous boundary, which
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is difficult to administer. 42 However, this does not appear to have
provided any obstacle to Italy and Yugoslavia, whose 1968 boundary
agreement was based on an equidistance line constructed (between points
1 and 26, and 39 and 43) using Yugoslavia's 1965 straight baselines and
the low-water line along the Italian coast.
Amongst the probable reasons why this was not found to be
problematic, is the fact that the real issue at stake for the Italians
was to offset the potentially inequitable effect on the boundary of the
Yugoslav islands of Jabuka, Pelagruz and KaJola, given their location
near the median line between the two States. In comparison, the effect
of the Yugoslav straight baselines upon the delimitation was
negligible.
	
Moreover, because the Yugoslav baselines closely follow
the rules of Article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention, it would have
been difficult for Italy to argue that they should not be taken into
account in the delimitation.
The problem of delimiting an equidistance line boundary between
two States where only one has straight baselines is, however, quite
different when there is doubt over the validity of the straight
baselines claimed.	 To accord such baselines weight in delimitation
would appear inequitable, in particular vis-à-vis States whose coasts
are either inappropriate for straight baseline drawing (e.g. Libya), or
which, like Greece, choose not to proclaim straight baselines, despite
having coasts with the appropriate geographical configuration.
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This situation might have been a problem iii the delimitation of
the continental shelf boundary between Italy and Greece, given the
doubtful legality of Italy's straight baselines along its Ionian coast.
However, the Italian straight baselines do not appear to have been used
in constructing the equidistance line boundary, despite the fact that
they were proclaimed in the month preceding the agreement in May 1977,
thereby making it logical to assume that they played a part in the
boundary negotiations.	 The explanation appears to be that, with the
exception of the historic bay baseline across the Gulf of Taranto, use
of the straight baselines along the Italian coast would have made
little difference to the delimited boundary, because the basepoints
selected to construct the boundary line are identical to those used by
Italy in its straight baseline system. 	 Consequently, straight
baselines have had no significance in any of the above agreements,
despite use of the equidistance method of delimitation.
However, the situation is not so clear cut in respect of historic
bay baselines, as perhaps the best and most important example of
foreign State acquiescence in the closure of the Gulf of Taranto was
the acceptance of its closing line as a baseline from which the
continental shelf boundary between Italy and Greece was delimited.
Examination of the boundary makes it clear that between turning points
4 and 6 the closing line of the Gulf of Taranto had a significant
effect upon the course of the delimited boundary. 49	 -Greece has,
therefore, indirectly legitimised its enclosure and, as the enclosure
could only affect boundary delimitations with Greece, contributed to
the general acquiescence in the claim by the community of States.
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(e) The Mediterranean Continental Shelf Boundary Cases 
In addition to these negotiated agreements, the legitimacy of
Tunisia and Malta's straight baseline systems could have been an issue
in the I.C.J.'s adjudication of the Tunisia-Libya and Libya-Malta
continental shelf disputes.	 That they were not is the subject of the
following sections.
(i) Tunisia-Libya 
In the Tunisia-Libya Case, the Court's methods of delimitation
were such as to not require it to rule on the validity of Tunisia's
straight baseline claims, although it is questionable whether the
I.C.J. should have ignored Tunisia's internal water claims in applying
proportionality to test the equity of its proposed delimitation line.
The Court agreed with Libya that both for the purpose of achieving
an equitable delimitation, and "for the purpose of comparing areas of
continental shelf in the light of the criterion of proportionality,"
all areas beyond the low-water mark of the two States had to be taken
into account, because:
the inclusion, or exclusion, for this purpose of the areas
claimed by Tunisia as internal waters ... [made] a very marked
difference in the ratios resulting from any foreseeable
delimitation line.01,44
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Tunisia, on the other hand, had held that for proportionality
purposes, the internal water area behind its straight baselines should
not be considered, because the continental shelf, as a legal concept,
is measured from the baselines of the territorial sea, thereby
excluding seabed areas within straight baselines. How, asked Tunisia,
could the equitable character of a delimitation be determined by
reference to the degree of proportionality between areas which were not
the subject of that delimitation, i.e. the internal water areas?
In response, the Court admitted that the seabed within the
Tunisian baselines was not part of the continental shelf "in the legal
sense", but noted that it was "the natural prolongation of the land
territory in the physical sense."	 Tunisia's question as to whether
internal waters could be assimilated to continental shelf for
proportionality purposes was "beside the point."
	 Instead, the Court
argued that because the seabed beneath internal waters was not legal
continental shelf, this did not mean that the coastal State did not
enjoy sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its
natural resources:
"... it enjoys those rights and more, by virtue of its full
sovereignty over that area."
Therefore,	 internal waters were to be included in applying
proportionality, for the question was "not one of definition, but of
proportionality as a function of equity."
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The Court also pointed out that proportionality used the lengths
nF•
of the coasts concerned, rather than straight baselines drawn around
those coasts, and "since it is a question of proportionality, the only
absolute requirement of equity is that one should compare like with
like." Thus, in the Court's opinion, a comparison of the shelf areas
below the low-water mark of -the relevant coasts of Libya and Tunisia
would make it possible to determine the equitable character of its
delimitation line.
However, it could be argued that disregarding of Tunisia's
internal water areas for proportionality purposes invalidated the
Court's use of proportionality as a test of the equity of its proposed
continental shelf boundary, for the I.C.J.'s use of proportionality
was, in strictly legal terms, more a test of the equity of its
delimitation of offshore seabed areas, than of continental shelf areas.
To some extent, this problem could have been avoided had the
I.C.J. chosen to rule on the validity of Tunisia's straight baseline
claims. Instead, in deciding to include Tunisia's internal water areas
for the purposes of proportionality, the Court stated that it was "rot
making any ruling as to the validity or opposability to Libya of tte
straight baselines." 46
 If the I.C.I. had ruled the baselines illegal
the Court would have had no problem in comparing all areas teTT.Id
low-water mark in testing the equitableness of its conthental seL
boundary. Conversely, if it had upheld Tunisia's strait tal-arltmas az
legal, then the Court would still have had to dec. -1.de utat s'ar ar mct ta
include internal waters in its proportionality calcdlatrams
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However, in the Court's opinion, in applying proportionality to
determine whether the delimitation is equitable, it was the relevant
circumstances of an area which afforded the basis for deciding whether
continental shelf areas, with or without the inclusion of internal
waters, should be compared.' 7 In this case, the Court took the view
that the relevant circumstances justified their inclusion.
	
Nevertheless,	 the fact	 remains that internal waters and
continental shelf are two distinct legal regimes: the former involves
complete territorial sovereignty, the latter merely "sovereign rights."
Moreover, using straight baselines effectively displaces the land/sea
	
boundary seawards.	 Therefore, in comparing coastal lengths for the
purposes of proportionality, it could be argued that the relevant
length of the coast concerned should no longer be the actual coast, but
rather that coast now formed by straight baselines. This "false" coast
should then be measured for proportionality purposes, for it defines
the "coastal" limit of the territorial sea. However, for any Court to
adopt this view, it would be necessary for it first to adjudicate on
the legality of the straight baselines claimed.
(ii) Libya-Malta 
In the Libya-Malta Case the I.C.J. again found it unnecessary to
adjudicate on disputed baselines. 	 Malta argued that the continental
boundary should be "a median line every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest points on the baselines of Malta, and the low-water
mark of the coast of Libya." However, by the time the I.C.J. came to
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-decide the Case, Mediterranean State practice was already weighted
against the use of the Maltese straight baselines, notwithstanding the
Court's doubts concerning the uninhabited rock of Filfla, and the fact
that Libya had no straight baselines. 	 Nevertheless, having decided
that equidistance was, at least initially, the appropriate method of
delimitation, State practice and juristic opinion did provide the Court
with various means by which it could solve the problem of one State
having straight baselines, and the other not.	 Hodgson, for example,
put forward two methods for general application.4
His first solution would have involved ignoring the Maltese
straight baselines for the purpose of delimitation, and constructing an
equidistance line between the low-water lines of the two States. This
would have enabled the Court to avoid ruling on the legal validity of
the Maltese baselines, although Malta could have justifiably objected
to the metamorphosing of its internal water areas into continental
shelf.
The second solution would have been for straight baselines to be
developed along the Libyan coast solely for the purposes of
delimitation, the straight baselines so constructed having no permanent
legal validity as a definition of Libya's internal waters. A precedent
for this is the continental shelf boundary agreement of 13 March 1973
between Canada and Denmark (Greenland). 	 The southern section of this
boundary was delimited by means of equidistance from Greenland's
straight baselines, and from straight baselines along the Canadian
coast drawn specifically for delimitation purposes, with no legislative
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constitution. 49 If applied to the Libya-Malta situation the technical
difficulties involved in the construction of the median line would have
been overcome, and Malta's straight baseline claim respected.
A third alternative was provided by the continental shelf boundary
agreement between the United States and Cuba of 16 December 1977. Both
States agreed in principle upon application of the equidistance method
of delimitation, but negotiations were complicated inter alia by the
States' different policies regarding baselines.	 The U.S., as a matter
of both national and federal policy, does not have straight baselines
along its coast, whereas from 26 February 1977, Cuba had adopted a
straight baseline system. s° Although much of this straight baseline
system was acceptable to the U.S., in the area affecting the
•
delimitation it did not recognise baselines drawn along a relatively
smooth coast not fringed by islands.
The problem was overcome in three stages. First, an equidistant
line was delimited using the relevant basepoints on the low-water line
of the two coasts.	 Artificial "construction lines" were then drawn
along the Florida coast, and an equidistance line delimited using the
Cuban straight baselines and the artificial U.S. baselines. Finally, a
third line, which forms the agreed boundary, was drawn between the two
previously delimited lines, which, although not equidistant, divided
equally the area between them. s'
However, the I.C.I. decided to follow none of these methods, and
instead developed a fourth method of dealing with this delimitation
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problem.	 The Maltese baselines were ignored for the purposes of
••-•
delimitation, but instead of delimiting the equidistance line from the
low-water marks on both States' coasts, the Court drew its own straight
baselines along the coasts of both Libya and Malta.	 It then
constructed a median line between these two false coasts, whilst still
claiming not to rule on the validity of the Maltese straight baselines.
Then, even more extraordinarily, in deciding that the relevant
circumstances dictated that this provisional median line be transposed
northwards, the I.C.J. developed a "notional median line" between Italy
and Libya, using the straight baselines drawn by Italy along the
Sicilian coast, and the low-water line along the coast of Libya. Thus,
not only did the Court approve of the dubious straight baselines used
by Italy, but by finding no difficulty in delimiting a median line
between the straight baselines of one State and the low-water line of
another, the	 made it clear that its disregard of the Maltese
baselines was based not on practical but legal grounds, despite its
disclaimers to that effect.
One of the reasons for the Court's decision to delimit its own
straight baselines along the Maltese coast was its objections to the
use of Filfla as a basepoint in the generation of the provisional
median line.	 Although the I.C.J. held that it was not expressing any
opinion as to whether the inclusion of Filfla in the Maltese baselines
was "legally justified," it found it inequitable to accord this
uninhabited rock any weight in order to eliminate the "disprOportionate
effect" it would have on the determination of that line. 	 In so doing,
the Court noted that:
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II ... the baselines as determined by coastal States are not per se
identical with the points chosen on a coast to make it possible to
calculate the area of continental shelf appertaining to that
State."s2
This treatment of Filfla had been envisaged by the I.C.J. in its
Judgement in the North Sea Cases, where it observed that it was
appropriate in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries to
ignore "the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections,
the disproportionately distorting effect of which can be eliminated by
other means" 3 - presumably by not according them the weight in
delimitation to which they would normally be entitled.	 Admittedly,
these remarks were not made with reference to islands, islets, or rocks
which form part of straight baseline systems, but Hodgson saw no reason
why they should not also be so applicable. He believed that the use of
a straight baseline system should be restricted, "on the basis of
equity," to the delimitation of the territorial sea, because:
"A straight baseline system may incorporate within it rocks,
islets, and/or isles which, ... [by virtue of their small size and
lack of economic life], should be discounted as basepoints [for
the purpose of constructing an equidistant continental shelf
boundary]. ... Many straight baseline systems contain excesses
that should not be perpetuated in shelf and seabed boundaries,
therefore	 creating
	 (because	 of	 distance)	 even	 greater
inequities.usA
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However, acceptance of the Court's view that Filfla should not be
a controlling basepoint in the delimitation of the provisional median
line raises an interesting question as to the status of those straight
baselines drawn to it.	 The Court stated that, for the purposes of
delimitation, the relevant coast of Malta was that from Ras il-Wardija
to Delimara Point, "following straight baselines but excluding the
islet of Filfla." ss The straight baselines referred to by the Court
are not defined or illustrated, but logically they cannot be those
linking Filfla to the island of Malta, because to use them for
delimitation purposes would be to accord Filfla weight in the
delimitation of the provisional median line. By ignoring the straight
baselines drawn to Filfla in favour of others drawn along the coast of
the island of Malta, the Court in effect changes the legal status of
the waters behind Malta's claimed baselines from internal waters to
continental shelf insofar as the results of its delimitation are
concerned.
(f) Conclusions 
Clearly, in both of these cases, the I.C.S.'s delimitation of
continental shelf areas based purely on coastal configurations,
disregarding the straight baselines claimed, presumes the use of the
low-water mark as the relevant baseline. This would seem to deny the
coastal State's right to delimit its own territorial waters in
accordance with international law, and rests uneasily with the fact
that all seaward zones of national jurisdiction, including the
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-continental shelf, are measured from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
However, in Degan's view, this practice is "prudent," for it is
his belief that baseline abuse has prompted the I.C.T. not to take into
account unilaterally established baselines, "in order to avoid
conflicts with neighbouring States as to their legality." G'; Similarly,
Hodgson noted that:
"It is probable, ..., that the difficulties encountered by some
members of the Court in accepting the validity of the Tunisian
baselines drawn to the Kerkennah Islands had considerable bearing
on the Court's decision to include such areas within the areas
considered relevant for the proportionality test."s7
Nevertheless, however good the Court's reasons may have been, the fact
remains that neither the Tunisian nor Maltese continental shelf was
allowed to begin from the claimed baselines.
In the Tunisia-Libya Case it is difficult to imagine the Court
amending its proposed boundary, even if the internal water areas had
been excluded from the proportionality calculations, as proportionality
is a test of the equity of the result, not a principle of delimitation.
Moreover, the Court's delimitation methods were not depehdent on the
respective States' baselines.
	 By contrast, in the Libya-Malta Case,
the Court used equidistance - a method reliant on each State's
baselines - to construct a provisional median line between Libya and
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-Malta, which it then found reasons to transpose northwards. 	 The
provisional median line disregarded Malta's straight baselines,
possibly slightly reducing the continental shelf area accruing to Malta
compared with that it might have received had its straight baselines
been used.
The problems highlighted result from the fact that in neither case
was the I.C,J. asked to rule on the validity of the straight baselines
employed by one of the Parties to the arbitration, and for it to have
done so would have been to go beyond its jurisdiction. Thus, from its
Judgements in these cases, it is clear that the I.C.J. is unable to
arbitrate on the use of disputed baselines as part of its task to
delimit respective continental shelves, unless specifically asked to do
SO.
These conclusions must also apply by analogy to the delimitation
of E.E.Z. boundaries between States, given the repetition of the
continental shelf delimitation provisions in Article 83 of the 1982
Convention.	 Indeed, with respect to the E.E.Z. neither customary nor
conventional international law would appear to require straight
baselines to form the starting point for E.E.Z. delimitation between
States.
Proof of this is provided by the unanimous decision in the 1985
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau "maritime boundary" delimitation arbitration. 	 On
establishing the E.E.Z. boundary between the two adjacent States the
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Tribunal dismissed, (without full explanation), -
 as irrelevant to the
delimitation, the straight baseline legislation of the two States
"The problem of the baselines necessary to establish the 200-mile
limit recognized by the Parties as the extent of their exclusive
economic zones is not of direct concern to the Tribunal, as these
lines depend on the unilateral decision of the States concerned
and do not form part of the present dispute.	 During the oral
proceedings,
	 the Parties set aside their latest baselines,
established after the critical date on which the dispute arose:
the Guinea decree of 30 July 1980 and the Guinea-Bissau law of 19
May 1978.	 This leads to the consideration of the previous lines
(Guinea decree of 3 June 1964 and Guinea-Bissau decision of 31
December 1974).
	 However, none of this is of any practical
consequence
	 where	 the	 present	 lateral	 delimitation	 is
concerned."ss
Three points arise out of this ruling. Firstly, as with the two
Mediterranean continental shelf cases, the fact that the parties did
not make their straight baselines part of the dispute meant that the
Tribunal was able to avoid ruling upon their validity. Secondly, to be
significant to delimitation, the straight baselines must be in place
when a dispute arises: they may not be proclaimed with a view to
improving the negotiating position.
	
Finally, and most crucially,
because baselines are unilaterally proclaimed they may have have no
relevance to a bilateral dispute.s'
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Thus, in future, States with straight baseline systems, which are
parties to delimitation cases, would do well to remember that where
straight baselines are employed by only one State, these may be ignored
by the courts for the purposes of delimitation, without prejudice to
the legitimacy of the baselines employed.	 Where the denial or
approbation of straight baselines may be significant in terms of the
size of area received as a result of delimitation, States should give
the Court the jurisdiction to rule on the use of those baselines.
(g) Straight Baselines and Maritime Boundary Delimitatisn: c--= 
Concluding Remarks 
Insofar as continental shelf and E.E.Z. boundary delimitation is
concerned, there is little evidence of strait taselines teing
significant factors in the settlement of neighbourins States' maritime
frontiers, despite an apparent presumption in favour of their use in
the 1958 Geneva Conventions.
In theory, all boundaries drawn between States are affected by the
respective baseline regimes claimed by the States involved in a
particular delimitation. 	 In practice, the increasing reliance on
"equitable principles," rather than on equidistance, as a means of
delimiting boundaries between States, has, to a certain extent,
lessened the importance of baseline configuration in boundary drawing.
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention made explicit references
to "points on the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured"
in the application of the equidistance method; by contrast, Articles 74
-713-
and 83 of the 1982 Convention state no point of reference from which
E.E.Z. and continental shelf boundaries are to "Se drawn.	 Moreover,
successive third-party adjuducations have confirmed that the baselines
claimed by States provide no fundamental starting point for
delimitation.
However, the fact that straight baselines have been ignored in
delimitations by arbitral bodies is largely because, in the absence of
specific requests to rule on their validity, adjudication upon such
baselines has not formed part of their task. 	 In many ways, this has
been a fortunate aberration, because it is easy to foresee the
delimitation problems which would be posed by an adjudication of a
dispute concerning a State's interpretation of the straight baseline
rules.
More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that use of straight
baselines	 makes little difference to the boundaries Italy negotiated
with neighbouring States. 	 This may be because, unlike points on the
low-water line, where the line running between two turning points is
already a geodesic, points along a straight baseline are not able to be
used as basepoints in determining an equidistance line boundary.s°
Therefore, the basepoints for determining the boundary are the same as
those used in the straight baseline system, with the result that
boundaries developed upon straight baselines and the low-water mark are
Identical.	 Hence, straight baselines may not pose the obstacles to
Mediterranean boundary delimitation one might think they would.
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8.5 The Problems Posed by Coastal Configuration 
Certain Mediterranean delimitations may, however, be complicated
by the effect of a particular coastal configuration upon the proposed
boundary.	 For example, assuming good political relations, unless
Tunisia makes exorbitant claims on the basis of its more northerly
coastal extension, the continental shelf boundary between Tunisia and
Algeria should prove to be a relatively easy exercise, despite the
existence of Algerian straight baselines in the boundary region.
Similarly, coastal configuration would seem to suggest that the
continental shelf boundary between Algeria and Morocco travels
northeastwards	 to the	 advantage of	 Morocco,	 particularly if
equidistance is the chosen method of delimitation.
A potentially more complicated situation exists with respect to
the boundary to be delimited by France and Italy. The delimitation of
maritime boundaries between France and Monaco would appear to cause the
boundary to follow the same southwesterly course in its initial
departure from the mainland coasts, although France may argue that the
boundary should be deflected eastwards to take account of the proximity
of Monaco, to ensure that it is left with more than just a thin sliver
of seabed off Cap Martin. Proceeding offshore, the penetration of the
Corsican landmass into the Gulf of Genoa would then force the boundary
abruptly to change direction to travel northeastwards, before another
abrupt directional change to pass between the east coast of Corsica and
the Archipelago of Tuscany, there to link up with the States'
territorial sea boundary through the Strait of Bonifacio.	 From the
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westerly terminus of this boundary, the final segment(s) of the
continental shelf boundary would then seem likely to travel in a
generally westward direction to link up with the already agreed
boundary between Italy and Spain, and that yet to be delimited between
France and Spain. 	 Corsica would, therefore, be encircled, a situation
to which France is held to object, although it is difficult to imagine
any other delimitation.
Geographical problems also beset any agreement between Spain and
France, where coastal configuration would seem to require that the
continental shelf boundary follow a northeasterly course into the Gulf
of Lyons for approximately 45 miles, before turning southwest to a
trijunction with the Spain-Italy and France-Italy continental shelf
boundaries.	 This seems likely to be unacceptable to France in
particular, because of the "cut-off" effect of the first segment of the
boundary, made potentially worse by the Spanish straight baselines in
the boundary region. Consequently, the States may agree to some form
of compromise boundary along the lines of that agreed by them for the
Bay of Biscay. Here the first segment of the boundary was delimited on
the basis of equidistance, and the second segment negotiated according
to equitable principles utilising the ratio of artificial coastlines
specially constructed to represent the different coastal lengths. €1
Should political relations improve, a similar compromise may be
necessary to settle the continental shelf boundary between Yugoslavia
and Albania, as the configuration of the Albanian coast would appear to
dictate that the boundary follow a southerly course in the nearshore
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area, thereby threatening to cut off the coastal front of Albania.
Perhaps partly to counter this, Albania has drawn a straight baseline
from the terminus of the land boundary to Cape Rodoni, which is
unjustified either under the rules for straight baselines or for bays.
On the other hand, Yugoslavia has delimited an apparently illegal
straight baseline between Cape Platamuni and Cape Mendra, which also
impinges on the boundary region, making the outcome of any boundary
negotiations difficult to predict.
Coastal configuration would also appear severely to restrict the
extent of Turkey's continental shelf off Iskenderun Bay in respect of
any delimitation with Syria.	 Turkey will, no doubt, claim a boundary
which has less of a cut-off effect on its potential seabed area.2
8.6 Island Problems 
Islands pose the most persistent problem in the delimitation of
maritime boundaries between States; and as the Mediterranean Sea is
studded with islands, they may be thought likely to prove troublesome
in future boundary delimitations.
	
However, before one considers this
proposition, it is necessary to examine the regime of islands in
international law.
(a) Islands and Continental Shelf Entitlement under Conventional 
International Law
Article 121(1) of the 1982 Convention retains the definition of an
island found in the Territorial Sea Convention:
"An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide."
The rest of the Article reads as follows:
"2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with
the provisions of the ... E19821 Convention applicable to other
land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."
No accompanying guidance is given as to how to interpret paragraph
3, and space permits only a brief examination of the UNCLOS III debates
to understand how it was arrived at, but, significantly, Mediterranean
States were active and effective participants in the discussions which
focussed on the fact that by increasing continental shelf jurisdiction
to at least 200 miles, full continental shelf entitlement for islands
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had even greater potential for creating disputes than it had under the
narrower limits prescribed in the Continental Shelf Convention.
Consequently, several States produced draft articles which sought to
place geographic, economic, or political limitations upon the types of
islands which should be entitled to full continental shelf rights,
and/or those islands which should be accorded full weight in
delimitation.	 Many of these were carried over from the U.N. Seabed
Committee, which, by the time of its conclusion in 1973, had evidenced
two opposing viewpoints on the entitlement of islands to offshore
jurisdiction, each based on the national interests of its proponents.
In the first place, there were those States that held that there
should be no distinction between islands and continental land masses;
and that the criteria relating to delimitation should be applied in the
same way for each land mass. 6' Greece, for example, argued for equal
treatment of islands and continents, but against special privileges for
islands in the attribution of maritime zones; 4 whilst Cyprus held that
if there was to be any differential treatment of continents and
Islands, the bias should be in favour of islands since, generally
speaking, they were reliant upon resources in their maritime zones g6
However, other States, particularly those which were developing or
geographically disadvantaged, argued that the maritime spaces of
certain types of islands, other than island and archipelagic States,
should be determined by taking into account factors such as their
habitability, size, population numbers, contiguity to the prim ipal
territory, and geophysical affinity.	 For example, Malta, in a draft
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-article to the U.N. Seabed Committee, defined an island as greater than
one square kilometre in area, with islets being anything smaller,
	 and
held that it was "necessary to distinguish between islands
geographically close to coasts and isolated islands."' Turkey and
Tunisia went further and submitted amendments seeking to delete Article
13 of Colombia et al's "Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea," which
attributed a continental shelf to islands.	 Indeed, rejecting the
definition of an "island" in Article 10 of the Territorial Sea
Convention, Tunisia held that "equal treatment of islands" might
perpetuate or even accentuate the gap between rich and poor nations,
for it "definitely favoured countries possessing islands," whose
maritime claims:
" • • • conflicted with the interests of the international community,
when the islands were in the high sea, or with the major
interests, and sometimes even the sovereignty, of certain coastal
states, when the foreign islands were in areas coming under the
national jurisdiction of the coastal states."6
Thus, although continental shelf rights were already bestowed on
islands under the Continental Shelf Convention, 69 UNCLOS III witnessed
several attempte to redefine the meaning of the term "island," in order
to reduce the inequity of according all islands full maritime spaces in
delimitation.
Of the reasons adduced for this action by Symmons, 7° three are
relevant to the Mediterranean:
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(i) the definition of an island contained inArticle 10 of the
Territorial Sea Convention was perceived to be too generalised,
allowing any natural feature permanently above sea level to be regarded
as an island, irrespective of its size;
(ii) the diversity of islands in terms of their size, location,
population, and economic importance, made it inequitable that a small
insignificant "island" could generate a contidental shelf, potentially
out of proportion to its size and significance;71
(iii) an island could deprive a State of a large area of continental
shelf which would otherwise accrue to it, simply because it lay nearer
to the coast of a State other that to which it belonged.72
Hence,	 for example,	 Turkey proposed that rocks,	 low-tide
elevations, and islands without economic life and situated outside the
territorial sea of a State, should have no marine space of their own.
Indeed:
"An island situated in the economic zone or continental shelf of
other States shall have no economic zone or continental shelf of
its own if it does not contain at least one-tenth of the land area
and population of the State to which it belongs."73
This proposal was clearly designed to deprive Greece's Aegean islands
of a continental shelf or E.E.Z., 74
 and was given more -weight in 1977
when Turkey and other States (including Algeria and Libya) revised it
thus:
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"Islands which are situated on the continental shelf or exclusive
economic zone of another State, or which on the basis of their
geographical location affect the normal continental shelf or
exclusive economic zone of other States shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf of their own."75
However, despite the emphasis upon island location in these
proposals, the three criteria which came to the fore in the attempts to
distinguish between true "islands" - which would be entitled to a
continental shelf - and "islets" and "rocks" - which would not - were
an island's size, its habitability, and its ability to maintain an
economic life of its own.	 As already seen, these were eventually
linked together in Article 121(3) to deny particular natural features
the continental shelves to which they had previously been entitled
under the Geneva Convention.
On the other hand, the Continental Shelf Convention remains in
force between parties to it until the 1982 Convention enters into
force, which means that Article 121(3) is at present inoperative
between adherents to the Geneva Convention; between non-parties to the
Continental Shelf Convention the position is less clear.
(b) Islands and Continental Shelf Entitlement under Customary 
International Law
In the North Sea Cases, the I.C.J. upheld Article 1 of the
Continental Shelf Convention as expressing customary international law,
thereby entitling all islands irrespective of size, habitability or
economic life, to a continental shelf of their own. The question now
is whether the more restrictive provision laid down in Article 121(3)
is declaratory of customary international law. 	 Brown has concluded
that:
"Given the less than certain position of rocks under international
customary law, as developed before UNCLOS III, and the fact that
the U.N. Convention has been adopted and signed by a very large
proportion of the world community, it seems more than likely that
a tribunal would now find that the rule in Article 121(3), by
virtue of its clearly demonstrated acceptability as a rule of
customary law, must now be recognised as such."76
However, the position is at best unclear, because he continues:
"Certainly, at the very least it can be said that State practice
is tending strongly in that direction."77
Hence, it would appear that as under conventional international law,
there are presently no restrictions upon the entitlement of an island
to a continental shelf of its own, even if, in practice, islands which
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-are incapable of habitation or of supporting an independent economic
life will be given reduced weight in delimitation.
(c) Islands and Continental Shelf Boundary Delimitation 
Although many of the proposals regarding islands at UNCLOS III
concerned their entitlement to a continental shelf or E.E.Z., they
often had as their aim the denial of their right to be used as
basepoints in inter-State delimitations.	 Other States were more
explicit and discussed the question of islands solely in relation to
delimitation, e.g. Rumania, Ireland,
Amongst Mediterranean States, France and Tunisia (with Kenya)
independently proposed that insofar as the delimitation of the
continental shelf or the E.E.Z. was concerned, special account should
be taken of inter alla the existence of islands or islets in the area
to be delimited. 7E'	 However, these proposals did little more than
recognise that islands were problematic in the delimitation of maritime
boundaries, requiring them to be the subject of particular attention in
an equitable delimitation. 	 More surprising, (in view of the Aegean
situation), Turkey took the same moderate approach:
"In the course of negotiations, the States shall take into account
all	 the	 relevant	 factors,	 including	 inter 'alia	 the
geomorphological and geological structure of the shelf up to the
outer limit of the continental margin, and special circumstances
such as the general configuration of the respective coasts, the
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-existence of islands, islets, or rocks of one State on the
continental shelf of the other.
Where the coasts of two or more States are adjacent or opposite to
each other, the delimitation of the respective economic zones
shall be determined by agreement among them in accordance with
equitable principles, taking into account all the relevant factors
including,	 inter alia,	 the geomorphological and geological
structure of the sea-bed area involved, and special circumstances
such as the general configuration of the respective coasts, and
the existence of islands, islets or rocks within the area."79
By contrast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia et al drew a distinction
between adjacent and non-adjacent islands, proposing that for non-
adjacent islands their marine spaces be delimited on the basis of
equitable criteria including their size and location, plus the needs
and interest of their populations.9°
Greece, on the other hand, proposed that islands be uniformly
entitled to full marine spaces, its "Draft Articles on the Continental
Shelf" providing that, failing agreement:
II ... no State is entitled to extend its sovereignty beyond the
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines, continental or insular, from which the
continental shelf of each of the two States is measured.flei
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-However,	 Article 121 remained silent on the question of
delimitation and concerned itself exclusively with the entitlement of
islands to a continental shelf or E.E.Z., prompting Algeria to
criticise UNCLOS III for separating delimitation and the regime of
islands, which were really two aspects of the same problem:
"Given that the search for equity was at the root of the
Conference, it was regrettable that the regime of islands
resulted, in certain cases, in a situation which was not
equitable.	 By giving all islands the same maritime space and
advantages, without taking account of the harmful effects on the
delimitation of sea borders with neighbouring States, article 121
ran contrary to the general spirit of the draft Convention,"
Along similar lines,	 Turkey stated that Article 121 was
unacceptable because it was "out of harmony with both international
laws and articles 15, 74 and 63." e'3 With the Aegean in mind, the lack
of any reference to the inequity of according certain islands full
effect in delimitation was for Turkey a serious omission, although
Greece retorted that:
"The fundamental principles of international law embodied in
article 121 ..,	 had remained consistently unchanged.
	 No
connection had ever been established between that arttcle and the
provisions on delimitation and none could be established.u94
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Nevertheless, Turkey maintained that the problem of islands in semi-
enclosed seas made Article 121 unacceptable. 96	 The islands' regime
contained therein was of a general nature which did not determine the
maritime space to be allocated to islands in delimitation, hence it was
Inapplicable to delimitations involving islands.8
However, the failure of UNCLOS III to devise a formula that would
meet with universal approval was inevitable, 97
 for the variety of
island situations and characteristics worldwide would make the
imposition	 of	 defined	 criteria	 purely	 arbitrary:	 hence,	 in
delimitation, all islands must be treated on their merits and in
relation to the other prevailing circumstances. This was certainly the
approach taken by the courts in the Anglo-French Arbitration and
Tunisia-Libya Case, and is provided for in the Continental Shelf
Convention by the "special circumstances" rule of Article 6. Moreover,
State practice appears to have evolved its own set of guidelines for
dealing with islands, at least insofar as opposite State delimitation
is concerned, namely:eR
(i) islands lying within the territorial sea of a coastal State are
given full effect;e'
(ii) islands lying beyond the territorial sea of the coastal State may
be accorded only partial effect;9°
(iii) islands lying on or near a median line drawn between mainlands
may sometimes be given full effect, but are more usually given partial
effect;91
(iv) islands belonging to State A, but lying nearer to State B, may
either be given partial effect' 2 or enclaved on State B's continental
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shelf;"
(v)	 islands which are either very small, 94 or of disputed
sovereignty, gs may be ignored.
Thus, although an island's political status and its economic importance
may be factors which affect the weight to be attached to it in
delimitation,	 State practice appears to evidence that	 it is
predominantly a combination of an island's size and location, (or more
correctly	 the	 inequitable	 effect	 of	 its location upon the
delimitation), which brings these factors into operation.'6
This conclusion would also appear to apply to delimitation between
adjacent States, although State practice is less extensive, partly
because where islands lie at a distance offshore they have little
effect upon the delimitation."	 However, when islands lie close
inshore they may have a disproportionate influence upon the course of
the
	 boundary,	 in	 particular	 where	 equidistance	 is	 used."
Consequently, in some boundary agreements islands lying close inshore
have been ignored," whilst in others they have been accorded
weight, '°° though sometimes only partial. 101
(d) Islands and Future Mediterranean Maritime Boundary Delimitations 
Applying the above to the Mediterranean, it would appear that even
the larger islands, (e.g. the Balearics, Corsica, Sardinia-, or Crete),
will be accorded only partial effect in future delimitations, because
they lie beyond the territorial sea of their respective mainland
coasts.'" However, although location seems a powerful influence in
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deciding the treatment accorded to islands in delimitation, it seems
highly unlikely that any of the large islands will be denied full
effect, as their size and economic importance would seem to be more
weighty circumstances than location in the delimitations in which they
will be involved.
Moreover, it should be remembered that in the North Sea Cases, the
I.C.J. envisaged eliminating only the disproportionately distorting
effect of "islets" and "rocks" in delimitation, '° 	 which prompted
Goldie to suggest that there was a presumption in favour of "large"
islands being used as basepoints in continental shelf boundary
delimitation.'" The fact that Spain and Italy agreed a continental
shelf boundary between the Balearic Islands and Sardinia, which in
effect assimilated the islands to mainland for delimitation purposes,
supports this view.	 Furthermore, the right of Sicily to generate a
full continental shelf of its own was not disputed in the delimitation
between Italy and Tunisia, although the agreement limited the amount of
continental shelf accruing to Italy's smaller and "inequitably located"
islands.
Therefore, where islands are both small and inequitably located,
it is likely, but not probable, that they will be subject to techniques
to reduce their effect upon delimitation. Indeed, it would appear that
the factors of size and location conspire even to deny island States
full effect on delimitation, "°' given that in the Libya-Malta Case,
Malta was treated as a small and inequitably located appendage not even
of mainland Italy, but of the island of Sicily,
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However, if this reasoning is correct, there are relatively few
situations in the Mediterranean where attributing islands full effect
in delimitation is likely to be inequitable.
One such situation is the delimitation of the continental shelf
boundary between Spain and Morocco, which is complicated not only by
the sovereignty disputes concerning Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla, but
also by the presence of the Spanish island of Alboran on or near the
median line between the mainland coasts, and by the several Spanish
islets off the North African coast. 	 Continental shelf claims from
these islands could result in a Spanish jurisdictional zone stretching
the breadth of this vital part of the Mediterranean.
However, Alboran is a tiny uninhabited "island" of less than one
square kilometre, which, despite its strategic location, has no
military or economic use. Under Article 121(3) of the 1982 Convention,
it would only be entitled to a 12 mile territorial sea and, therefore,
It should not be used as a basepoint in the delimitation of the Spain-
Morocco continental shelf boundary, particularly in the light of the
treatment of Filfla in the Libya-Malta Case. 107 Thus, although Spain
and Morocco may not agree on an equidistance-based delimitation, the
most likely solution is for Alboran to be partially enclaved on the
Moroccan continental shelf, in the same way that Italian and
Yugoslavian	 islands	 were	 enclaved
	 in	 previous Mediterranean
delimitations,
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Potentially more difficult problems are posed-by the three sets of
Spanish "islets" situated just off the Moroccan coast. Penon de
Alhucemas and the nearby associated islets of Isole del Mer and Isla de
Tierra, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera and its associated islets, lie
less than a mile from the Morocccan coast; the Chafarinas Islands (Isla
del Congreso, Isla de Isabella II, and Isla del Ray) lie approximately
4 miles offshore, and near to the border with Algeria.
	 Though, at
present, Spain has not made even a territorial sea claim on their
behalf, their potential use as basepoints in the delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary, threatens to restrict severely the amount
of seabed area accruing to Morocco,'" because the fact that these
islands lie nearer to the coast of Morocco than to Spain cannot deny
their entitlement to a continental shelf.
However, in the Anglo-French Arbitration the U.K.'s argument that
location was irrelevant to entitlement, and that therefore, a median
line should be drawn around the Channel Islands,'" was rejected, as
was the French contention that the location of the Channel Islands
close to its coast negated their continental shelf rights."° Instead,
the Court found that the presence of the Channel Islands close to the
French coast, indeed, "practically within the arms" of a French gulf,
and "on the wrong side of the median line," disturbed "the balance of
the geographical circumstances which would otherwise exist between the
parties in this region as a result of the broad equality of the
coastlines of their mainlands."" Indeed, the location of the Channel
Islands, if given full effect in delimitation, would result "In a
substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would
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otherwise accrue to the French Republic," a circumstance creative of
inequity calling for a method of delimitation that in some measure
could'redress the situation. 112 Hence, the Channel Islands were given
12 mile enclaves on the French continental shelf.
Clearly, there are similarities between this delimitation and that
in the Alboran Sea in terms of island location, the broadly similar
lengths of coastline which face onto the delimitation area, and the
fact that the Continental Shelf Convention is inapplicable. However:
"It would ... be quite inconsistent with the Court's approach to
press these parallels very far. The whole thrust of the Judgment
is that an equitable delimitation can be achieved only by taking
into account the situation in the disputed area in its entirety,
and by paying special attention to its unique features.
Therefore, while it is legitimate, and indeed essential, to
characterise situations by reference to their similarities or
differences, it must also be recognised that an equitable
delimitation in any given case will depend upon its own peculiar
features.""'
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, the treatment of the Channel
Islands was related to their existing fishery limit, and to their
potential for a 12 mile territorial sea. 	 The Court also. took account
of the fact that the Islands could only claim significant areas of
continental shelf to their north and west, 	 However, the Court was
perhaps most influenced by the islands' size and economic importance,
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their considerable population, and their semr-autonomous political
status, " 4 none of which apply to the Spanish islets.
All of the islets are very small: the Chafarinas Islands as a
whole only cover 2.5 square kilometres, whilst the largest islands in
the other two groups do not exceed 200 square metres. None is capable
of habitation or of sustaining an economic life, and thus there is no
entitlement to a continental shelf under the 1982 Convention, although
they are entitled to a territorial sea. Therefore, one solution would
be for the islands to be enclaved on the Moroccan continental shelf,
the main seabed boundary passing well to their north, as in the Anglo-
French Arbitration.
Morocco, however, appears determined to prevent the islets
exercising any offshore jurisdiction.	 In establishing an E.F.Z. in
1973, and in later utilising the Chafarinas Islands as basepoints in
its straight baseline system, Morocco denied them any maritime zones,
explaining its action at UNCLOS III, in 1974, by reference to paragraph
10 of the 0.A. U.'S "Declaration on Issues of the Law of the Sea," which
concerned the non-recognition of E.E.Z. regimes in the case of
territories under colonial domination, specifically extended by Morocco
to non-recognition of the territorial sea.'' s Non-recognition of the
continental shelf was not mentioned, but it can be inferred that
Morocco would not recognise any continental shelf claim made from the
Spanish islets, which it considers to be occupied by a "foreign power."
Indeed, Article 5 of the joint African articles, which gave "concrete
form" to the 0.A.U. Declaration, used the all-encompassing term
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"maritime spaces" in denying any "colonial or foreign or racist Power"
rights to the maritime spaces or resources of those islands under their
contrOl."'
A more complicated situation exists in the central Mediterranean,
where the delimitation of the Italy-Malta continental shelf boundary to
the west of Malta is affected by the presence of the Italian Pelagie
Islands.	 Malta takes the view that the Islands should be discounted
and restricted to at most a 12 mile territorial sea, so enlarging its
claim westwards.'" However, the fact that Italy settled for a reduced
area of seabed for these islands in its agreement with Tunisia had more
to do with the necessity of concluding an agreement enabling Italian
fishermen to continue to operate in Tunisian waters. 	 Hence Italy
traded seabed area for renewal of the fisheries agreement.
No such motives pertain as between Italy and Malta and, given that
the islands are the nearest piece of Italian territory to Malta, it is
difficult to foresee any way in which Italy would be prepared to accept
the islands having anything less than full effect. 119 Moreover, the
precedent set by the Italy-Tunisia agreement makes it difficult for
Malta to deny that the Islands are entitled to their own continental
shelf.	 Malta's position is also compromised by its past insistence
that islands - the rock of Filfla included - are entitled to a
continental shelf of their own, and that the appropriate means of
continental shelf delimitation is a median line utilising islands as
basepoints.
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Prescott suggests that the Pelagie Islands will also be important
in determining the common point of the boundaries between Italy and
Tunisia, and/or Malta and Tunisia, and/or Libya and Malta, depending
where the terminus of the boundary between Libya and Tunisia eventually
lies.	 On the doubtful assumption that the States agree upon the
boundary suggested by the I.C.J., the extension of the second segment
for 26 miles results in its termination at a point lying on the median
line between Tunisia and Italy, giving full effect to the Italian
Islands.	 Any extension of the boundary beyond this point would,
therefore, indicate that the Islands were not being given full effect,
thereby benefiting Libya.
The total area involved is 200 square miles (Figure 30)," 9 which
Prescott concludes Italy has no reason not to claim:
n ... the fact that the Isole Pelagie were discounted as an act of
favour for Tunisia does not mean that the islands also have to be
discounted for Libya or Malta."°
However, it would seem difficult, if not impossible, for Italy to claim
this area, given that its claims to the seabed south-east of the
Pelagie Islands have been constricted by the continental shelf area
belonging to Tunisia as a result of the delimitation of those States'
respective continental shelves. Therefore, following the 'doctrine that
"the land dominates the sea," Italy has no direct link via natural
prolongation with the seabed under consideration, debarring it from
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Figure 30 - The area of continental shelf disputed by four States in
the central Mediterranean.
Source: J.R.V. Prescott The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World,
p. 301.	 (London and New York: Methuen, 1985)
making a claim to the area in question, which, consequently, must be
delimited between Tunisia, Libya and Malta.
A different sort of island problem exists for Albania and Greece,
whose boundary should, in theory, be delimited on the basis of
equidistance, both States being parties to the Continental Shelf
Convention.	 However, in applying this rule, Albania is likely to
contest the effect of the Greek islands of Kerkira (Corfu), Erikousa
and Orthonoi,"" which overlap the Albanian coast, forcing the
equidistance line to follow a northerly course that places severe
restrictions on Albania's offshore claims.
The islands would appear to constitute "special circumstances"
under Article 6, but State practice gives few clues as to how the
boundary might be adjusted to take account of them. 	 Islands affected
the axis of the equidistance line in the Anglo-French Arbitration and
resulted in the Scilly Isles being granted half-effect; but the two
situations are not comparable and, therefore, a solution is difficult
to predict.
Resolution of the Aegean Sea continental shelf boundary dispute
between Greece and Turkey is also difficult to predict, although Karl
has made an excellent attempt at devising a model-based solution.1'2
Without doubt the most difficult problem area in the Mediterranean Sea,
the basis of the dispute is given detailed attention in Appendix 2.
However, it is worthy of note here that Turkey and Greece have a
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history of conflict and hostility which is not conducive to concessions
by either side, and geography is overwhelmingly advantageous to Greece.
8.7 The Problem of Third States 
Of the eight continental shelf agreements to which Italy must be a
party, the boundary with Algeria is the only one for which negotiations
have not been opened, perhaps because of differences of opinion as to
the appropriate method of delimitation, but more likely because the
boundary will run through deep, currently unexplored, waters. 	 Once
delimited the boundary will terminate in the west at a trijunction with
the Algeria-Spain and Spain-Italy boundaries, and in the east at a
trijunction with the Algeria-Tunisia and Italy-Tunisia boundaries.
Hence, its delimitation will be far from simple.
Similarly, a major problem in the delimitation of a continental
shelf boundary between Italy and Albania may be where to site the
boundary terminal points, given the boundaries between Italy and
Yugoslavia to the north, and between Italy and Greece to the south. Of
these, the Italy-Greece boundary poses the greater difficulty as this
overlaps the Albanian coast due to the presence of Greek islands off
Albania's southern coast; this would also seem to require that the
boundary between Albania and Greece be diverted northward. 	 Thus, it
may well be necessary for Albania to settle its boundary with Greece
before delimitation with Italy can proceed fruitfully.
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Perhaps, however, the most difficult area in which to delimit
continental shelf or E.E.Z. boundaries is the central Mediterranean,
where the presence of a number of States makes bilateral negotiations
almost impossible. In the Libya-Malta Case, the I.C.J. refrained from
delimiting a boundary in the areas claimed by Italy, causing Arangio-
Ruiz to conclude somewhat prematurely, (and without support in the
Court's Judgement), that the I.C.T. had made it "abundantly clear" that
it was left to Italy alone to delimit continental shelf boundaries "to
the west and south-west and even more to the east and south-east" of
the Libya-Malta boundary. Hence, he envisaged two provisional
median line boundaries, each adjusted to take acco.ant of the States'
respective coastal lengths and directions.12°.
However, notwithstanding the unlikelihood of Ita1y acnepting such
delimitations, the I.C.J. made it clear that there existed an area east
of 15 30' E and south of the parallel 34' 30' N to which Italian
claims did not extend, but to which Libya and Malta made conflicting
claims.	 Thus, the Libya-Malta boundary will need to be extended in
this area, following negotiations which must also involve Italy.
Similarly, to the west of the boundary, discussions must involve Malta,
Libya, Italy and possibly Tunisia, given the probable linking up of
boundaries with that to be established between Tunisia and Libya. Any
boundary between Tunisia and Malta will though depend upon the prior
resolution of the Tunisia-Libya dispute, as the I.C.J.'s boundary does
not extend far enough offshore to obviate the need for negotiations
between Tunisia and Malta, and possibly Italy.
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A comparable situation exists in the eastern_Mediterranean, where
the claims of Malta and Italy in the central Ionian Sea, and of Egypt,
south of Crete, are likely to complicate continental shelf boundary
negotiations between Greece and Libya.	 In the same way, the
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Greece and Egypt
is potentially complicated by the claims of Cyprus, Libya and possibly
Turkey.	 However, it is by no means certain that a continental shelf
boundary between Turkey and Egypt will be necessary, as this would
appear to depend on the prior delimitation of the boundaries between
Greece and Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus, and Egypt and Cyprus. Were Turkey
and Egypt to proceed to a delimitation of a boundary in the absence of
these agreements, Greece and Cyprus would feel impelled to participate
in discussions, and only then would the likely problems in such a
boundary delimitation become clear.
However, the delimitation of a boundary between Cyprus and Egypt
is complicated not only by the likely claims of Greece and Israel, but
also by a potential claim on behalf of Akrotiri, the U.K.'s Sovereign
Base Area.	 Theoretically, at least, the U.K. may seek to establish
continental shelf boundaries with Cyprus for its Sovereign Base Areas
of Dhekelia and Akrotiri.
	 If these are to be continuations of the
territorial sea boundaries already in force, the prolongation of the
converging territorial water boundaries of Dhekelia would cause them to
meet 32 miles offshore, 12$ thereby posing no problem.	 On the other
hand, any extension of the diverging territorial sea boundaries between
Akrotiri and Cyprus could result in the need for an opposite State
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boundary with Egypt, whilst securing the Sovertign Base a generous
slice of seabed area.
It seems unlikely, however, that the U.K. will press such claims
for its Sovereign Bases, although it would certainly wish its interests
to be protected by any delimitation agreement between Cyprus and Egypt.
On the other hand, if the U.K. were to make continental shelf claims on
behalf of its Sovereign Bases, any subsequent boundaries would not be
bound to prolong the existing territorial sea boundaries.
8.8 Conclusions 
The previous sections have indicated the wide variety of problems
attending the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries in the
Mediterranean,	 and where possible, likely solutions have been
suggested.	 However, the above discussion shows that to focus purely
upon bilateral delimitations is to ignore the fact that in order to
establish the terminal points of many bilateral boundaries negotiations
must be entered into with third States.	 Hence, any study of the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries in the Mediterranean
requires more than simply a consideration of a number of bilateral
delimitations: it needs also to consider the question of tripoints
common to three bilateral boundaries.
It is highly unlikely given the poor prospects for bilateral
agreements that such tripoints will be settled with any ease. Not only
Is there the problem of negotiations between three States, but in the
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case of dispute, courts are poorly equipped to teal with the pleadings
of more than two parties.	 Moreover, thus far, State practice
concerning trijunctions is limited. 126	 The example of the
establishment of the India-Indonesia-Thailand tripoint in the Andaman
Sea suffices to point out the unwieldy nature of the process required
to delimit one:
December 1971 -
	 Indonesia and Thailand agree upon a partial
delimitation of their continental shelf boundary
August 1973
	 -	 India and Indonesia delimit a continental shelf
boundary between Great Nicobar Island and Sumatra
December 1975 -
	 Indonesia and Thailand agree to extend their
boundary into the Andaman Sea
January 1977 -
	 India and Indonesia sign an agreement extending
their 1974 boundary northwestward into the
Andaman Sea and southwestward into the Indian
Ocean
June 1978
	 India, Indonesia, and Thailand agree upon a
tripoint to their respective boundaries that
allows India and Thailand to establish a
continental shelf boundary extending north from
that point.'27
It is, therefore, evident that the process of .determining
tripoints is a lengthy process, 	 involving multiple bilateral
negotiations. As Table 26 illustrates, applied to the Mediterranean it
would create "a lawyer's paradise," notwithstanding "the difficulty
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Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-Cyprus
Turkey-Cyprus/Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-Syria
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-Cyprus-Syria
Cyprus-Syria-Lebanon
Cyprus-U.K. (Sovereign Base of Dhekelia)-Lebanon
Cyprus-Lebanon-Israel
Cyprus-Israel-Egypt
Cyprus-U.K. (Sovereign Base of Akrotiri)-Egypt
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CHAPTER 9 - E.F.Z AND E.E.Z BOUNDARIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
9.1 Introduction 
At various points previously, mention has been made of E.F.Z.s or
E.E.Z.s, but neither has been discussed in detail, because in the
Mediterranean there are few claims to either.	 In the last twenty
years, only Morocco and Malta have claimed E.F.Z.s beyond their
territorial sea limits, and Morocco's E.F.Z. claim has since been
superseded by a 200 mile E.E.Z. claim.	 Egypt is the only other
Mediterranean State to claim an E.E.Z.
The absence of such claims is partly explained by the
Mediterranean's relative poverty of fish resources, although as the
E.E.Z. regime also includes rights to the seabed, the problems of
dividing up the Sea between the coastal States have also been
significant.	 In addition, there have been fears about the maintenance
of the freedom of navigation.
9.2 Mediterranean Fish Resources 
The small size of Mediterranean fish stocks is a consequence of
the slow rate of plankton production throughout the Sea. 	 This is
inhibited by lack of nutrient interchange between the surface and
deeper waters, and by the limited supply of land-derived nutrients from
the relatively few rivers which flow into the Mediterranean,
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particularly in the east.	 Indeed, at depths beyond 120-130 metres, the
Mediterranean is virtually sterile, whilst severe coastal pollution has
also played its part in impoverishing fish stocks.'
	
Nevertheless,
about 120 out of a total of 500 fish species are fished commercially,
with the northern waters being more productive than the southern.
Demersal species such as hake, sole and red mullet are well
distributed throughout the Mediterranean, but other species such as
poutassou and cod are only found in the colder waters along the
northwestern shore. Gray mullet, sea bream, sea bass and some shrimps
are confined to shallow waters less than 30 feet deep. Pelagic species
are more independent of the seabed, but are nevertheless mainly found
in shallow coastal waters where plankton supplies are the most
plentiful.	 Common species are anchovy, sardine, sprat, sardinella,
mackerel, horse mackerel and tuna, with some swordfish fishing north of
Sicily.
In the mid-1970s,	 pelagic species were considered to be
underfished, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, probably
because of their mobility which only brings them into the nearshore
areas in the summer. Consequently, they are only fished seasonally.
Nevertheless, the Clupediae (anchovies, sardines, etc.) account for
about half of the Mediterranean's fish catch, followed by mackerel,
with shellfish and molluscs representing approximately 15 per cent of
the total by weight.3
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For the western and central Mediterranean, species distribution
reflects differences in seabed morphology and possibly fishing
intensity.	 The number of species decreases with water depth, whilst
the area between the zero and 50 metre isobaths, corresponding to the
sea grass beds and the shelf fish nurseries, is often forbidden to
trawling.	 Hence, it is the preferred zone for the use of fixed gear
and small-scale fisheries.	 Most activity, however, takes place in the
area between the 50 and 200 metre isobaths. This is the zone favoured
by traditional trawls, and within which most of the catches are made.
The deeper waters beyond the 200 metre isobath are restricted to the
more powerful trawlers.
	
Consequently, differences between States in
their catch potential appear to be directly related to the size of
their respective continental shelves.	 Similar patterns are to be
expected in the eastern Mediterranean, although data is less readily
available.4
Unusually, a high proportion of Mediterranean fish species are
economically important.	 In 1980, official landings of fish from the
Mediterranean totalled 862 000 tonnes, which although undoubtedly an
understatement, represents about 1 per cent of the world total; in
terms of value the figure is much higher, due to the quality of fish
caught.	 Fishing boats are traditionally small, making short trips and
landing only small catches, but high market prices have led to
overfishing, with net mesh sizes as small as 30-40 mm. having been
used.	 Demersal species along the northern Mediterranean coast have
been the most severely depleted, with stocks of fish such as hake, sole
and red mullet the most affected.s
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Fisheries information in respect of the Mediterranean remains
incomplete, however, despite the mapping efforts of the General
Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (G.F.C.M.).6	 Even in the
western and central Mediterranean, scientific data on fish abundance is
as yet too fragmentary and disparate, and there is no data on the
catches per unit of effort of professional trawlers for geographic
zones. The data on exploitation levels is also insufficient, although
it does give some indication of resource potential: significantly, in
many sectors of the western Mediterranean age classes 0+ and 1 clearly
predominate, indicating excessive pressure on the fisheries found
largely within the coastal zone and the nearshore areas of the
continental shelf.
9.3 Mediterranean States and E.F.Z.s 
The life cycle of the main species of the Mediterranean
continental shelf involves a coastal phase for juveniles, with
migration towards deeper waters during growth.
	 As a result, where
continental shelves are wide, fish stocks move into international
waters, where they can be fished by vessels of non-coastal States. It
Is, therefore, somewhat curious that so few States have sought to place
the fisheries off their coasts within their exclusive jurisdiction.
However, the Mediterranean is not a favoured area for distant-water
fishing fleets, and in the absence of such a threat to indigenous fish
stocks the requirement to establish E.F.Z. or E.E.Z. regimes is
removed. Moreover, few if any of the commercial fish stocks appear to
require legislative protection: in most cases, based upon the criterion
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of total output by weight, those fish resources considered to be over-
exploited are not inherently profitable nor fished for export.
Consequently, Mediterranean States have historically exerted exclusive
control over fishing in their coastal waters via their territorial sea
claims, with which the concept of the E.F.Z. has been closely linked.
At UNCLOS II in 1960, the narrowly defeated joint U.S.-Canadian
proposal for a 6 mile territorial sea plus a 6 mile E.F.Z. 7 split
Mediterranean States, with eight States voting for (France, Greece,
Israel, Italy, Monaco, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey), and five against
(Albania, Libya, Morocco, the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia).	 For Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and the U.A.R.	 (Egypt and Syria), these
proposals did not go far enough, as they co-sponsored alternative
proposals suggesting a 12 mile E.F.Z. 9 This was rejected along with a
further resolution co-sponsored inter alia by Lebanon, Morocco and the
U.A.R., which proposed jurisdictional rights over a 12 mile zone for
the purposes of "fishing and exploitation of the living resources of
the sea."'
The inability of the international community to agree upon an
E.F.Z. regime did not, however, deter States from claiming E.F.Z.s,1°
Mediterranean States included, although all but the most recent Maltese
claim have been absorbed within the States' territorial sea or E.E.Z.
claim (Table 27).
	 Where Mediterranean States have made no specific
E.F.Z. or E.E.Z. claim, their exclusive fishing rights are restricted
to their territorial waters."
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Table 27 - Mediterranean E.F.Z. claims 
Claim (n. m. )
	 Year







Algeria	 12 (12)	 1972
Egypt	 200 E.E.Z.	 1983
France	 12 (3)	 1967
	
(12)	 1971





Monaco	 12 (3)	 1967
	
(12)	 1973



























L Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding territorial sea claims.
2. Claims to territorial seas for fisheries purposes have been
excluded.
3. The Tunisian E.F.Z. extends to 12 miles from the border with Algeria
to Ras Kapoudia, and up to the 50 metre isobath (i.e. beyond 12 miles)
from Ras Kapoudia to the border with Libya at Ras AJdir, an area of the
Gulf of Gabes known as the "mammellone." Italy, the State most
affected by this claim has, in successive fisheries agreements with
Tunisia, made express mention of the reserved fishing zone beyond
Tunisia's territorial sea. 12 However, when, in 1979, Tunisia refused
to negotiate a new fisheries agreement with the E.G. (on behalf of
Italy), Italian acceptance of the E.F.Z. was terminated. 13
Nevertheless, Italy issued a Shipping Ministry Decree on 25 September
1979, prohibiting its nationals from fishing in "a zone of fish re-
stocking" coincident with the "mammellone. 1114
4. With respect to Turkey, by Act No. 476 of 15 May 1964, the regime of
the territorial sea was to be applied in regard to fishing and
exploitation of living resources up to 12 miles offshore in zones
"contiguous to Turkey's territorial sea."' s As the territorial sea
limit established by the same Act was 6 miles, this would seem to apply
a 12 mile fishing zone throughout the Mediterranean including the
Aegean. However, given that the 1982 extension of the Turkish
territorial sea to 12 miles was not to apply to the Aegean, where the 6
mile limit was retained, it seems unlikely that Turkey has ever claimed
a 12 mile fishing zone in the Aegean.
Source: Author's research.
As to the measures taken by Mediterranean -States with respect to
fishing in their territorial waters, Algeria prohibits fishing by
foreign vessels, whereas Greece allows such vessels to fish in its
territorial sea on the basis of reciprocity. 1E Italy excludes foreign
fishing vessels from an area within 6 miles of its coasts, although
foreign fishermen may operate in the Italian territorial sea in
accordance with treaties.	 Foreign vessels may fish in Libyan waters
under international agreement, or where their fishing constitutes an
economic benefit to the country, whilst only Monesgasque and authorised
French fishermen may operate in Monaco's territorial sea. 	 In the
Syrian territorial sea, special consideration is given to vessels from
Arab countries subject to reciprocity.
9.4 Fisheries Agreements 
One reason for the lack of concern in establishing boundaries to
define exclusive rights over fish resources in the Mediterranean has,
until comparatively recently, been the ability of States to negotiate
fisheries agreements.
	 For example, traditional fishing by Italians in
specific areas of Yugoslav and Tunisian waters has been permitted by a
series of bilateral agreements."
However, during the 1970s, there was increasing reluctance on the
part of the developing North African States to negotiate agreements
permitting the European fishermen to exploit the fishing grounds lying
off their coasts.
	 These actions, which were in line with the trend
towards extended fisheries jurisdiction and a universally acceptable 12
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mile territorial sea, put pressure on the developed States to negotiate
agreements based upon financial and technical assistance for local
fishing industries in return for continued access.
For example, fisheries problems between Morocco and Spain had
existed since 1969, but detiorated in 1972 when Morocco abrogated a
fisheries agreement due to last until 1979.
	
This was followed by
Morocco's unilateral declaration of a 70 mile E.F.Z. in March 1973.
Spain's refusal to recognise this claim led to several unpleasant
incidents involving Spanish fishermen and Moroccan patrol boats before,
in January 1974, an agreement was reached for the joint exploitation of
certain Moroccan resources in return for Spanish technical and
financial assistance towards the development of the Moroccan fishing
industry. 18 Nevertheless, seizures of Spanish fishing boats resumed in
April 1975, 19 evidence that the agreements between European and North
African States proved to be of limited value. No such agreements have
occurred since 1979 and thus, with the exception of habitual fishing
rights preserved by bilateral agreements, the only fishing treaty
recently concluded has been that for the Gulf of Trieste between Italy
and Yugoslavia.20
9.5 Delimiting E.F.Z. Boundaries between States 
The question of boundaries separating neighbouring States' E.F.Z.s
does not arise in the Mediterranean given the paucity of such claims.
If such boundaries were to be drawn, there are no conventional rules
pertaining to their delimitation, the concept only having validity in
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customary law.	 Consequently the rules for the delimitation of E.F.Z.
boundaries between States must be assumed to be based on either on
State practice or on those pertaining to the delimitation of other
offshore zones of Jurisdiction. 	 Article 74(1) relating to E.E.Z.
delimitation would appear to be particularly relevant, given that under
the 1982 Convention it is expected that States will claim E.E.Z.s to
protect their fish resources beyond the territorial sea.
9.6 Fisheries and Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
Whereas the existence of hydrocarbon resources, or the potential
for their exploitation, has historically been the major motivation for
the assertion of overlapping claims to continental shelf areas, which,
in turn, have led to boundary delimitations, fisheries have not, to
date, had the same effect, with the notable exception of the dispute
between the United States and Canada concerning Georges Bank. However,
with the consolidation of the E.F.Z. concept in customary international
law and the acceptance of the E.E.Z. in the 1982 Convention, there
seems good reason to suppose that the desire to place fisheries under
exclusive coastal State Jurisdiction will initiate boundary disputes
over the limits of neighbouring States' respective E.F.Z. or E.E.Z.
jurisdiction.	 Indeed, this would appear to be particularly likely
where the fisheries in a boundary region have a high commercial value,
or are of considerable importance for domestic consumption, or are
under threat through over-exploitation.
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However, on the basis of existing Mediterranean fisheries data,
and notwithstanding the mobility of fish stocks and the occasional
fishing incident, there is no evidence, at present, to suggest that
competition for fish resources will provoke boundary disputes,
particularly insofar as opposite State boundaries are concerned. The
evidence of over-exploitation in nearshore areas, especially of
demersal species, may prompt boundary negotiations between adjacent
States, but it is more likely that more effective management and
conservation measures will be attempted first. 2 '	 Indeed, it is
interesting to note that when France and Italy redefined their maritime
boundaries through the Strait of Bonifacio in 1986, only limited
restrictions were placed upon the nationals of either country to fish
only their own waters. Although fishing pressure is not so intense in
the Strait of Bonifacio as off Corsica, the resources in the Strait
were already being fully exploited at the time of this agreement and
any increase in fishing effort might lead to stock decline.22
State practice in the region also supports the general conclusion
that fisheries matters are unlikely to provoke major boundary disputes.
Monaco and France, Italy and Yugoslavia (for the Gulf of Trieste),23
and Italy and France (for the Strait of Bonifacio), have all settled
their maritime boundaries by making provision for the nationals of one
State to fish in the other State's Jurisdictional area. This is not to
say that States will not seek to punish foreign State fishermen who
fish in their exclusive waters.	 Several fishing incidents in the
Mediterranean have involved shootings, e.g. in 1978 when a Tunisian
patrol boat fired upon an Italian fishing vessel held to be operating
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illegally, killing one man. 24	Similarly, in NoArember 1988, eleven
Italian fishermen were sentenced to 30 months hard labour, fined, and
had their fishing vessel and gear confiscated, for illegally' entering
Libyan territorial waters.26
9.7 Mediterranean State Practice with Respect to the E.E.Z. 
Of Mediterranean States only Egypt and Morocco have proclaimed an
E.E.Z., although France and Monaco have concluded an agreement on their
"maritime" boundaries, which delimit rights to both seabed and water
column.
The Moroccan E.E.Z. was established on 8 April 1981 by Decree No.
1-81-179. It extends for 200 miles up to median line with neighbouring
States. Indeed, the Moroccan legislation is explicit with reference to
the question of boundary delimitation:
"Without prejudice to geographic or geomorphic conditions under
which,	 taking	 all	 relevant	 factors	 into	 consideration,
delimitation must be carried out in accordance with the equitable
principles established by international law under bilateral
agreements between states, the outer limit of the exclusive
economic zone shall not extend beyond a median line whose points
are equidistant from the closest points of the baselines of the
Moroccan coasts and the coasts of foreign countries facing or
bordering on the Moroccan coasts."
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Fishing within the Moroccan E.E.Z. is re gerved exclusively to
Moroccan vessels, but, as under its previous E.F.Z. legislation,
foreigners may fish within the E.E.Z. under charter arrangements with
Moroccan companies or under international agreement, with preference
being given to neighbouring landlocked countries.
Insofar as Egypt is concerned, it had strongly supported the
E.E.Z. at UNCLOS III, in particular, as a means of eradicating the
perceived shortcomings of the continental shelf regime. 26 On 26 August
1983, as part of its declaration on ratifying the 1982 Convention, an
Egyptian E.E.Z. was established. 7
	No limit is prescribed for this
zone, which is applicable both to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean
Sea: Egypt merely "undertakes to establish the outer limits of its
exclusive economic zone in accordance with the rules, criteria and
modalities laid down in the [1982] Convention." 2e This would appear to
point to a 200 mile claim, although no mention is made of boundary
delimitation procedures to overcome the potential problem of
overlapping claims.
No other Mediterranean State has proclaimed an E.E.Z. for the
Mediterranean, although both Spain and France have enacted E.E.Z.
legislation which could be applied to the Mediterranean's waters in the
future. 29	 Indeed, although Law 15/1978 applies only to Spain's
Atlantic coasts, "the right to extend these provisions to other coasts
of Spain" is reserved.'3°
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However, Scovazzi's prediction that if one State was to proclaim
an E.E.Z. in the Mediterranean others would necessarily follow, 31
 has
not proved to be correct, and thus it is instructive to examine the
different positions adopted by Mediterranean States in relation to the
E.E.Z. at UNCLOS III as a possible pointer to their future conduct.
9.8 Mediterranean States' Attitudes Towards the E.E.Z. 
As early as 1972, Tunisia and Algeria co-sponsored a 200 mile
E.E.Z. proposal made to the U. N, Seabed Committee; 32 and, in 1973,
Malta proposed a 200 mile zone of national ocean space in which there
would be a 12 mile zone for navigation.
	 However, this fell short of
some coastal States' territorial sea claims, which sought to regulate
navigation and overflight up to 200 miles offshore.'"
	 Libya, for
example, at UNCLOS III, declared itself strongly in favour of an E.E.Z.
concept which would give the coastal State complete sovereignty over
both living and non-living resources. 4
 Thus, together with Algeria
and Albania, it envisaged a zone akin to the territorial sea, 36 rather
than the more limited sovereign rights afforded by the 1982 Convention
and favoured by Inter alia Italy, Israel, Turkey and Yugoslavia.3t'
Lebanon accepted the concept of an E.E.Z. reluctantly.
	 In its
view, the imposition of 200 mile E.E.Z.s in the Mediterranean would be
"meaningless", given the restricted amount of seaspace available and
the relative proximity of neighbouring countries. 37
	Indeed, at an
earlier debate at the U. N. Seabed Committtee in 1971, Lebanon had drawn
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attention to the impossibility of exercising effective control over
such a wide expanse of sea,
Other Mediterranean States also had doubts concerning the
institution of the E.E.Z.
	
Turkey felt that the concept was
inappropriate in the Mediterranean where its imposition by all littoral
States would leave the entire Sea under coastal State jurisdiction,
thereby threatening freedoms of navigation and overflight. 39 Similar
views were expressed by Yugoslavia and Israel, the latter of which saw
coastal State jurisidiction over such matters as pollution control
coming into conflict with the freedom of navigation within such a small
semi-enclosed sea.	 Together with other Mediterranean States, it
favoured regional arrangements, 4° rather the division of the
Mediterranean	 into numerous	 territorial	 and functional
	
zones.
Nevertheless, Italy, which has potentially the largest E.E.Z. in the
Mediterranean, was one of only eight States which spoke against a 200
mile regime at the Caracas session of UNCLOS III in 1974; 110 States,
(or 73 per cent of the international community), spoke in favour.'"
Alexander suggests that countries such as Italy and Israel may, in
time, assert a claim to a 200 mile zone of offshore jurisdiction.42
Indeed, at the U.N. Seabed Committee, Italy had favoured a patrimonial
sea of 100 miles, d'1 whilst, in July 1977, the Italian Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs stated that Italy was in favour of "introducing an
'economic zone' extending to a maximum of 200 nautical miles for the
purpose of protecting freedom of navigation, 114d
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This quotation is interesting not only as an expression of intent,
At.,
but also because it points to the major problem with the E.E.Z. for
most Mediterranean States, namely the preservation of the freedom of
navigation.	 For although the 1982 Convention spells out in Article 58
that all States shall enjoy the high seas' freedoms of navigation and
overflight (Article 87), as Ibler points out:
"The number of rights of coastal states in their exclusive
economic zone is very large, and even the correct and moderate use
and exercise of these rights can be an interference for navigation
and ships ..."46
Whether this is overstating the issue is a moot point, but clearly
Italy feels it is easier to preserve the freedom of navigation through
the imposition of an E.E.Z.
	 Indeed, on the basis of the above, there
would appear to be many potential E.E.Z. c1aimants; 46
 that there is not
at present is explicable in terms of the boundary delimitation problems
which a general establishment of E.E.Z.s would entail.
9.9 E.E.Z. Boundary Delimitation between Neighbouring States 
With the exception of the 1.69 mile wide Monegasque corridor
extending 47.51 miles offshore (a total area of 280 square kilometres),
and delimited by the maritime boundaries between France and Monaco,47
the relative absence of E.E.Z. claims in the Mediterranean means that
the question of E.E.Z.
	 boundary delimitation is, 	 at present,
irrelevant.	 However, given the support expressed for the concept at
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UNCLOS III by Mediterranean States, the likelihoCid is that many will
claim E.E.Z.s at some point in the future.
	 Consequently, E.E.Z.
,
boundary delimitations between States will become a future reality.
This raises two important questions, namely:
(i) what evidence is there to suggest that where continental shelf
boundaries have already been delimited E.E.Z. boundaries will be
coincident with them; and
(ii) are the legal rules and criteria by which an E.E.Z. boundary is to
be delimited different from, or the same as, those used to settle
continental shelf boundary disputes?
Under the 1982 Convention, the delimitation articles for the
E.E.Z.	 (Article 74) and the continental shelf (Article 83) are
Identical, but this would appear to have more to do with practicality
than law, for there is no legal reason why their vague provisions
should be interpreted in the same way in each delimitation. 4e
 Indeed
Nalal believes that the existence of two separate articles for the
delimitation of continental shelf and E.E.Z. boundaries implies the
potential for, rather than the denial of, separate boundaries. 4	 A
boundary which is equitable for E.E.Z. purposes may not be equitable
for continental shelf purposes, because different considerations aee
relevant to the two legal regimes: had the intention been for E E,Z.
and shelf boundaries to be identical, it would have been easy to draft
the Convention to say so.°
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Nevertheless, there are strong practical. and administrative
reasons why this should be the case.	 For example, should the E.E.Z.
and continental shelves of two States overlap, then the State wishing
to explore or exploit that part of its continental shelf which
underlies the other's E.E.Z. may have difficulties should the area
concerned be of importance to the latter State's fishing activities,
and vice versa.
However, in considering the relationship between the E.E.Z. and
continental shelf regimes in international law, what is immediately
striking is that the E.E.Z. concept incorporates the regime of the
continental shelf.	 Consequently, if the E.E.Z. and continental shelf
boundaries do not coincide, then the E.E.Z. becomes effectively
assimilated to an E.F.Z. for the State whose E.E.Z. is underlain by
another's continental shelf.E°
An examination of State practice shows that where E.E.Z.
boundaries have been delimited by agreement, the single maritime
boundary separates zones in which each coastal State has Jurisdiction
over both the living and non-living resources off its coast. Examples
of such State practice are plentiful. 2
	In addition, a number of
agreements have specified that the continental shelf boundary is also
to apply to the E.E.Z. once each State has the appropriate legislation,
e. g. Burma-Thailand. s3
On the other hand, many commentators have pointed to the Treaty
signed by Australia and Papua New Guinea on 18 December 1978, s4 as
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proof that an E.E.Z. and continental shelf boundary should not
necessarily legally coincide.
	
By this Treaty, the boundary of
fisheries Jurisdiction diverges from the continental shelf boundary in
the Torres Strait.	 Elsewhere,	 the boundaries separating the
continental shelves and fishing zones of the two States are coincident,
but in the area of overlapping zones, Australia has jurisdiction over
the fisheries overlying the Papuan continental shelf, whilst Papua has
Jurisdiction over the resources in the seabed beneath the Australian
fishing zone.ss
This somewhat curious arrangement represents a negotiated
compromise between Papua's desire for a single maritime boundary
following the course of what was to become the agreed continental shelf
boundary, and Australia's refusal to accept as an all-purpose boundary
a line which cut off completely its island possessions lying close to
the north of Papua. ss	 It is not, however, without significance that
Australia and Papua New Guinea determined upon delimiting both a
continental shelf and an E.F.Z. boundary in the Torres Strait: by
delimiting the boundaries of two entirely separate legal regimes they
avoided the confusing and incongruous legal position of having
different continental shelf and E.E. Z. boundaries. Although neither
State had proclaimed E.E.Z.s, their claims to E.F.Z.s, s7 rather than
the broader E.E.Z., do not appear to have been unplanned. 	 The
"residual Jurisdiction" over such things as pollution or marine
scientific research - jurisdiction which is incorporated within the
regime of the E.E.Z., but not within either the continental shelf or
E.F.Z. regimes - is specially provided for in the area where the
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boundary lines diverge.	 Where the boundary lines coincide no special
provision is made.
	 Hence, Burmester concludes that when full E.E.Z.s
are established such Jurisdiction will be exercised by each State
outside of the area of overlap, in accordance with the change of
function of the agreed line as one separating E.E.Z.s rather than
separate but coterminous E.F.Z.s and continental shelves.9
The real issue, therefore, is not so much whether continental
shelf boundaries should coincide with the boundary of the E.E.Z, but as
to whether States should establish either non-coincident E.F.Z. and
continental shelf boundaries, or a single E.E.Z. boundary. 	 To have
boundaries for the continental shelf and the E.E.Z. which do not
coincide is an impossibility, given that the continental shelf regime
is an integral part of the E.E.Z.	 Thus, to delimit an E.E.Z. boundary
which does not coincide with the continental shelf is to render the
continental shelf boundary meaningless.s9
However, this is not to say that the circumstances relevant to the
delimitation of the single maritime boundary will not be different to
those applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf: Hodgson
and Smith suggested that it would be fortuitous if the factors relating
to the seabed and the water column pointed to the same boundary. G° In
certain situations seabed factors may have greater importance than
water column factors, and prevail in the final outcome;- in other
situations, the reverse may be the case.
	 Indeed, Churchill suggested
that where E.E.Z. delimitation has greatest importance for fisheries,
then these factors would predominate in the selection of the boundary
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line, and presumably vice versa, whilst - perceAively - where seabed
and fishery interests were equally represented, agreement upon a common
E.E.Z./continental shelf boundary would be more difficult.'"	 However,
as will be seen, the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case took a different
view.
If one set of circumstances is to prevail over another in the
delimitation of the E.E.Z. boundary, some States may prefer to
negotiate their continental shelf boundaries first, in particular in
the Mediterranean, where non-living resources are of considerably
greater economic importance than the living resources. This is because
the need to consider, in combination, circumstances relating to the
water column and seabed might result in a compromise boundary that does
not completely satisfy the interests of any State as to the living or
non-living resources in the boundary region. 	 Independent negotiation
of the boundary separating respective continental shelves or fis'aing
zones would, however, require consideration only of those factors
relating to either the seabed or the water column, and might better
serve the resource interests of the States concerned.
Therefore, in the Mediterranean, the greater importance of
hydrocarbon resources may encourage States to settle their continental
shelf boundaries first, and then to consider at a later date whether a
boundary delimited upon the basis of seabed factors alone would suffice
as a boundary between their respective fishing interests.62
Alternatively, as in the boundary agreement between Papua New Guinea
and Australia, States may decide to give effect to both sets of factors
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independently, but simultaneously, by drawing different boundaries for
the continental shelf and the E.F,Z. (but not the E.E.Z.).
	 However,
States may also exercise their right to agree to delimit an E.E.Z.
boundary, which excludes certain factors from consideration during the
negotiations, i.e. if joint consideration of water column or seabed
factors might prejudice the final outcome with respect to the more
important interest, the parties may decide to limit the arbitration to
consideration of only one set of factors.
Where separate delimitation lines for the E.F.Z. and continental
shelf are appropriate, the establishment of a joint development zone,
either with or without the delimitation of a single delimitation line
may be more desirable than separate boundary lines. 	 Indeed, Churchill
suggested that the adoption of cooperative arrangements in addition to
delimiting a boundary might make easier the delimitation of a common
E.E.Z./continental shelf boundary.63
9.10 Third-Party Settlement of E.E.Z. Boundary Delimitation Disputes 
Two disputes concerning single maritime boundary delimitation have
been submitted to third parties for arbitration, and both concerned
delimitations between adjacent States. 	 The dispute between the United
States and Canada concerning their continental shelf and E.F.Z.
boundary in the Gulf of Maine was settled by a Chamber of the I.C.J. in
1984;" the dispute concerning the common territorial sea, continental
shelf and E.E.Z. boundary of Guinea and Guinea Bissau was settled by an
ad hoc arbitral tribunal comprising three I.C.J. judges, in 1985. Both
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are significant because they provide evidence as-to whether different
factors govern E.E.Z. and continental boundary delimitation, and as to
whether E.E.Z. delimitation will come to replace the 'successive
delimitation of boundaries for the seabed and the water column.
(a) The Gulf of Maine Case 
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber recognised that although
delimitation of the single maritime boundary entailed drawing one
boundary between two legal regimes, the criteria applied in previous
continental shelf boundary cases were not to be disregarded.6s
However, Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, the only treaty
rule in force between the Parties, was not applicable, as the Chamber
interpreted its task as being distinct from earlier cases which had
concerned only the seabed.
Canada thought that this would mean that the Chamber would be
forced to consider relevant factors additional to those previously put
forward in continental shelf boundary cases, 66 but the Chamber decided
that the delimitation of the single maritime boundary required "a
reductionist geographic approach" 67 not envisaged by either Party. The
Chamber held that because it was dealing with the delimitation of both
seabed and water column it could not take into account factors relevant
solely to either the seabed or the superjacent waters. It rejected the
Parties' view that it should balance the relevant circumstances
appropriate to each in order to arrive at a method or methods suitable
for the delimitation of the single maritime boundary. 69	 Rather,
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because the Parties recognised that different methods of delimitation
might pertain to the delimitation of the two natural entities, the
Chamber sought "neutral" criteria which were more appropriate for such
a multi-purpose delimitation, and which did not give preferential
treatment to the delimitation of either the shelf or the water
column. 69 Hence the Chamber's decision was based on coastal geography,
the aim being to achieve an equal division of areas where the States'
coastal projections overlapped," geography being "not so much the most
neutral factor as the most positive factor in relation to both the
seabed and the water column."'
Other factors such as economic considerations were not disregarded
but relegated to the subsidiary role of testing the equity of the
result derived from geographical factors alone, with the possibility of
their redressing any apparent inequity arising from a purely
geographically based delimitation. 72	For example, both the U.S. and
Canada pleaded that their fishing activities in the disputed areas were
relevant circumstances in the delimitation. 	 Citing the Grisbadarna
Case as a precedent, 73
 the U.S. argued that the Georges Bank area was
an ecologically distinct area which would be harmed were it to be
divided up between competing nations. 	 Moreover, its historical
presence in the disputed waters, whether in relation to fishing, the
conservation and management of fisheries, navigational assistance,
rescue, research or defence, and the avoidance of international
d1sputes, 74
 proved its predominant interest in the waters over a long
period of time.'	 Canada, on the other hand, focussed on the
distribution of different fish stocks in the disputed area, and on the
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established fishing practices of the two States, arguing that any
delimitation should maintain established patterns which were vital to
the coastal communities dependent upon them.7e
The Chamber, however, refused to give any decisive weight to
either pleading. 77	Instead, these factors were used to assess the
equity of the result derived from the neutral geographical facts,
whereupon the Chamber found that because its delimitation fell short of
assigning the Georges Bank area to any one Party, no catastrophic
consequences for the livelihood or well-being of the States'
populations were envisaged and, therefore, the boundary line did not
require modification,
Significantly, the Chamber also rejected the U.S. argument for
"natural boundaries" separating distinct oceanographic and ecological
regimes in the water column. The U.S. claimed that these boundaries -
and in particular that coinciding with the physical discontinuity in
the continental shelf, the North-east Channel - could form the basis
of the single boundary delimitation. e° The Chamber, however, remained
unconvinced by the "possibility of discerning any genuine, sure and
stable 'natural boundaries' in so fluctuating an environment as the
waters of the ocean, their flora and fauna." 81	It further made it
clear that for an E. E. Z. boundary to be drawn utilising a "natural
boundary," such a boundary had to be proven both for the seabed and the
water column - an unlikely, or fortuitous, occurrence - an& further,
that such a boundary had no presumption in law if inequitable.e2
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(b) Guinea-Guinea Bissau 
The arbitral tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Case followed
the Chamber of the I.C.J. in giving overriding significance to
geographical factors.	 Specific circumstances relevant to either the
seabed or the water column were given only secondary significance, and
were found by the Tribunal not to require modification of the boundary
developed purely on the basis of geographical factors."
9.11 E.E.Z. Boundary Delimitation: Some Conclusions 
The courts' emphasis on geographical factors has been welcomed,
not least because it removes the need for an adjudicatory body to base
its delimitation upon conflicting scientific evidence concerning, for
example, the existence of "natural boundaries" in the seabed or water
column. e' d
 Nevertheless, other commentators have been critical of what
they perceive to be an over-reliance on geography. 	 Bowett, for
example, states that to reduce delimitation to an exercise of
"geography and geometry" and to ignore "the reality of the economic
interests involved" is simplistic and unrealistic.	 However, his
rejection of delimitation as a "cartographic exercise"" is built on
the premise that every dispute concerns control over resources. This
premise may not always exist, as disputes may arise where knowledge of
the resources at stake is limited (e.g. the North Sea
	 Cases), or
irrelevant." Moreover, as Judge Gros pointed out in the Gulf of Maine
Case, resources are not the legal cause of either the E.E.Z. or the
continental shelf, 97 and thus a sea empty of resources would not
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prevent a dispute concerning offshore jurisdiction with respect to
either regime.	 Hence, the courts would seem co
-
rrect to stress the
immutable facts of geography and to disregard the vagaries of
economics, despite the fact that a geographically fashioned boundary
may have little to do with the management or allocation of the
resources at stake. To place the emphasis on anything else would be to
act extra-legally,	 however unpalatable the consequences may be.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the application of
geography as the dominant criterion in maritime boundary delimitation
may not be a purely objective exercise.
	 As each of the offshore
boundary cases have proved, geographical "facts" are as open to
subjective interpretation and legal manipulation as geophysical and
economic evidence. ee	 One has only to consider the U.S.'s arguments
concerning primary and secondary coastal fronts, or the courts' own
generalised view of various delimitation areas, to prove the point.
However, as Collins and Rogoff are at pains to point out:
"While the geographical approach still requires the exercise of
judgment and discretion in its application, subjectivity is
minimised, probably to the greatest degree possible."e°
The focus upon coastal geography as a neutral criterion common to
both legal regimes would also seem to point to the boundaries of
continental shelf and E.E.Z. being coincident - at least insofar as the
courts are concerned.
	 O'Connell, writing in 1984, postulated that as
State and judicial practice in boundary making evolved, a set of
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-rubrics was likely to emerge common to both the E,E.Z, and the
continental shelf, if not to the territorial sea as wel1. 91	In the
reliance upon geographical factors as the primary means of effecting a
delimitation, with non-geographical circumstances being used a means of
testing the equity of the result with a view to possible modification
should it prove radically inequitable in the light of those
circumstances, 92 the courts appear to have developed a methodology
which is applicable to all kinds of maritime boundary arbitrations,93
but the E,E.Z. in particular.
9.12 The Relationship between an Existing Continental Shelf Boundary 
and a New E.E.Z. Boundary 
One further matter which demands consideration is the relationship
between an existing continental shelf boundary and a new E.E.Z.
boundary. 94	Although in most cases the pre-existing seabed boundary
will be transmuted into an E.E.Z. boundary, a problem may arise where a
State objects to the change of function of the boundary previously
delimited on purely seabed considerations.	 Does the existence of the
continental shelf boundary tie the hands of any arbitral tribunal, or
Is it but one relevant circumstance to be weighed in the determination
of the equitable result? Will the new E.E.Z. boundary abrogate the old
continental shelf boundary?
In answer to these questions one must stress again the
incorporation of the continental shelf regime within that of the
E.E.Z. 	 This fact alone must mean that the co-existence of separate
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E.E.Z. and continental shelf boundaries is an impossibility, although
the co-existence of separate seabed and E,F.Z. boundaries is not. 96 In
which case, if both States claim E.E.Z.s, the new E.E.Z. boundary must
abrogate the old continental shelf boundary even if the two boundaries
differ in their delimitation. 	 As to whether the seabed boundary has
any influence upon the new E.E.Z. delimitation, this will be up to the
States concerned in their negotiations. However, should the problem be
referred to arbitration the tribunal should be free to delimit the
boundary on the basis of the arguments placed before it. It is likely,
therefore, that its boundary will be a reflection of the geographical
relationship of the States' coastal projections. This may not coincide
with the pre-existing continental shelf boundary, 97 although the
tribunal is free to give this factor whatever weight it chooses in its
delimitation: however, it is not bound to delimit a boundary for both
water column and seabed coincidental with a boundary established on
seabed criteria alone.
Moreover, this conclusion must hold true even when the continental
shelf boundary has been the subject of arbitration, although should the
courts continue to give emphasis to geographical factors in their
delimitations the problem may not arise, for as McRae pointed out:
"Although the Chamber (in the Gulf of Maine Case] Justified
recourse to geography on the ground of its 'neutrality,' the real
rationale is that geography is 'constant' whether one is concerned
with the continental shelf, a fishing zone, or an E.E.Z. - the
geography is always there."99
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Thus, a continental shelf boundary delimited pririlarily on the basis of
coastal geography should suffice for the E.E.Z. as well, unless it was
modified in such a way as to redress inequity in the light of non-
geographical seabed factors unrelated to the delimitation of the water
column." However, the fact that in the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf
Boundary Case the I.C.I. chose to make the permissible E.E.Z. a
relevant circumstance, °° would seem to infer that it considered its
delimitation appropriate to any future E.E.Z. boundary between the two
States.
9.13 Settling E.E.Z. Boundaries in the Mediterranean 
On the assumption that Mediterranean States will claim E.E.Z.s at
some time in the future, a new series of boundary delimitations will be
set in motion.	 The above discussion has attempted to put these
delimitations in context,
	 although clearly there is plenty of
opportunity for the applicable law to develop before sore Mediterranean
boundaries come to be negotiated. One can orly foresee that the same
basic problems which beset continental s'aelf boundary delimitations in
the Mediterranean, namely those caused by isla rlds, historic bays and
straight ba.eline., will also arfect the deliritation of E.E.Z.
boundarie., and, thPrefore, they do not require repetition here.
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PART IV -
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 10 - MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Mediterranean Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
Prescott has pointed out that:
"Each maritime boundary occupies a unique location, and its
selection in bilateral negotiations will be based on a unique set
of circumstances. Those circumstances, which might be related to
politics, geography or economics, will occur in a variety of
combinations; some of those combinations will make agreements
harder to reach than others."'
In the Mediterranean, the factorial combinations are such that the
majority of boundaries will prove difficult to delimit.	 The
Mediterranean's political and geographical characteristics interact
with each other so as to ensure that the delimitation process will
generally require very delicate and complex negotiations.	 Indeed, as
the dispute between Libya and Malta has shown, where boundaries have to
be delimited in a relatively confined geographical area, not even the
existence of generally good political relations may permit agreement;
instead, in the restricted limits of the Mediterranean, every offshore
claim has repercussions for another State. Therefore, on the evidence
of previous Mediterranean disputes, it seems likely that once the
present standoff position with respect to 200 mile offshore zones is
broken, the coastal States will compete to control as great a slice of
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the Mediterranean as possible, whether the motivation be economic,
environmental, or political.
Nevertheless, if the prospects for negotiated boundary agreements
in the Mediterranean are poor, there remains recourse to third-party
arbitration.	 However, this is but an option, for the 1982 Convention
expressly excludes boundary disputes from compulsory third-party
arbitration: this may only occur with the joint consent of the
disputing States.	 Moreover, and perhaps more pertinently, as the
Tunisia-Libya
	
Case has shown, even where a dispute is subject to
third-party settlement, if the court is not asked to delimit an actual
boundary line binding on the Parties, then not even recourse to
arbitration can be guaranteed to establish the boundary.
On the other hand, it is important to state that there is no
guarantee that difficulties will attend the negotiation of a maritime
boundary simply because a particular geographical circumstance exists,
or because political relations between States are generally troubled.
Indeed, it is all too easy to focus on the potential for dispute and
overlook those boundaries which would appear likely to be delimited
with relative ease, or to forget that there are many examples
throughout the world where States lay claim to the same offshore area
without there being any evident prospect of delimitation.
Nevertheless, from the evidence presented, it would appear that
Mediterranean States are unwilling to accept peaceful co-existence with
their neighbours.
	
Although the concept of territory as applied to the
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land is not directly applicable to sea areas, the delimitation of a
maritime boundary between States involves the separation of quasi-
territorial zones, with the attendant psychological and nationalistic
attachments thereto. Thus, though sovereignty over maritime areas may
be less than absolute, in the fixing of a boundary between overlapping
jurisdictional zones it is to all intents and purposes the boundary of
each State's territory which is being delimited.	 There is, therefore,
a need to delimit clear and unambiguous boundaries to resolve disputes
concerning Mediterranean maritime territory, but how?
10.2 Zones of Joint Economic Exploitation 
One idea which has been put forward as a possible solution to
Mediterranean maritime boundary problems is the zone of joint economic
exploitation, first employed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in their 1965
agreement concerning the annexation of the Overland Neutral Zone.
Under this agreement, the rights of each State to the natural resources
within the adjoining territorial waters were to continue to be
exercised in common, irrespective of any territorial sea boundary
agreement.'
The I.C.J. put forward a similar solution for continental shelf
problems in the North Sea Cases, wherein it stated that:
"if ... delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap,
these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions, or,
failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a regime of
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joint jurisdiction, user, or exploitation 16r the zones of overlap
or any part of them."
,
Subsequently, there have been a number of examples from State
practice illustrating the utility of the joint development zone
concept.	 For example, on 30 January 1974, Japan and the Republic of
South Korea agreed to establish a joint development zone covering a
total of 241 000 square miles (82 663 square kilometres), in the
southern part of their continental shelf. s	This was stated to be
without prejudice either to the question of sovereign rights over this
area, or to the future delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between the two States, upon expiry of the agreement in 2024.6
Therefore, in the absence of a boundary line separating the two States'
continental shelves, detailed regulations govern the exploitation of
the development area by concessionaires from each country, with
resources to be shared equally between them.
A similar situation pertains as a result of arrangements adopted
by Thailand and Malaysia in a "Memorandum of Understanding" signed on
21 February 1979.	 They agreed that it was "in the best interests of
the two countries" to exploit the resources of the seabed in the area
of overlapping seabed claims as soon as possible,' but that the
negotiations concerning their continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of
Thailand were likely to continue for some time.
	 Therefore, in the
absence of agreement, they agreed to establish a Joint Authority for
the exploration and exploitation of the non-living resources of the
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seabed and subsoil within the defined area of overlapping shelf claims,
sharing equally the costs incurred and the benefits derived.
The agreement also provided for each State to retain its sovereign
rights over the disputed area and, specifically, that the States were
to continue to exercise their individual rights in the disputed area
with respect to the regulation of customs, fishing, navigation,
scientific research, and pollution control. In addition, they were to
have "a combined and coordinated security arrangement in the joint
development area."	 Only with respect to criminal jurisdiction was a
boundary to be drawn through the joint development area, and this was
to be without prejudice to the question of delimitation.'
These arrangements, which came into force on 15 July 1982, are to
last for 50 years, during which time the States have agreed to continue
to resolve their continental shelf boundary dispute by negotiations,
"or such other peaceful means as agreed by both Parties."
	 If the
delimitation question is settled before the end of the 50 year period,
then the agreement provides for the Joint Authority to be wound up,
although the possibility exists for the present arrangement to be re-
negotiated.	 On the other hand, if after 50 years the boundary still
remains undelimited, then the existing arrangements are to continue, a
fact which may not encourage resolution of the boundary dispute.
Other solutions to difficult delimitation problems have involved
the actual drawing of a negotiated boundary, but with special
arrangements for the exploration and exploitation of particular
-800-
resources.	 An example is the continental shelf--boundary agreement of
22 October 1981 between Iceland and Norway (in respect of Jan Mayen
Island),"' which implemented the 	 recommendations of the Jan Mayen
Conciliation Commission (May 1981).
	 This provided both for the
establishment of a continental shelf boundary between the two States,
and for co-operative arrangements with respect to the exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in a designated area straddling
the boundary. 11 This Joint development area covers a rectangular area
of 45 475 square kilometres, seventy two per cent of which (32 750
square kilometres) lies north of the boundary on the Norwegian side,
and 12 720 square kilometres of which lies south of the boundary on the
Icelandic side.	 It, therefore, covers most of the Jan Mayen Ridge,
wherein hydrocarbon potential is regarded as the greatest.
	 The
agreement provides inter alia that within this Joint development zone
each State is entitled to a 25 per cent interest in Joint-venture
operations in the seabed area of the other.12
Other variations of the Joint exploitation theme are provided by
each of Iran's continental shelf boundary agreements, which include
provisions preventing exploitation of mineral deposits by "directional
drilling" within a certain distance of the agreed boundary line, except
by mutual agreement.
	 In the 1968 agreement with Saudi Arabia the
specified distance was 500 metres, reduced to 125 metres in the
subsequent agreements with Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E. (Dubai), and Oman.13
Finally, the continental shelf boundary agreement of 22 February
1958 between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia provides for the net revenues
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from Saudi exploitation of the Fasht Abu Safah - hexagon to be divided
equally between the two States, even though the area lies exclusively
under the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia by means of the delimitation. 14
State practice has, therefore, evidenced that where it is
difficult for States to reach agreement on the delimitation of maritime
boundaries,	 (thereby	 preventing	 exploration	 or	 exploitation
activities), the task may be made easier if it is not limited to the
rigid definition of a line separating the States' maritime territories.
Instead, if the emphasis is switched to a consideration of cooperative
arrangements,	 (e.g. for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation),
either in combination with, or in disregard of, boundary delimitation,
the likelihood of an equitable solution being negotiated may be
increased.
There are a number of reasons why this should be so. 	 Firstly,
where particular resources, e.g. hydrocarbons, are located in an area
to which both States lay claim, than consideration of cooperative
arrangements may increase the possibility for trade-offs and
compromises, by redirecting the negotiations from a narrow focus upon
the delimitation of a boundary, placing the emphasis instead upon the
resources at the centre of the dispute. 15 Conversely, where knowledge
about the seabed resources is limited, States may be unwilling to
commit themselves to a permanent boundary settlement the consequences
of which, in future years, they may come to regret. However, if States
can agree upon arrangements to share any resources in the area where
they may make overlapping claims, then this lack of knowledge loses
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significance. Indeed, agreement upon such cooperative arrangements may
postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the need for a boundary delimitation in
the disputed area.	 Alternatively, if, irrespective of , resource-
sharing, a boundary delimitation is felt to be necessary in order to
establish territorial Jurisdiction over the areas concerned, the
precise delimitation of the line may be of less importance than in
situations where it would determine exclusive Jurisdiction over seabed
resources.' e
 Most importantly, the establishment of a zone of Joint
economic exploitation has immediate benefit, for by removing or
postponing the problem of delimitation the States concerned are able to
explore or exploit the known or potential resources.
However, although Joint development "is a useful concept which has
applicability as pressure mounts to develop oil and mineral resources
in areas of Jurisdictional overlap," 17 one should nevertheless exercise
caution in seeing it as the answer to all difficult delimitation
problems, or as a means of sidestepping the impediments to the
exploitation of seabed resources.
	 As the experience of Malaysia and
Thailand has shown, the existence of an agreement Jointly to exploit an
area is not a guarantee of its development. Rather, to be successfully
Implemented, the requirements for Joint development arrangements are
good political relations between the States concerned, "practical
mindedness," the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits, and "cooperative
private companies."'e
The Japan-South Korea agreement also evidences that Joint
development arrangements are no more immune from the problem of third
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States than bilateral boundary agreements in "semi-enclosed seas, as
they may impinge upon areas subject to third State claims. Most of the
Japan-South Korea joint development zone appears to lie on the Japanese
side of the median lines between Japan and South Korea, and Japan and
China. However, in June 1977, following the initial Korean activity in
the joint development zone, China claimed the continental shelf of the
East China Sea, argued that the agreement between Japan and South Korea
was "illegal and null and void," and asserted its right to be involved
in any negotiations concerning delimitation of the continental shelf in
the East China Sea." Similarly, North Korea also filed an official
protest, claiming part of the area.2°
Finally, mention has also been made of the fact that in the
agreement between Malaysia and Thailand provision is made for the
States to agree to extend joint development beyond the stated expiry
date, thereby further delaying the solution to the boundary dispute. A
similar provision is to be found in the agreement between Japan and
South Korea. However, on reflection, this would seem to be a sensible
provision, for the peaceful and rational exploitation of the resources
at the centre of the dispute is more important than the definition of a
political boundary insensitive to those objectives.
10.3 Mediterranean Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Regional or 
Bilateral? 
Out of a recognition that the establishment of maritime boundaries
will pose particularly acute delimitation problems in semi-enclosed
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seas such as the Mediterranean, some commentators have stressed the
need for regional arrangements to replace traditional piecemeal
bilateral boundary-making. 2 '	 For example, Bastianelli argues that in
the Mediterranean "delimitation" or "division" should give way to
"collaboration:" programmes should be arranged and carried out in
common; unilateral legislation should be replaced by international or
regional conventions; and the governing power of each State should be
transformed into coordinated operations towards common goals.22
Such ideas were considered at UNCLOS III, where many States
bordering semi-enclosed seas were concerned about the effects of the
E.E.Z. on conservation, management, the allocation of living resources,
the preservation of the marine environment, the delimitation of
maritime areas, and the freedom of navigation. 	 They called for a
special legal regime to apply to such seas, the result of which was
Article 123 of the 1982 Convention:
"States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-
operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties under this Convention.	 To this end
they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional
organisation:
(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and
exploitation of the living resources of the sea;
(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties







co-ordinate their scientific research policies and
where appropriate joint programmes of scientific
research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or other
international organizations to co-operate with them in furtherance
of the provisions of this article."
Given the difficulties of delimiting maritime boundaries in the
Mediterranean or other semi-enclosed seas, a notable omission is any
provision requesting the littoral States to cooperate either directly,
or through an appropriate regional organisation, to delimit their
maritime boundaries. 	 For example, it could have been suggested that
States bordering semi-enclosed seas set up an independent regional body
comprising	 delimitation	 experts	 from various	 disciplines and
representatives from each of the coastal States, with a mandate to
settle the outstanding regional delimitation problems. A regional body
such as this would have several advantages:
(i) the piecemeal division of the Sea would be prevented: all remaining
boundaries could be delimited at once, and there would be no need for
further agreements to delimit tripoints where two bilaterally delimited
boundaries met;
(ii) each maritime boundary could be delimited taking account of all
regional geographical circumstances, with proper respect being paid to
the legitimate claims of third States. There would be no need for
intervention proceedings or boundaries which avoided impinging on areas
which might belong to a another State;
(iii) if sufficient powers were invested in such a body, the boundaries
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so delimited would be binding and require no further legal action by
any of the States concerned.
However, if such a body was established, the task facing it would
be by no means easy.	 It would require very clear terms of reference
and far-reaching powers.
	
The means by which States submitted their
boundary claims would have to be strictly defined,
	 and the
circumstances considered by the body as relevant published beforehand.
A decision would need to be made as to whether issues such as historic
bay and straight baseline claims were to be considered as part of the
delimitation process, and in the event of disagreement within the
adjudicatory body, provision would need to be made for majority votes
to settle disagreements.	 And all this before even one boundary could
be considered! Consequently, there seems little reason not to suppose
that the Mediterranean's maritime boundaries will be delimited, as far
as geographical circumstances allow, bilaterally.
There is, however, one alternative which has not been considered.
Although it is noted that in semi-enclosed seas, "the details of
offshore boundary delimitation stand as obstacles to effective action
on joint marine-related problems," 2-3 no one has suggested that in
regional seas like the Mediterranean no maritime boundaries should be
delimited.	 Whilst it is inconceivable, not to say impractical, to
dismantle existing continental shelf boundaries, or to believe that
Mediterranean States would be willing to place the Sea's hydrocarbon
resources under regional control, they could agree not to institute the
E.E.Z. regime, and only to complete the division of the Sea's seabed.
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In other words, the remaining undPfined territorial sea and continental
shelf boundaries would be delimited, but Minditerranean States would
refrain from claiming E.E.Z.e and institute regional programmes for the
conservation, management, and allocation of the Sea's living resources,
to protect and precerve its marine environment, and to govern maline
scientific research. Those few MeditPrranean E.E.Z.s as exist would be
dismantled.
Whilst this falls short of not delimiting any boundaries at all,
the present ab.ence of E.E.Z. boundaries between States offers an
opportunity both for the avoidance of many future boundary conflicts,
and for effective regional cooperation on many marine management
issues.	 To a certain extent, regional arrangements of this sort
already exist for fisheries and pollution control purposes, the best
example of which is the Mediterranean Action Plan, adopted under the
auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme in 1975. This led
to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
pollution, signed in 1976, ratified by seventeen of the Mediterranean's
coastal States, the exception being Albania. 	 In addition, other
-egional organisations include the General Fisheries Council for the
l'!diterranean	 (G.F.C.M.)	 (a F.A.O.	 sponsored body dealing with
fisheries conservation and management); the International Commission
fzr the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean (I.C.S.E.M.); and
T:operative Investigations in the Mediterranean (C.I.M.) (sponsored by
an Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (I.O.C.) of UNESCO).24
All of these provide evidence that despite seeming a region by little
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more than physical definition, the Mediterr gnean may be managed
cooperatively, irrespective of political differences.
On the other hand, the general acceptance of a 200 mile E.E.Z.,
(or even a 200 mile E.F.Z.), may mean that irrespective of the coastal
States' interest in any shelf resources, there will be sufficient
interest in fisheries, pollution control, scientific research and so
forth to stimulate renewed interest in delimitation. 	 Indeed, Bilder
suggests that the institution of the 200 mile E.E.Z. seems more likely
to lead to an increase in unilateral or bilateral efforts to manage
ocean problems, rather than to any increased trend towards regional
efforts. Regional solutions are only adopted when they seem clearly in
a State's interest, either because of their inherent rationality or for
political bargaining purposes; and many regional arrangements may have
objectives or goals opposed to the interests of al1. 2s	If
Mediterranean regional arrangements were not to respect the 1982
Convention but to establish some uniquely Mediterranean legal regime,
then non-regional sea users would have good grounds to protest, but the
idea deserves serious and urgent political consideration.
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APPENDIX 1 - HYDROCARBON EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
Introduction 
The greatest incentive for maritime boundary delimitation has been
historically the discovery of, or the potential for, oil and/or gas in
offshore waters. The area between Libya, Tunisia, Malta and Sicily is
considered highly promising for hydrocarbons, and thus it should be no
surprise that this same area has been the scene of both boundary
disputes and boundary agreements.	 Similarly, the aborted continental
shelf negotiations between France and Italy appear to have been
motivated by the possibility of mineral exploitation in the shallow
waters off the Ligurian coast. 	 Thus, although boundary delimitation,
(at least by the I.C.J.), is unrelated to the location of known or
potential resources, 2 knowledge of the locations of these resources
nevertheless provides valuable information concerning the likelihood of
overlapping areas of national jurisdiction, as States seek to secure
these resources for their exclusive economic benefit. Consequently, it
is in these overlapping areas that the motives for boundary drawing
will be greatest and the most pressing.
	 Conversely, where known or
potential hydrocarbon resources are located in non-contentious areas,
i.e. indisputably within the jurisdiction of a single coastal State,
the need for boundaries between neighbouring States if not non-
existent, is greatly reduced.
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In order to ascertain if the reason why so few maritime boundaries
have been drawn in the Mediteranean was due to the non-contentious
location of known and potential hydrocarbon resources, a geographical
survey of offshore exploration and exploitation in the Mediterranean
Sea was undertaken, (using fragmentary documentary date), for the
years up to and including 1987. However, this study was embarked upon
with caution, as any map showing hydrocarbon concession areas needs
careful interpretation if incorrect assumptions and conclusions are not
to be made concerning the nature and location of hydrocarbon resources.
Moreover, offshore exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons is a
relatively recent phenomenon, the search for oil and gas having
naturally begun on land. Only in the last 15-20 years has the need to
Increase hydrocarbon reserves and diversify them geographically
prompted offshore exploration and production in increasingly difficult
working conditions, the offshore environment providing more obstacles
to overcome than its land-based equivalents, including the prevalent
meteorological conditions, the degree of the oxygenation of the water,
and water depth.4
Water depth is the critical "natural" limiting factor on offshore
exploration and production in the Mediterranean, and is itself a
function of seabed topography.	 Continental shelf development is
generally limited in the Mediterranean, and there are extensive areas
of deep waters. This is particularly significant as far as production
Is concerned, for production is much more difficult than exploration in
deep	 waters, and demands greater technological expertise and
equipment.	 Drilling rigs exist that can operate in 6 000 metres of
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water, and exploratory wells have been sunk in 2 000 metres of water,'
with the deepest drilling operations in the Mediterranean having been
carried out in 1983 by the drillship Discoverer Seven Seas, which
operated in waters 1 714 metres deep in the French offshore.
Hydrocarbon production, on the other hand, is limited to waters of less
than 1 000 metres depth, and thereby possible in only 44 per cent of
the Mediterranean seabed area.	 It is to be supposed, however, that
given the very significant technological developments that have allowed
production in these depths, together with the dynamism of the offshore
industry, production will be possible in greater water depths in the
future.
Nevertheless, as Attard has noted, the economic incentive to
exploit the Mediterranean's hydrocarbon resources is diminished by the
depth of its waters.' However, any extension of the area of production
will be subject to economic variables, of which the most significant is
the world price of oil.	 Given the very high capital and operating
costs associated with hydrocarbon production from the offshore sector,
there clearly is an economic limit beyond which production is not
commercially feasible even if it is technologically possible. 	 Any
slump in world oil prices does not encourage deeper water exploration,
particularly as costs increase in proportion to difficulty of
exploitation, and hence with increasing water depth. 	 For example,
France's 1983 deep Mediterranean drilling programme was conducted at a
cost of 500 million francs, the operating cost of the -drillship
Discoverer Seven Seas alone costing 1.5 million francs per day.
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Other economic constraints on offshore exploration and production
are complex and varied, and involve the negotiation of detailed
contracts between the concession-awarding State and the interested
company or companies,	 which may be State-owned,	 independent,
indigenous, or foreign enterprises. 	 Often the high cost of offshore
activities necessitates the formation of consortiums of two or more
companies, each with a percentage stake in the permit(s) secured. 	 As
to funding for exploration, sometimes this is provided by the awarding
government, but in most cases, the companies themselves bear the cost.
However, in almost all cases, if production results the government
picks up a fixed percentage of the profits by means of a production-
sharing contract.	 It may then pay a lump sum towards the exploration
costs, and will contribute to the costs of exploitation. 	 The
significance of the contractual terms of such agreements should,
therefore, be clear: attractive financial terms provide an incentive
for offshore exploration and may attract companies to prospect in less
promising tracts.	 Conversely, harsh financial terms may deter
companies from taking high economic risks.
Other government policies determine just where, when and how,
hydrocarbon exploration can take place. 	 Governments open up defined
areas for exploration on the basis of their own needs.	 Consequently,
some Mediterranean States such as Italy and Tunisia have issued permits
covering virtually the whole of their offshore domains, whereas others
such as Algeria and Morocco have virtually no offshore exploration.
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When concession areas become available is also at the discretion
of governments.	 For example, in August 1980, as part of its policy of
greatly expanding its search for oil, Greece invited foreign companies
to compete for concessions in specified offshore areas.
	 At the same
time, it increased the budget of the State-owned Public Petroleum
Corporation (DEP), and directed its attention to nine specified areas.
Of the eighteen foreign companies invited to submit tenders, only AGIP
of Italy responded with a firm undertaking, and was awarded a contract
covering the areas around the islands of Paxoi and Andipaxoi in the
Ionian Sea.
	 It transpired that the other foreign companies had been
put off both by the inadequate seismic and other data supplied by the
Greek Petroleum Board, and because there were no suitable provisions
for discontinuing contracts in the event of failure to find oil. This,
therefore, illustrates both an unwillingness to take financial risks,
and how the terms of a contract can be a deterrent even in the face of
a positive policy of encouraging exploration.
	 Moreover, even once
exploration has started, the offshore operator may find himself
frustrated by national regulations and local rules governing his
activities.
Whether the offshore is explored is, therefore, clearly dependent
upon the policies adopted by the government concerned. These policies
are often determined by a country's dependence on oil and/or gas
imports. Greece, for example, has become increasingly concerned about
her dependence on foreign oil, hence her increased offshore oil
exploration activity in the 1980s. Italy has been similarly concerned,
although her early interest in the offshore was also prompted by a
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balance-of-payments deficit, 	 for which any, indigenous oil was
important, almost independently of production costs. 9	By contrast,
neighbouring Yugoslavia was comparatively slow to explore her Adriatic
area, largely because of a political unwillingness to offer areas to
foreign companies, despite its serious lack of indigenous hydrocarbon
resources.	 Other Mediterranean States, notably Libya, and most
particularly Algeria, have paid relatively little attention to their
offshore due to their plentiful supplies of hydrocarbons from land
sources, whilst in the case of Lebanon, offshore exploration has been
stymied by civil war.
Finally, companies exploring the Mediterranean offshore have been
inhibited by maritime boundary disputes between neighbouring States.
The development of oilfields in both the Tunisian and Libyan offshore
was halted because of their boundary dispute, and exploration
activities both in the Aegean and on the Medina Bank were halted by
military activity in the boundary disputes between Greece and Turkey,
and Libya and Malta, respectively. 	 In each case, the dispute was
occasioned by overlapping concessions by the States concerned.
All of these positive and negative factors affecting offshore
exploration and production must, therefore, be borne in mind in
considering the following survey of the exploration and exploitation of
the Mediterranean offshore. 	 Moreover, as noted in Chapter 1, the
Mediterranean presents complex and differentiated geological situations
and, consequently, diverse hydrocarbon potential.
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A Geographical Survey of Offshore Exploration and-Production in the 
Mediterranean Sea 
Although some consideration is given to the potential for future
exploration and production, the following survey must be read as an
indication of the situation prevailing in 1987, upon which one may put
forward only the most tentative of conclusions with regard to future
maritime boundary delimitation in the Mediterranean.
Spain 
Exploration in the Spanish Mediterranean offshore has been
relatively extensive by Mediterranean standards, encouraged by some
commercial oil finds in the Gulf of Valencia.	 The continental shelf
between Tarragona and Valencia, wherein oil finds have been made,
averages 75 kilometres in width narrowing to between 20 to 30
kilometres north of Tarragona and south of Valencia. 	 Favourable
geological formations associated with sedimentation from the Ebro river
estuary have been fully explored, with Mesozoic carbonates the main
drilling objectives.	 Each new find has stimulated new interest in the
region, with some relinquished shallow water blocks being re-explored
in the hope of striking lucky.	 Moreover, as finds have occurred at
regular intervals, interest in the Spanish offshore has not waned,
despite the variable quality of oil found; and although the fields have
been comparatively small and their productive lives short, the decline
of one field has been offset by the discovery of another.
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The exploration effort began in the lee 1960s following
disappointing results onshore, with initial permits being granted for
areas off the Ebro river delta and for a 400 square kilometre area off
Majorca.	 Success came quickly with the discovery of the Amposta field
lying 90 kilometres south west of Tarragona and 24 kilometres offshore
in 60 metres of water. 	 In August 1970, a Shell-led consortium tested
2 500 barrels per day (b/d) of heavy crude oil from their Amposta
Marino Cl exploratory well, to be followed by further oil strikes from
succeeding exploratory drilling, with each well flowing at a rate of
around 12 000 b/d.	 This resulted in estimates of a commercial field
with 40 million tons of reserves, and prompted immediate intensified
interest in the Spanish offshore.
A number of applications were already pending for Mediterranean
areas north and south of the Ebro river, 9 and following the Amposta
discovery, a number of companies entered bids for areas in the Gulf of
Valencia, just to its south. 	 Further offshore bids were entered for
areas to the north off Barcelona, whilst Georex and Sipsa competed for
offshore areas extending to French waters.
Production from the Amposta field began in May 1973, although the
quality of the crude discovered was relatively poor and heavy (17' API)
with a high sulphur content (5.5%).	 However, as this was the first
offshore oil production in the entire Mediterranean, it partly explains
why such poor quality crude was exploited. Consequently, although the
Amposta field was important for Spanish oil reserves, 	 almost
immediately after production started the field's output began to
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decline.	 In its first two years of production, Amposta produced
-
41-42 000 b/d of oil, but in 1976 production had fallen to 30 000 b/d,
and was further cut to 15 000 b/d in 1977, and to a mere 4 000 b/d in
1979.
At its peak in 1975, Amposta produced nearly 2 million tonnes of
crude, but by 1981 its production was a mere 99 300 tonnes, falling to
a low of 44 000 tonnes in 1984. Declining production eventually led
to it being taken out of continuous production in January 1981, to be
produced only intermittently, although a new well was brought on stream
in December 1985. Nevertheless, despite its small size and its sharply
declining production profile, the significance of the Amposta field
should not be underestimated. Not only did it produce 47 out of the 54
million barrels taken from the Spanish Mediterranean by the end of
1978, but its discovery directly led to the increased exploration
activity that resulted in further commercial finds, offsetting its own
decline.	 Moreover, its development provided a catalyst for further
offshore exploration in the Mediterranean offshore as a whole.
After Amposta, the next two oil fields to be exploited from the
Spanish Mediterranean were Tarraco (or Castell6n) and Casablanca, both
of which came on stream in 1977. The former field lies 60 kilometres
to the north-east of Amposta in 117 metres of water.	 The field was
small, with reserves estimated in 1979 at 16 million barrels of 35 API
oil.
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Casablanca, on the other hand, is Spain's largest producing
oilfield, although it too has run into production difficulties. 	 The
field was first discovered in October 1975 by Standard Oil, who
announced that its Casablanca 1 well, drilled 55 kilometres offshore in
133 metres of water, had tested 32 API crude at 10 670 b/d, with 29*
API crude flowing at 2 860 b/d from a shallower zone. A large offshore
field was confirmed by a second well completed in early 1976, which
flowed at 9 700 b/d from the same zones, prompting the Spanish
Government to estimate reserves at 30 million tonnes.
Unlike the Amposta find, the crude was of high quality, with a low
sulphur content (0.2%), and it was hoped to start production as soon as
possible.	 However, this was delayed following a series of setbacks,
including the drilling of three dry holes and lower than expected flow
rates.	 Nevertheless, having virtually been closed down in 1979, when
only 10 600 tonnes of crude were produced, Casablanca's output reached
672 400 tonnes in 1980, and thus finally fulfilled initial expectations
for the field. By the end of 1980, output had reached 15 000 b/d and
remained at this level until late 1982, when the addition of two new
wells further boosted output to its maximum potential of 35 to 40 000
b/d. This resulted in over 2.1 million tonnes of crude being produced
in 1983 for the Tarragona refinery, but thereafter decline set in,
forcing additional wells to be sunk.
In 1985, Casablanca represented 90 per cent of Spanish oil
production.	 With few other significant finds, the decreased output
from Casablanca had debilitating effects on Spain's indigenous oil
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Other oil strikes have occurred in the Mich explored Gulf of
Valencia, A well 40 kilometres to the south of Amposta was reported to
have tested
	 15 000 b/d of heavy 20-21° API oil in 1976, bit nothing
more is known of this find,
	 In 1983, Eniepsa discovered light crude
(44 0
 API) with its Salmonete-1 well, drilled 45 kilometres off
Tarragona.
	 Test flows were 3 723 b/d.
	 Soon after, in 1984, Union
Texas tested 3 800 b/d of 43 0
 API oil with its Angola-1 well in 114
metres of water, both finds being in close proximity to already
developed fields.	 Almonete was put into production for a long-term
test, which yielded 70 000 tonnes by the end of 1984, and a second well
was drilled in 1986.	 The Angola find was production tested in 1985,
but gave "a high water cut."
This intensive exploration of parts of the Spanish offshore has
been aided by the offer of attractive financial terms to foreign
companies, and this, plus the above finds, explains why, for example,
sixteen oil companies submitted bids for six of thirteen Ebro delta
concessions offered in 1976.
	 Indeed, at one time Spain hoped
production from the Mediterranean offshore between Alicante and the
French border might provide ten per cent of its total oil requirements
by the late 1980s.
By the end of 1977, 66 exploration wells had been drilled in
Spain's Mediterranean waters, the majority in the area between the
Spanish mainland and the Balearic Islands, although concessions have
been granted in the Alboran Sea in an area stretching from offshore
Marbella beyond Almena.
	
A total of 75 wildcats were drilled in the
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Spanish offshore in the years 1980-1982, and by the , end of 1982, twelve
oil companies were exploring 	 50 000 square kilometres of the Spanish
Mediterranean.
	
However, commercial success was confined to the near
waters of the Spanish mainland, e.g. a dry well was drilled off Ibiza
in 1978.
	
Investment in offshore exploration has been high, and some
deep drilling has been attempted, e.g. in 1979, Getty drilled a wildcat
well in a then record water depth of 4 441 feet in its Grumete C block
forty miles south east of Tarragona.
No gas finds have been made, although significant, if small, gas
fields have been located outside of the Mediterranean in both the Bay
of Biscay and the Gulf of Cadiz.
France 
Similar geological conditions exist off the RhOne delta as
produced commercial oil successes in the Spanish offshore, but up until
1987, there had been no commercial strikes in the French Mediterranean
offshore.
Initial interest concentrated on the area off the eastern coast of
Corsica, but in 1971, discoveries off the Spanish coast stimulated and
Intensified interest in the exploration of the area off the French
mainland coast. A number of permits were granted for areas in the Gulf
of Lyons; indeed, interest in the French offshore prompted questions in
the Italian Parliament as to the legitimacy of permits covering areas
of the Mediterranean up to the nominal median line with Italy. 1 ° In
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addition, by 1973, applications for exploration permit applications
covered virtually all of the waters surrounding Corsica.
Although several of the permits applied for were in deep waters,
given the Spanish experience, France could have hoped for a commercial
strike.	 Instead a succession of dry holes were drilled, and interest
in the Mediterranean, so intense between 1971 and 1973, soon waned. By
1977, there was little activity in the Mediterranean offshore, largely
because of the lack of a commercial discovery, e.g. Total (CFP)/BP
drilled four dry wells in its Gulf of Lyons' permits.
However, in 1978, there were indications that the Mediterranean
offshore had not been completely abandoned. Elf Aquitaine was granted
an exclusive search permit covering 3 323 square kilometres, onshore
and offshore in the Gulf of Lyons in the Languedoc-Provence-Maritime
region, and in December began drilling the Cicindele well in 25 metres
of water, approximately 5 kilometres off Saintes Manes de la Men.
Similarly, towards the end of 1978, Total (CFP) and BP applied to
extend to March 1980 their joint search permit by 220 square
kilometres, to take in areas in the extreme western part of the Gulf of
Lyons off the departments of Pyrenees-Orientales, Ande and Herault. It
was further reported in 1979, that CFP had defined two "prospects" off
Corsica in water depths of 150 and 2 500 feet, although these were
unlikely to be drilled because of non-defined boundaries between France
and Italy, and France and Monaco.
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In 1980, France called for a State-funded fhventory of potential
Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources to be drawn up, paying special
attention to areas which had previously been largely unexplored.
	 A
total of 16.3 million francs was committed to various exploration and
mapping projects and, at the same time, a two year licence was given to
SNEA and Total for preliminary prospecting in an area of 80 000 square
kilometres off the departments of Eastern Pyrenees, Ande, Herault, Gard
and Alpes Maritimes, known as "Mediterranee Grands Fonds."
In 1982, a 500 million francs deep drilling programme for the
Mediterranean was announced, with 60 per cent government funding. This
was intended to confirm assumptions about the hydrocarbon prospects of
the deep Tertiary basins and their substratums, arising out of the
previous two-years' aeromagnetic and seismic surveys. The first stage
of this programme was completed in June 1983, when Total drilled the
GLPI well to the then record depth of 3 607 metres below sea level in
the Grands Fonds "B" permit.	 The well was located 100 kilometres off
Marseille in waters 1 714 metres deep. A second Golfe du Lion Profond
well (GLP2) was then sunk by Elf Aquitaine, 80 kilometres south west of
Marseille and 25 kilometres north-west of GLP1, in the same permit.
This was drilled to a depth of 5 354 metres, in waters 1 246 metres
deep, but neither well found oil nor gas, although according to Total,
GLP1 was successful in confirming the assumptions about this area's
hydrocarbon potential.
Neverthless, as a result of its intensive, costly, and
disappointing offshore exploration efforts, France switched attention
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to extensive exploration of onshore areas. Consequently, the offshore,
although relatively unexplored, has been all but abandoned for the
present.
Italy 
Italy has been the prime mover in exploration and exploitation of
the Mediterranean offshore, with activity having been both extensive
and intensive.	 It began in 1959, with the completion of Europe's first
offshore oil well, Gela 21, off southern Sicily. Thereafter, between
1960 and 1967, Agip discovered six productive offshore gas fields in
the offshore area betweeen Ravenna and Rimini in the northern Adriatic.
Most of these fields (Favenna, Cesenatico, Cervia, South Ravenna, Porto
Corsini and West Porto), lie south-east of the Po river estuary, and as
extensive natural gas reserves had been found in the Po river valley,
it came as no surprise that Europe's first productive gasfield should
lie in its offshore.	 By 1968, these Adriatic gasfields had an output
T.f 880 million cubic metres (cu. m.) of natural gas."
In 1967, the passing of the Hydrocarbon Law initiated a great
s.arge of interest in the exploration of the Italian offshore,
encouraged by previous successes. For the first time areas were opened
41 to foreign and private operators, having been previously solely
reserved to the State company Agip and its partners. Italian offshore
areas up to the 200 metre isobath were divided into five zones, <Zone A
- Northern Adriatic; Zone B - Central Adriatic; Zone C - Sicilian
5.aters; Zone D	 Southern Adriatic and Ionian Seas; and Zone E -
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Tyrrhenian Sea), and companies were invited to tubmit bids for areas
which they demarcated for themselves, the Italians eschewing the normal
process of allocating regularly defined blocks of continental shelf.
Consequently,	 some blocks were peculiarly shaped,	 and several
overlapped, which led to a delay in licensing.
Thirty different companies sought licences in the northern
Adriatic (Zone A), and in 1969 the first twenty were allocated for an
area of 20 723 ha. Agip and Agip-Shell already held twelve licences in
this zone by 1969, and had discovered an estimated 20 000 million cu.m.
of gas, hence prospects were good. Four further licenses were awarded
in 1971, and as a result of this licensing activity three new gasfields
(Porto Garibaldi, Agostino, and Amelia) were discovered.
Bidding for exploration licences in the central Adriatic zone
between the parallels of latitude 42° and 44' North (Zone B), attracted
even greater interest than bidding for Zone A tracts.
	
Prospects in
Zone B were regarded as even better than Zone A, as a number of
promising geological structures, thought to be extensions of Agip's
known gas sources in the northern zone, were thought to run southwards
into Zone B.	 Moreover, the area north of Ancona had revealed
characteristics similar to the Sicilian offshore fields of Gela and
Ragusa discussed below. 	 Fifty companies applied for licences, and
during 1970, at least 72 were awarded for a minimum area of 1 139 429
ha., with a further four in 1971.
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By early 1972, virtually all of the seabed in Zones A and B had
been allocated.
	
Drilling was moving into deeper 'waters, particularly
in Zone B, where in 1971 the deepest well drilled was the Ernesto Nord,
fifty miles off Pescara in 1 167 metres of water, sunk to a. depth of
6 173 metres. Moreover, although at the time, few companies other than
Agip and its partners had had the opportunity to drill for gas in the
Pliocene sands, or to test the pre-Pliocene sediments at greater
depths, gas finds were already plentiful. For example, in Zone B they
included the San Giorgio field off the Marche coast, the San Stefano
field off Abruzzi, and Elf Italiana's find off Torino di Sangro.
As they began operations, offshore prospecting was moving south
into Calabrian and Sicilian waters.	 In the southern Adriatic part of
Zone D, surveys had been concentrated on a relatively narrow strip of
continental shelf, with attention being focussed on the Mesozoic
reservoir off the Puglia shore, where oil and gas had already been
found.	 Interest was also focussed on the seaward extensions of the
Pliocene basin off the Gulf of Taranto (Lucania) and off Calabria, in
the Ionian Sea.	 At the beginning of 1972, a total of 27 licenses
existed for Zone D, and Agip had already drilled the first exploration
well, Gondola 1, 35 kilometres off Foggia (Manfredonia) in 95 metres of
water, and was planning a further wildcat in 200 metres of water off
Cort one.
However, as 1972 began, the greatest interest in the Italian
offshore lay in the Sicilian waters of Zone C, where Agip already held
fourteen licenses covering a total area of 468 739 ha. One of Agip's
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blocks in the Malta Channel lay off the Gela aria' Ragusa oil fields in
southern Sicily.	 The Ragusa field had been discovered in 1953, and
Agip was producing around 10 000 b/d heavy 11° API crude from its 7 991
hectare offshore extension of the Gela oilfields, where oil was derived
from the Dolomite at about 3 500 metres depth. 	 Therefore, given the
oil and gas finds in southern Sicily, combined with other hydrocarbon
discoveries in eastern Tunisia, there were strong indications that oil
might lie beneath the relatively shallow Sicilian and Malta Channels.
Indeed, in addition to Agip, a further 25 exploration licenses had been
granted to other companies for areas in Zone C covering 566 205 ha.,
and hopes for success were high.
Exploration of the Tyrrhenian Sea (Zone E) was also beginning. In
1969, Agip had selected eight areas covering 33 407 ha., and two blocks
covering 127 200 ha. were leased to other companies in 1970, with a
further seven in 1971.
Clearly, interest in the Italian offshore at the beginning of the
1970s cannot be understated. Spurred on by Agip's high success rate -
up to the middle of November 1971 Agip had drilled 183 wells, two
thirds (123) of which had been productive - companies were eager to
secure the rights to what they saw as easy pickings, although, with the
notable exception of Gela, oil had proved elusive. 	 Licenses were
issued at an incredible rate; for example, by the end of March 1970 the
licensed area had increased by 40 per cent in just four months.
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Throughout 1972, exploration effort remained at a high level, and
,10.•
22 licenses covering 662 844 ha. were issued for the highly promising
Sicilian waters of Zone C.
	
In addition, a further 24 674 ha. of the
heavily leased Adriatic Zone B waters were released, as were 62 909 ha.
of Zone D (southern Adriatic and Ionian), and 110 067 ha. of Zone E
(Tyrrhenian).	 The San Stefano gasfield, discovered in Pliocene sands
at about 1 400 metres in 1967, began production in 1972 at a rate of
490 000 cu. m. per day, and three new gasfields (Antonella, Barbara and
Emilio) were discovered in the waters of Zones A and B.
More significantly, Agip began development of the first major gas
discovery outside the Adriatic.
	
The Luna field, discovered late in
1971 by a well drilled 7 kilometres off Crotone in the Ionian Sea, was
tentatively estimated to have recoverable resources of 15 000 million
cu. m. of high purity gas, and to have a productive potential of 1 000
million cu. m. per year.
	
This was a significant addition to Italy's
offshore gas output,
	 (5 787 million cu. m. in 1971), which came
almost exclusively from ENI's exclusive inshore concession in the
northern Adriatic, and the Ravenna gasfields in the same zone.
Although no new discoveries were announced in 1973, the issue of
exploration licences continued unabated.
	 Agip acquired a further
10 841 ha. in Zone A, 12 926 ha. in Zone B (both in the Adriatic), and
34 041 ha. for two areas in the Tyrrhenian Sea (Zone E). Its major new
Interest was, however, off the Ionian coast of Calabria, where it
acquired sixteen permits covering 89 781 ha. (Zone D). Other companies
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received permits covering 150 051 ha. in Sicilian- waters (Zone C), and
1 765 ha. in Zone B.
Exploration activity continued to increase tremendously between
1973 and 1979, as a result of a rise in the price of crude oil, and
further gasfields were discovered, such as the Amnemone field about 20
kilometres off Rimini in the Adriatic, and another adjacent to the Luna
field in the Ionian Sea.	 By 1977, about 23 gas fields had been found,
with recoverable reserves estimated at around 150 000 million cu. m.
The major gas producing basin off the northern Adriatic coast had 13
fields on stream, and several other Adriatic fields were expected on
stream soon (Antonella, David and Barbara within a year and Squalo
within two).	 In the Ionian Sea, the Luna field was in production, and
the fields of Hera, Lucinia, and Lavinia were under appraisal.
Nevertheless, despite these and earlier finds, the drilling of over 170
exploration and 130 development wells in the period 1959-1977 did not
lead Italy to find major reserves of either oil or gas.
	 Indeed,
although the Italian offshore was producing about 70 per cent of
Italy's indigenous gas, Italy was still importing over a third of the
gas required to meet domestic demand, with projections indicating the
need for increased imports.
The situation concerning oil was even more serious. The only oil
find thus far was that of Emilio, so heavy that production.was subject
to appraisal; and of Italy's 100 million tonnes of domestic oil
consumption, only 18 million tonnes were supplied nationally or through
Agip's overseas participation.	 A decision was thus taken to open up
-832-
for exploration waters beyond the 200 metre isdTath. During 1976 Agip
had carried out geophysical exploration of 26 000 square kilometres of
the newly created Zone F in the deep waters of the Ionian Sea, wherein
it was reportedly "very confident" of finding oil, though not enough to
meet demand; and in 1977, companies were invited to bid for Zone F
tracts up to 1 100 metres depth, Agip having pre-selected 9 blocks
covering 6 700 square kilometres for itself.
However, there were other oil finds in the Italian offshore at
this time.	 In August 1977, Agip/Shell found high quality oil in a
small but commercial field named Hilde in the Sicilian Channel, 40
miles southwest of Marsala.	 A series of other oil finds ensued.
Montesidon found 35 API oil with its Mile 1 wildcat in the same area,
about 6 kilometres off Maria di Ragusa, in depths of 3 500 metres; and
Elf Aquitaine's second well Rospo-2, confirmed a find of heavy, viscous
oil in the central Adriatic. 12 Agip made an oil discovery with its
Perla 1 wildcat off southern Sicily, and two of the four wells drilled
off Sicily by Conoco in 1978-1979 encountered shows. 	 These oil finds
thus attracted further interest in the deep water areas of the southern
Adriatic and Ionian Seas, and offshore Sicily.
In the meantime, Italy continued to find new gas fields in her
Mediterranean offshore, including the mid-Adriatic fields of Squalo,
Tratello Nord and Emma Ovest, whilst others came on stream, e.g.
Amnemone-Azales and Antonella.	 In 1980, Agip found a further major
gasfield, Porto Corsini, 20 kilometres off Ravenna in waters 25 metres
deep, which was expected to yield more than 300 million cu. m. per year.
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During 1981, as exploration continued to move into deeper waters,
particularly in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, further oil finds were
made in the Sicilian Channel, the wells Vega 1 and 3 striking oil at
distances between 15 and 25 kilometres offshore. ' 3 Agip also announced
its Akiula 1 well in 827 metres of water in the southern Adriatic, had
tested 3 500 b/d of oil.
Thus, by the end of that year, Italy had drilled 528 wells in its
offshore: 318 for exploratory purposes and 210 for production purposes.
Sixty-five oil and/or natural gas wells had been discovered, of which
29 were in production, with an output of 1 460 million tons of oil, and
a little more than half of Italy's indigenous natural gas (greater than
6 billion cu. m.). By 30 April 1982, 51 companies were operating on the
Italian continental shelf, with exploration permits covering a total
area of 47 053 square kilometres; and during 1982 alone, 60 offshore
wells were drilled resulting in twelve oil, and four gas, finds.
Consequently, by 1983, increased offshore activity had led to an
increase in Italy's offshore oil production.	 Of particular importance
was the Vega field, thought at first to be small, but which
subsequently proved to be the largest discovery made in the Italian
offshore.	 In 1983, it was announced that the three wells drilled had
"proved a major oil accumulation in a structure 143 kilometres long,
and 3 kilometres wide." Recoverable reserves were estimated at 3 000
million barrels, with production expected to rise to 60-80 000 b/d.
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To the north-west of Vega, Agip had begun ddVelopment of its Perla
heavy oil field in 1984, in addition to boosting the capacity of its
small Hilde field; Elf's long-term production test on its 'substantial
Rospo field in the Adriatic had also provided "excellent results."
Using the world's first horizontally-drilled offshore well, production
was fifteen times greater than by conventional vertical wells, and
provided optimistic forecasts for its development.
Thus, by the mid-1980s, Italian offshore oil production looked to
have a promising future.
	 The Vega field was expected to yield twice
current onshore production, whilst LASMO had announced tests of 200,
1 400 and 100 b/d of oil from three zones of its Aretusa 1 well, 19
kilometres off the south coast of Sicily.
	 In the Adriatic, the Tospo
field was due to start production at a rate in excess of 10 000 b/d in
1987.
As far as gas was concerned, during 1985 Agip had begun
development of three further Adriatic gasfields (Cervia Mare II,
Flavia/Fluvia and San Benedeto), and the following year it installed
platforms to develop its Porto Corsini East, Basil, Barbara and Cervia
fields in the Adriatic.
	 LASMO's oil strike off southern Sicily had
also yielded gas floors of 1.48, 11.54 and 0.9 million cfd from its
respective zones.
The future would seem to suggest further exploration of the deeper
waters beyond the 200 metre isobath, in particular, the waters of Zones
E (Tyrrhenian Sea) and F (Ionian Sea), where no finds have yet been
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made.	 However, these explorations are unlikely to be extensive whilst
significant oil and gas fields continue to be found in the near
offshore, especially off southern Sicily, and in the Adriatic.
Malta
Like its northern neighbour, Malta showed an early interest in the
hydrocarbon potential of its offshore.
	 As early as 1965, experts
advised the Maltese Government that oil might lie in Maltese waters;
and in response, the Government asked oil companies to bid for survey
permits.' 	 In 1970, applications were opened for two areas to the
north and north-east of Malta, (Blocks I and II respectively), divided
so as to ensure the Hurd Bank lay in both. 15 Drilling was not to be
permitted deeper than 350 metres below the surface of the seabed, nor
in a 500 metre wide strip along the notional median line between Malta
and Sicily.	 Fourteen applications were received for production
licences and three for exploration licences, of which six were for
Block I and seven for Block II.	 The latter was then subdivided into
two zones (north/south), on account of its promising geology.'s
A consortium led by Home Oil (Canada) was given the licence for
the southern section of Block II, up to 30 miles offshore and to the
edge of the continental shelf in waters 660 feet deep. It undertook to
carry out a seismic survey and to drill one well in this 1 925 square
kilometre concession.	 Aquitaine Malta was awarded the 1 558 square
kilometre northern section and undertook to drill two wells (one deep)
and to carry out a seismic survey. The 2 375 square kilometre Block I
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area was awarded to Malta Shell for production purposes, the company
,..
guaranteeing an aeromagnetic and seismic survey, and the drilling of
two wells, one deep, in an area which extended some 20 miles to the
north-east of Malta. Concessions were thus awarded for a total area of
some 6 058 square kilometres.
Late in 1971, Aquitaine Malta obtained a renewable ten year permit
for an area of 1 958 square kilometres to the south-east of the island,
and the Maltese Government offered for sale seismic data for 2 000
square kilometres on the Medina Bank and other areas to the south, with
a view to granting new production concessions. These were divided into
sixteen offshore blocks and applications invited. By early 1975, eight
blocks had been awarded: four to Texaco Malta, three to Joc Oil
covering 2 534 square kilometres, and the eighth, a block of 1 000
square kilometres covering waters between 200 and 250 metres deep, to a
consortium led by Aquitaine Malta. 	 The award of these blocks was,
however, controversial, given that the seabed boundary line between
Malta and Libya was disputed from the moment Malta indicated her
intention to offer them.
	
Libya refused to accept Malta's de facto 
median line delimitation, arguing for a boundary much farther north.
As a result, some of the Maltese concession areas to the south of the
islands were held to cover areas of the Libyan continental shelf. 17
On 23 May 1976, the States signed an agreement to send their
continental shelf boundary to the I.C.J. for adiudicatiOn.	 Malta
ratified this agreement almost immediately, but Libya procrastinated,
and a series of polite but forceful letters from Malta to Libya, failed
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to induce Libyan ratification. 10 Part of the reason for this may have
been that Malta would remain chiefly dependent on Libyan oil supplies
in the absence of any indigenous resources; as the Sicilian Channel was
thought to be a potentially rich hydrocarbon area, Libya not only
wanted the maximum area to explore, but also to deny her dependent
neighbour the opportunity to exploit any oil resources in the region.
Conversely, Malta was keen to secure the rights to any potential
resources that might lessen her total reliance on foreign oil imports,
and was optimistic that its offshore areas provided an opportunity for
self-sufficiency in oil.
Exploration in Malta's southern blocks was suspended virtually
since the award of the appropriate licences, so that by late 1979 its
patience was wearing thin. Consequently, Malta informed Libya of its
intention to commence drilling in these concessions, thereby honouring
the commitments it had made in 1974.
	
However, as a conciliatory
gesture, it offered not to explore in a fifteen mile zone on its side
of the notional median line between the two States. 19 Libya's reply
was to restate its claims to areas of the Maltese concession areas, to
denounce Malta's proposed activities, and to declare its non-
recognition of the agreements make by Malta with foreign oil
companies. 20
Nevertheless, in 1980, Malta ordered Amoco and Texaco to begin
drilling in accordance with their 1974 licences, or in default to
forfeit all their rights.
	
Amoco (which had succeeded Joc Oil as the
licensee for three blocks) defaulted, fearing Libyan actions, but
-838-
Texaco sent a rig to drill a wildcat in a location 68 miles south-east
of Malta in the Medina Bank area. On 20 August 1980, a submarine and
Libyan warship appeared and attempted to eject the rig from the area
threatening force, and claiming the rig's activities were illegal as
the area belonged to Libya.
	 Malta advised Texaco to continue, but on
22 August 1980, the captain of the rig reluctantly terminated drilling,
despite the fact that drilling was not taking place in an area in which
Libya (in 1975) had informed Texaco not to prospect.21
After this incident a stalemate again ensued in the waters to the
south of Malta, until a Libyan Note Verbale of 26 January 1981
indicated its willingness to ratify the 1976 agreement submitting the
dispute to the I.C.J.
	 However, three days later, a further Note
Verbale added the proviso that until the I.C.J. decided the case, no
drilling should take place in the disputed area.
	 This was initially
unacceptable to Malta, ==2
 but after the visit of Colonel Gadaffi to
Malta on 13 March 1982, it was agreed to send the dispute to the I.C.J.
under the conditions proposed by Libya.23
In 1985, the I.C.J. indicated that the boundary line should lie
north of the median line claimed by Malta, and this was stee7t.zent/i
accepted by the parties, despite the fact that both Aitaine FA2ta an!
Amoco held blocks, or parts of blocks, that now /ay on the LtbTam
continental shelf, and one of Texaco's wells drilled Lade- license fro=
the Maltese Government was now on Libyan territory.
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By contrast, exploration to the north of Malta, in the Maltese
Channel, has proceeded in a much more orderly fashion, even in the
absence of a formal boundary, because Malta and Italy , respect an
accepted working arrangement. The first Maltese concessions were made
in this area, and with their expiry it was to its northern waters that
Malta turned again in 1980, once it became clear there was to be no
quick solution to the boundary dispute with Libya.
	 Although the
original Blocks I and II had not provided oil for their operators,
Malta undertook a seismic survey of these blocks, and extended
invitations to foreign oil companies to explore and exploit increased
seabed areas. Contracts were awarded in 1981; and in 1982, Reading and
Bates began drilling 8 miles north-west of Gozo in Block 8, while IECO
(Agip) drilled 30 miles north-east of Malta in Block 3, where it held a
2 000 square kilometre permit. 24 A number of wells were drilled in the
area in subsequent years, but none produced discoveries of economic
value.	 Nevertheless, Malta reopened the same blocks for research in
1988, upon the expiry of the aforementioned concessions. 2E
Thus, although exploration of the Maltese offshore has by no means
been extensive, it is somewhat surprising given Italy's oil strikes off
southern Sicily that no trace of oil has been found in Maltese waters,
especially to the north of the islands. However, one significant oil
strike, and Malta would be likely to be besieged by companies
interested in exploring its offshore.	 In the meantime, offshore




By comparison with neighbouring Italy, Yugoslavia's exploration of
the Adriatic offshore has been minimal, which is almost entirely due to
the fact that it was not until the mid-1970s that Yugoslavia modified
its legislation to allow for foreign company participation in joint
ventures.26'
Yugoslavia's State company, INA Naftaplin, began drilling its
first offshore test well in the central Adriatic in 1970, but by early
1973, only three further test wells had been drilled, during a period
in which Italy had licensed exploration of almost the whole of Zones A
and B in the northern and central Adriatic. These wells showed oil and
gas, but in non-commercial quantities, although there were further
showings of hydrocarbons in a well drilled 120 kilometres from Zada in
1973.
That same year, an area of about 1 million acres on- and offshore
Montenegro in the southern-central Adriatic was allocated to
Yugopetrol-Adriatic-Kotor. 	 In conjunction with an American group led
by Buttes Gas and Oil, it spudded its first test well off Herceg-Novi
(Montenegro) in 1976, in one of the first joint ventures with foreign
companies, but again non-commercial traces of hydrocarbons were found.
During 1977, Naftaplin began a programme of drilling off the
Dalmatian coast, and in 1979, a seismic survey of the southern Adriatic
off Montenegro was completed, designed to select a suitable site for an
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exploratory well to be drilled by Yugopetrol/Checrfon/Bates Oil, Buttes
Gas and Oil continued a seismic survey of its concession areas, and
Naftaplin was planning to drill five wells in the northern Adriatic
during 1979, with a further fifteen or so planned for the period 1980-
1982,	 In addition, in 1981, Naftaplin announced that in the next five
years it would drill more than 200 000 metres of wells in the central
and southern Adriatic, and
	
16 500 metres in cooperation with foreign
companies in the northern part of the Sea.
In 1982, Buttes Gas and Oil finally announced that after eight
years exploratory work, it had found an oil reservoir 30 kilometres off
the Montenegrian coast. 	 At the same time, Naftaplin's seismic survey
of the central Adriatic had indicated the presence of oil at depths of
around	 4 000 metres around the islands of Pelagruz, Jabuka and
Mljet, in areas each covering some 4 000 square kilometres. Agreements
were signed with foreign companies for joint exploration of these three
blocks over a 30 month period, which included the drilling of eight
wells and further seismic work.	 In 1984, promising results in the
Mljet block led Naftaplin and its overseas partners to extend their
concession area, but the following year, Agip, Chevron and Texaco,
withdrew from the Pelagruz and Jabuka blocks following disappointing
results.	 Chevron continued to operate with Hispanoil off Mljet, but
hopes of a find were very dim.
A couple of further non-commerical oil finds have been made,
including one 2 kilometres from the island of Dugi Otok, which was
still under appraisal in 1985. No further oil strikes were reported up
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to 1987, although in 1986, three Yugoslav companles announced a new
five-year exploration programme for a 4 300 square kilometre area off
Montenegro; and in 1987, Naftaplin, Texaco and Agip planned to begin
exploration off the island of Susac, in water depths of 130-160 metres.
As far as gas is concerned, Yugoslavia's first commerical find
came via Naftaplin's search off the north-eastern Adriatic, where in
1977, gas flowed from two zones in a well drilled 56 kilometres west of
Pula.	 However, the development of the fields of Ika and Ivana, which
lie 25 kilometres apart in 65 metres of water, 45 kilometres off Pula,
has been much delayed, and in the case of the Ika field abandoned.
These fields were expected to provide 5 000 million cu. m. of gas per
year by 1986, their combined reserves being estimated at 6 billion
cu. m. of gas; but development of the Ivana field did not begin until
1985, and it was not expected onstream before the 1990s, with its
production targets from 26 wells having been much downgraded.
Clearly, the lack of commercial success in the Yugoslavian
offshore is in marked contrast to Italy's numerous commercial finds.
By 1985, exploration had covered an area of 54 000 square kilometres,
largely nearshore. Given the lack of success in these nearshore areas,
the incentives for deep-water exploration are not great.	 However, the
whole Adriatic is geologically promising, and as Italy has found
plentiful gas supplies and some oil in the western Adriatic, there is
also high potential for oil in the eastern Adriatic. 	 Exploration of




It is unclear whether exploration of the Albanian offshore has
begun.	 There were reports of exploration wells being drilled in the
Adriatic in 1977, but both Bastianelli 27 and Luciani 29 deny any such
activity. Albania does not allow foreign companies to operate in its
territory, and would thus have to exploit the offshore itself.
By 1982, indigenous oil production onshore was 2.5 million tonnes
per year, originating from a mio-Pliocene sedimentary basin that
extended offshore as a limited continental shelf area. 29 Consequently,
the offshore would appear to have hydrocarbon potential.
Greece 
Offshore exploration in the seas around Greece commenced in 1968,
and until the overthrow of the military rêgime in 1974, involved
concessions to many small companies; no major operator was involved.
By 1970, concessions had been granted for over 20 000 square kilometres
in various parts of the Aegean and about 10 000 square kilometres in
the southern Ionian Sea, certain of these extending beyond territorial
waters.
Texaco, for example, held three concessions: for the shallow
waters of the Gulf of Thermaikos, off the islands of Chios and Lesbos
in the eastern Aegean, and in the Thracian Sea. In early 1970, it
completed the first deep well in Greek waters about 45 miles south-west
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of Salonica, and found some natural gas.	 Other concessions were held
4-•
for areas off Lemnos, 	 the coast of Thrace,	 the islands of
Zante/Cephalonia and off the mainland at Kyllene. Further exploration
concessions were reported in 1971, taking the total number to fourteen
covering	 66 300 square kilometres.
In November 1971, there were reports of "significant shows of
hydrocarbons" from a well drilled 30 miles south east of Kavalla, but
this later proved to be non-commercial.
In 1972, further offshore concessions were granted for areas off
south-western Peloponnese, east of Thasos, and on- and offshore western
Lesbos. Later that year, Colorado encountered significant gas shows 15
nautical miles south of Kavalla in the north Aegean.	 The Kavalla 1
well soon became a commercial find, with the early tests indicating a
potential gas flow of 20 million cfd. 	 However, development of this
gasfield was not approved until 1978, largely because the discovery of
the Frinos oilfield in the neighbouring vicinity took precedence.	 In
all, Oceanic found 25 structures in the area between Thasos and
northern Greece, each with shows of hydrocarbons, in water depths of 30
metres. It drilled on five of them, but only Prinos proved commercial.
Discovery of the Prinos oilfield late in 1973, virtually coincided
with the overthrow of the military junta, after which all offshore
concessions were renegotiated with the State company (DEP). ' Licenses
for exploration were given for a maximum of four years, with a further
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two years where water depths exceeded 200 metres.
	
Exploitation
licences were for a maximum of 25 years. 	 The first licences offered
were for the Gulf of Thermaikos, and for the area between Corfu and the
Peloponnese.	 Indications of oil were found in the Gulf of Thermaikos
and in the straits between Corfu and Leukas in 1975, but although the
Greek Government encouraged the exploration of large areas of the
Aegean and southern Ionian Seas, it was largely frustrated by the
results.3°
Meanwhile, Oceanic retained 426 000 acres of its original 1970
concession, and indicated that it hoped production of the Prinos field,
which lies 16 kilometres south-east of Kavalla and covers 23 000 acres,
would begin by mid-1978.	 Initial forecasts of reserves were, however,
grossly over-optimistic, with further exploration wells determining
that the field was divided into two zones, one of which was declared
non-commercial.
In late 1979, the first development well in the Prinos field was
tested at rates of 4 500-4 700 b/d from each of four zones. The second
(Beta 14) also encountered hydrocarbons from four zones below 8 240
feet, two of which flowed at rates of 4 210 and 4 550 b/d respectively.
Production estimates were revised to 25 000 b/d, and this revision of
output, combined with Oceanic's sale of its controlling interest in the
production consortium, led to delays in the field's exploitation.
Wintershall took over as operator, formed the North Aegean Petroleum
Company (NAPC) to develop the field, and began a programme of drilling
15 production and 8 injection wells. 	 However, these caused forecasts
-846-
in reserves to decrease further to 55-80 million barrels of oil and gas
liquids, with field life put at only 13-15 years. 	 Eventually, in
September 1981, production at Prinos began, but with an initial ouput
of less than 10 000 b/d.
In the meantime, in January 1978, approval was given for the South
Kavalla gasfield, discovered six years previously, to be developed in
conjunction with the Prinos oilfield, in the hope that it would
ultimately yield 10 000-12 000 b/d of natural gas liquids, and 1 000
b/d of condensates, seven wells having shown reserves to be 800 million
cu. m.
By 1983, joint production was 28 000 b/d, with Prinos alone having
produced 1.1 million tonnes of oil during 1982. 	 However, with
recoverable reserves now put at 10 million tonnes, the field's
productive life was only seven years if output was to be maintained at
this level.	 NAPC therefore sought to enlarge the Prinos field by
carrying out further exploratory drilling in its vicinity.
A discovery of low sulphur crude was made 800 metres to the west
of existing wells late in 1982, and in January 1983, a non-commercial
discovery of heavy oil was reported to the north-east. This proved to
be one of several minor discoveries made in the area, none of which
were large enough to warrant development; and with the downturn in oil
prices during 1986 it was feared production at the Prinos 'field might
cease.	 However, assurances were given that production was still
economically viable, with output remaining at 25 000 b/d. 	 Meanwhile,
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annual output from the Kavalla gas field was modest, at 65 billion
Most significantly the discovery of the Prinos oil and Kavalla gas
fields fuelled the dispute between Greece and Turkey concerning the
Aegean continental shelf by encouraging exploration activity in the
disputed waters, although this ceased almost immediately with the
threat of military conflict.	 The moratorium on exploration activity
which has existed since 1976 is, however, only one reason why
exploration of the Aegean Sea has been limited, for it is has also been
hindered by "the mediocre geological prospects which promise meagre
results."' In this respect, Greece has suffered more than Turkey, for
being a country heavily dependent on oil imports, any potential source
of hydrocarbons, however small, seems worth investigating.
Consequently, in 1977, DEP announced plans to concentrate its
activities on the geophysical surveying of estuaries and near offshore
areas.	 Targeted areas included the Gulf of Patras, Amvrakia, Messinia
and Laconia on the Ionian coast, and the Gulfs of Nestos and Syngitikos
in the northern Aegean. 	 Subsequently, Rompetrol drilled three dry
wells north-east of Prinos, in the Nestos River estuary, before, in
1979, attention was switched to the Ionian Sea. 	 Exploration began in
the areas between Corfu and Paxoi Island, east of Keffalinia Island,
and off Katakolon; whilst Wodeco drilled two wells in the Parga area,
(one of which found gas), and one in the Gulf of Patras.
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A new government in 1980 brought plans f6r an intensified search
of the Greek seabed. Foreign companies were invited to search off the
islands of Paxoi, Andipaxoi, and Levkas in the northern Ionian Sea; off
the south-eastern Peloponnese in the Mirtoan Sea; off southern Crete;
and in the Nestos river estuary near the Prinos oilfield. At the same
time, DEP's budget was increased, under instructions to intensify its
exploration efforts in several offshore areas, including the Gulfs of
Patras and Kyparissia, and off the islands of Zarinthos and Keffalinia.
Exploration was also to take place to the north-west of Corfu and in
the River Evros estuary, (close to the borders with Albania and Turkey
respectively), and off western Epirus. 	 In addition, a two-year
drilling programme was initiated for the Ionian Sea where seismic and
other tests had indicated oil prospects in relatively shallow waters.
The response from foreign companies to the offer of new
concessions, however, was disappointing. 	 Only one was awarded for a
1 300 square kilometre area on and around Paxoi and Andipaxoi, other
companies being deterred by the poor quality of seismic data offered,
and unsuitable contractual provisions. 	 Furthermore, late in 1981, the
Greek Government refused to ratify a tentative agreement made between
Its predecessor and a Shell subsidiary to conduct seismic tests and
test drilling in the Gulf of Thermaikos, preferring to reserve the area
for DEP, which had announced a gas find with a well drilled about a
mile off Katakolon. Initial reports suggested reserves of . at least 100
billion cu.ft., two or three times that estimated for the Kavalla gas
field; and in 1982, an oil discovery was reported from the same
location.
	
However, subsequent tests indicated non-commercial reserves
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of around 1 million barrels, and the drilli-ng effort was moved
northwards to drill between Killini and the island of Zante, and off
Keffalinia.
There were further setbacks in September 1983, when Agip abandoned
its drilling effort off Paxoi Island, partly because of alleged moves
by DEP to increase its stake in the event of a commercial find, and
partly because of a weak and unstable market price for oil.
Nevertheless, DEP, confident that this area off the coast of Epirus was
oil rich, and more concerned with successful finds than cost
considerations, drilled a further well, but without success.
Exploration of the Greek offshore, largely concentrated in
nearshore areas, has, therefore, brought little commercial success.
Gas production from the Kavalla field is negligible, and the only
offshore oil source is the Prinos field, which is expected to have a
short production life.	 Vast areas of the Greek offshore remain to be
explored, even allowing for the areas closed off by the Aegean dispute,
but as with Yugoslavia, the incentives to explore deeper waters are not
great, given the lack of success closer inshore.	 Nevertheless, in
1986, DEP denied any reports of a slowdown in exploration effort,
although such a slowdown would not be surprising given the unsuccessful
returns on exploration investment.
Turkey 
we'
Although Turkey's State company TPAO holds concessions for areas
up to the median line between Greek and Turkish mainlands, the Aegean
dispute frustrates exploration beyond the territorial sea limit. Thus,
Turkey's offshore exploration effort has to be concentrated on areas
lying off its southern and eastern coasts, rather than in the disputed
Aegean.
In the Gulf of Iskenderun there is significant continental shelf
development, and this led TPAO to carry out a seismic survey there in
the late 1960s.
	
Gulf and TPAO agreed to exploit jointly adjacent
concessions in the area, and drilling of the first of their three wells
began in April 1970, in the knowledge that the only previous well
drilled in this area, in 1966, had been dry.
	 No finds were reported,
but in September 1979 the Swedish Salen group obtained a license to
explore the Gulf with TPAO. A seismic survey was carried out, but no
drilling had taken place by the time Agip successfully acquired the
majority interest in the 4 500 square kilometre concession in 1981. It
quickly announced plans to begin drilling by September of that year,
and by November, a high quality oil find was announced, although this
proved to be non-commercial. Nevertheless, it indicated that the area
could be a promising one to exploit.
In the Aegean, exploration has been largely confined to the Gulf
of Saros. As early as 1972, Ashland Oil received licenses that covered
a total offshore area of 368 500 acres, and in 1983 six U. S.
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independents joined TPAO in a joint venture in the same area. 	 This
•••
interest appears to have been stimulated both by the production of gas
from onshore Thrace, and by the favourable terms of a new petroleum law
issued in 1983. Indeed, the new legislation led to Amoco being awarded
five on- and offshore blocks along Turkey's Aegean coast, where the
geology was thought to be similar to that in which Greece's Prinos
oilfield had been discovered.
As to other concessions awarded by the Turkish Government: a
consortium led by Union Texas drilled a 10 000 foot wildcat in 1978, 25
miles off Izmir in the Aegean; and Turkish Shell was awarded eight
blocks in August 1976, although it appears its seismic surveys were not
promising enough to prompt drilling activity. A map of Mediterranean
concessions produced by Offshore in 1980, also indicated that extensive
areas off Turkey's southern and eastern coasts from the Gulf of Adalia
(Antalya) to near the Syrian border had been granted to TPAO, but
nothing else is known of these concessions.
Turkey's need for oil is great: in 1985, only one-sixth of its
consumption came from onshore oilfields, and about half of Turkey's
import payments are expended on 011. 32	However, the prospects for
offshore sources of hydrocarbons are dim, 3 and no finds have been made
as yet.	 Even in the unlikely event of the Aegean dispute being
resolved, any finds are likely to be small and difficult to exploit,
given the fragmented nature of the Aegean seabed.
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Cyprus 
The Yugoslav State company Naftaplin began exploratory drilling
off Cyprus in 1969 on leases held by Forest Oil; and in 1970, Oxoco
acquired offshore exploration rights for just over 1 million acres,
where it planned a geophysical survey.	 Exploration of the Cypriot
offshore was, however, halted by the Turkish invasion in 1974, and
political circumstances would seem to militate against further offshore
exploration in the foreseeable future, particularly as the Cypriot
offshore is not regarded as a promising area for hydrocarbon
discoveries.34
Similarly poor prospects are forecast for the Syrian offshore,
although, despite some denials to the contrary, 35 offshore permits have
been issued. For example, an American group, with Tripco as operator,
were awarded a production sharing service contract covering 4 500
square kilometres offshore in 1975.	 By 1977, however, the lack of
commercial success had prompted some concession areas to be handed back
to the Syrian Government.
Lebanon 
The Lebanese offshore does not appear promising for hydrocarbon
formation and accumulation. 36 If oil or gas are to be found, rocks of
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pre Jurassic age s pem the mowt likely sources, but these predictions
have never been tested, as there has been no offshore exploration.
In the early 1970s foreign companies made offers to explore the
Lebanese offshore, but were not awarded permits.	 In 1975, the
Government invited bids for offshore exploration rights, but the onset
of civil war prevented any further action being taken. 	 The deadline
for bids to be received was postponed indefinitely, and until political




By 1977, Belco had eight on- and offshore concessions along the
Israeli coast from the Lebanese border to approximately 60 kilometres
north of Tel Aviv.	 In the period 1970-1971, it drilled six wells off
Ashdod, Haifa and Nathanya, but found no commercial oil.
In 1975, West Germany's Fed-Oil joined Belco in searching off the
Israeli coast, and in 1977, Israel's own company, Oil Exploration, was
employing the drillship "Wingate" in Mediterranean exploration.
A couple of gas finds were discovered off the coast of Gaza, one
of which, Sadot, was due onstream in 1979, with an expected flow of 30-
40 million cfd from three wells. The Shikma-1 wildcat also tested 18
million cfd from the same area, leading to the drilling of two more




oil was found at Ga'ash, north of Tel Aviv, but_as with several other
"finds" it was no more than a case of hydrocarbon "shows."
Nevertheless, this find stimulated a renewed interest in the Israeli
offshore.
In 1983, Coseka Resources announced an oil search off the Israeli
coast, but in March, Horizon Exploration began an extensive seismic
survey on behalf of the Israeli Government, which led to the suspension
of other exploration activity.	 Subsequently, in 1984, the Government
announced that up to 23 000 square kilometres of concessions would be
offered for bids, as a consequence of which, late in 1986, Isramco was
awarded a 1 million acre permit for the offshore between Tel Aviv and
the Egyptian border.	 However, up to 1987 there had been no
announcement of any finds from these areas.
Egypt
Egypt's most intensive offshore exploration effort has been in the
Gulf of Suez, where significant oil and gas discoveries have been made.
In the Mediterranean, exploration has been concentrated on the area
Just to the west of Port Said, where continental shelf development is
the most extensive,	 although, latterly, exploration has spread
westwards towards the Libyan border.
Exploration of the Mediterranean offshore received an early
stimulus with the discovery of the Abu Qir gasfield in 1965; a well
drilled 6 miles offshore in 43 feet of water tested 13 million cu.ft.
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of gas and 300 b/d of 58 API liquid hydrocarbons (condensate or
natural gasoline). Production of this field, lying 15 miles north-east
of Alexandria, did not begin, however, until January 1979; pine wells
had a combined output capacity of 135 million cfd of gas and 300 b/d of
condensate, with estimated recoverable reserves of 100 billion cu. ft.
of gas. In 1980, plans were outlined to double the output of the field
from 100-200 million cfd through the drilling of eight additional
wells. In the process of this developmental drilling, 1 500 b/d of oil
was discovered, which was to be evaluated by other wells. The second
phase of production was expected on stream in June 1985.
The Abu Qir success naturally encouraged exploration in nearby
areas and, in 1972, Egypt sought offers for 100 square kilometre blocks
In the Mediterranean offshore from the Nile Delta to the Libyan border.
Forty-three companies expressed an interest, with Geoquest receiving
concessions for 1 760 square kilometres north of Alexandria, and 400
square kilometres off Salloum.
	 However, by the time Epedeco had
discovered gas in very shallow water with its Abu Madi well in the Nile
Delta, Elf/Erap were committing $37.5 million to exploration of a 2 200
square kilometre concession to the north of Alexandria. In 1977, they
extended this concession by an additional 1 200 square kilometres, and
were quickly rewarded by their NAB 1 well, drilled in 1 870 feet of
water, about 30 miles north of Alexandria.
	 A second well, NAF-1,
drilled in 108 feet (33 metres) of water, 25 kilometres north-east of
Abu Qir, also found gas from two main reservoirs; their respective test
gas flows were 31.8 and 17.7 million cfd and of better quality than at
Abu Qir.
	 The shallower water depth made the NAF-1 well a better
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prospect, and further tests found 22.6 million cfd of gas and 50 b/d of
condensate from 10 080 feet, and 14 million cfd of gas and 278 b/d of
condensate from 7 740 feet. This led Egypt to describe the Nab field
as its largest gas discovery, with reserves estimated at greater than a
trillion cubic feet. However, in 1984, Elf reported that the find was
disappointing, and by 1986 the concession had been handed back.
In 1981, Mobil tested gas and condensate from two zones with its
Temsah 2 well, 28 miles offshore in its Damietta concession, where it
had made a similar find in 1977 half a mile away. 	 Mobil later
relinquished this concession, but, in early 1987, the Egyptian
Government was reported to be hoping this might still prove commercial.
Further concessions were granted in 1981 to Murphy - a 400 square
kilometre block to the west of Alexandria - and to Total - a 8 420
square kilometre concession in the Nile Delta region. 	 The same year,
IEOC found 4 600 b/d of oil with its El Tina 1 well, about 30 miles
east of Port Said, off north-west Sinai. This was the first find off
the province of Sinai, where the conflict between Egypt and Israel had
previously prevented exploration. The El Tina find seemed to confirm
Egypt's optimism for northern Sinai's offshore oil potential, although
it appeared that the oil-bearing stratum was not very deep.
Conoco drilled two wells on its Bardawil concession on- and
offshore Sinai in 1982-1983, but neither well proved successful.
However, other finds were made in this area. In 1982, Port Fuad Marine
1 found gas and condensate, and in 1983, IECO's Waker 1 well found a
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combined 442 million cfd of gas and 3 458 b/d of 49-50 API condensate
from two zones.	 This probably influenced Total Orient, who undertook
to spend £49 million over 7% years on a 2 400 square kilometre area off
northern Sinai, including the drilling of seven wells.
By the mid-1980s, the area off northern Sinai was looking
increasingly promising. Total found 5 000-10 000 b/d of oil with its
Mango 1 well, and a second well to assess the find's commercial
prospects was due for completion in early 1987. 25 million cfd of gas
was also found by IECO's Abu Daqu 1 well, drilled 53 kilometres north
of Port Said in 41 metres of water, although several companies reported
drilling difficulties in this area.
In 1986, it was announced that the Egyptian General Petroleum
Company (EGPC) was opening up the offshore area from the Libyan border
to just to the east of Alexandria, with bids to be received by 31 May
1987.	 Few wells have been drilled in this area, and thus exploration
along the entire Egyptian Mediterranean coast is likely to increase in
the future.	 This will necessitate some deep-water drilling, with its
attendant production problems, but prospects are nonetheless promising,
especially for gas.
Libya 
By Mediterranean standards, Libya has a relatively large area of
seabed in which to search for hydrocarbons. Much remains unexplored,
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but activity has been intense in the searched areas, especially since
n•••
1974.
There are three reasons for the lack of exploration.
	 Firstly,
Libya has been successful in finding both oil and gas - particularly
the former - onshore.	 Thus, unlike many other Mediterranean States,
the necessity to explore offshore has been delayed, particularly as
large onshore tracts remain untouched. Secondly, a number of foreign
companies have been dissatisfied with the economic conditions imposed
on them by Libya, leading, for example, to Exxon's withdrawal in 1982.
Finally, the continental shelf disputes with Tunisia and Malta have
hampered both exploration and production activities.	 This was
particularly the case in respect of the dispute with Tunisia, where for
a long time both States had unexploited finds in or near the disputed
area, as discussed in Chapter 7.
Interest in the boundary region was stimulated by commercial oil
and gas finds.	 Tunisia had already discovered the fields of Ashtart,
Miskar and Isis in the Gulf of Gal:4s, before, in 1976, Aquitaine Libya
found a large oilfield 100 kilometres north of Zuara, which made all
the more necessary the resolution of the boundary dispute. 	 In 1976,
the two States agreed to I.C.Y. adjudication, and pending the Court's
ruling, they agreed to prospect jointly for oil in the disputed region.
However, doubts expressed at the time as to whether there would be any
practical co-operation proved to be well-founded.
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The decision to submit the dispute to the I.C.J. was not
implemented, but instead, in January 1977, Libya commissioned ENI's
subsidiary Saipem to drill in the disputed area in the Gulf of Gabès.
,
Tunisia responded by despatching a warship to encourage the drillship
to leave the area.	 This had the desired effect, and the Italians
withdrew, despite Libyan threats to nationalise ENI's interests if it
did not quickly resume drilling operations. In May, the drillship 1.W,
Bates was sent into the disputed area, according to Tunisia - but
denied by Libya - accompanied by two warships, although Libya counter-
claimed that a Tunisian frigate had forced its drillship away.
This action seems to have been designed to demonstrate to Tunisia
that Libya would not bow to force in relinquishing its claimed rights
to the disputed continental shelf.
	 Similarly, Tunisia indicated to
Libya its determination to protect what it regarded as rightfully its
own, even to the point of risking a military confrontation, although
this sparring only served to emphasise the stalemate concerning the
boundary problem.	 However, In June, following the intervention of the
Secretary-General of the Arab League, the dispute was again submitted
to the I.C.J.	 There was no decision this time to exploit jointly the
area, and thus exploration was directed to areas outside the region of
contention until the Court's 1982 Judgement indicated the course of the
boundary.	 This decision left all known finds within the exclusive
jurisdiction of each State, and paved the way for further exploration
of the border region. However, the most significant effect of the 1982
decision was the go-ahead it gave for development of the Bouri
oilfield.
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Initially, Libya had given concessions for areas off Cyrenaica's
-
northern coast between Benghazi and the Egyptian border. For example,
in 1969, Sirtica Shell acquired blocks off Benghazi, on- and offshore
Dema and Tobruk; and Libyan Atlantic/Phillips found gas in two wells in
the Marsa el Brega area, but these were not developed. 	 In 1971,
Aquitaine-Elf found 1 080 b/d of 34 API crude with its first wildcat
on the notorious Zuara concession (Block 137) west of Tripoli, which,
although thought to be non-exploitable, bordered Tunisian concessions.
Then in 1976, in the same block, Aquitaine Libya found what the
Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) described as potentially the
largest oilfield in Libya in about 100 metres of water, about 60 miles
offshore.	 This encouraged Aquitaine to drill further wells in the
block, and although several were dry, in November 1977, the H1 well
found more than 100 b/d of oil about 30 kilometres offshore.
At the same time, Agip was interested in the potential of the
12 700 square kilometre Block NC41; and it was its attempt to drill in
this concession which led to the drillship Scarabeo IV being evicted
from disputed waters in early 1977. Work was suspended for a time, but
after the two States agreed for the second time to submit their dispute
to the I.C.I., Agip began exploratory work in the permit, away from
disputed waters, wherein it soon discovered the Bouri oilfield with one
of eight wells drilled in the period 1977-1979.
The Bouri field lies in 475 feet of water.	 With a productive
capacity of 8 million tonnes per year, it is the largest known
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petroleum reserve in the Mediterranean, with ,an estimated 7 billion
barrels. At least fifty wells were needed to develop the field, which
was expected to have an ultimate production capacity of 150 000 b/d.
Exploitation was due to begin in 1979, but development was delayed,
partly because of the boundary problem with Tunisia, and partly because
of the need to drill further wells.	 In 1984, the predicted start-up
date was 1986 or 1987.
Oil remains the major exploration interest in Libyan waters,
although both Aquitaine's undeveloped 1976 find, and the Bouri field,
were said to have associated gas finds. 	 Nevertheless, it is the
potential for oil that makes the Libyan offshore one of the
Mediterranean's most promising areas. This potential has begun to be
fulfilled.
In 1975, there was an unsubstantiated report that Aquitaine Libya
was bringing the Meheiriga field on stream at 12 000 b/d, and in 1984,
Agip confirmed an oil discovery in block MMN-120, north-west of
Benghazi, 7 miles offshore in about 200 feet of water. Reserves were
put at 765 million barrels. The find has a particular significance, as
it is the first in Libya's eastern offshore, all previous oil having
been found in western waters.
In 1985, Sirte Oil announced an oil find of 4 694 b/d from its
NC35A block off Tripoli, which complemented another good find made the
previous year.	 Rompetrol also made a discovery testing 1 800 b/d,
whilst other operators continued drilling in western waters; for
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example, Elf and Esso Sirte in block NC87, north of Agip's successful
NC41 block and near the boundary with Tunisia.
Exploration activity in the Gulf of Sirte area has, however, been
limited, although it is believed to be promising. 37 Offshore's 1980
map of Mediterranean concessions indicated that large tracts of the
western part of the Gulf had been granted to Exxon and Agip, with a few
smaller tracts to other companies, but these concessions have not been
corroborated.
The deeper offshore areas have also yet to be explored, with the
resolution of the dispute with Malta not, as yet, having been followed
by any Libyan exploration of the formerly disputed seabed.
Undoubtedly, this area will be explored in the future.
Tunisia 
After Italy, the Tunisian offshore has been the most extensively
and intensively explored in the Mediterranean. Indeed, because of its
smaller size, it is probably the most intensively explored per square
kilometre, with the only relatively undisturbed area being that near
the Algerian border.
Exploration of the Tunisian continental shelf began in the late
1960s.	 Petroper drilled a deep dry well off Cap Bon in the Gulf of
Hammamet in 1967, and Aquitaine found gas shows in the same year with
wells drilled on its Gulf of Gabés permit, which was extended in 1968
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to adjoin the Libyan Zuara concession, held- by the same company.
Aquitaine also received a further 1 600 square kilometre permit along
the Gulf of Gabes; CFP were granted the intervening permit 'for the area
between Sfax and the Kerkennah Islands. 	 A 7 032 square kilometre
concession also existed for the Gulf of Hammamet; and in 1970, two
concessions were granted for 2 924 square kilometres in the Gulf of
Tunis between Bizerta and Cap Bon, and 6 564 square kilometres between
Gabes and the island of Djerba. Further permits were granted in 1971
to cover areas from the Algerian border to the Gulf of Tunis, and from
Cap Bon into the Gulf of Hammamet. Thus, by the early 1970s much of
the Tunisian offshore was being actively explored.
As a result of this activity, the most significant find was that
of the Ashtart oilfield in August 1971. Aquitaine's Ashtart I well in
the Gulf of Gabes was drilled 50 miles (80 kilometres) south-east of
Sfax in 70 metres of water, and tested 1 500 b/d (240 cu. m.) per day of
30° API oil.
	
A second well confirmed a commercial discovery, and in
November, Aquitaine announced plans to develop the field at 1 million
tons per year by 1973. 	 Production duly began late in 1973, at an
Initial rate of only 24 000 b/d, reserves being estimated at 40 million
tons. By the end of 1975 production was 2-3 million tonnes, with peak
production of 2-5 million tonnes predicted for 1979. 	 Eighteen wells
had been drilled on the field by 1977, and with reserves estimated in
1977 at 103 million tonnes, economic exploitation until 1990 seemed
possible. However, production peaked in 1979 at around the 50 000 b/d
mark, after which decline set in, so that, at the end of the 1981, over
half of the field's estimated recoverable reserves had been exploited.
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Despite efforts to maintain production at gi high level, output
continued to fall, and new production wells had to be drilled to
increase output to 30 000 b/d for the latter half of the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the discovery of the Ashtart field clearly
encouraged companies to exploit the Tunisian offshore. 	 In 1972, a
Franco-Italian consortium was awarded a 6 000 square kilometre permit
south-east of Gabês; and to its north, Agip/Amoco/CFP received a four
year concession for 18 000 square kilometres. 	 Three small American
companies were granted a permit for 750 square miles to the east of
Monastir, around the Kuriate Islands; whilst, in 1973, three Canadian
companies were allocated an area of 1 276 square kilometres in the Gulf
of Hammamet. In addition, Shell was given five years to explore 13 284
square kilometres in the north-eastern part of this Gulf; and Buttes
Resources extended its Bizerta and Cap Bon concessions.
Success came relatively quickly. In 1975, the Miskar gasfield was
discovered in the Gulf of Gabès, 40 kilometres to the east of the
Ashtart oil field, and about 100 miles offshore. The field was small,
with reserves estimated at only 60 000 million cu. m., but was regarded
as commercial, partly due to its proximity to Ashtart, and partly
because of the Government's desire to build up industry around the Gulf
of Gabês.	 However, its exploitation soon ran into problems, with its
planned production promised but not fulfilled. In 1979, development of
the field was halted, publicly because of the failure of Miskar 5 to
find gas like previous wells drilled on the field, although there were
also rumours of financial problems. 	 The 1981 start-up date was
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indefinitely postponed, and reserves were re-estimated at 30 000
..
million cu. m., reducing the envisaged production rate from 2 000/2 500
to 1 700 million cu. m. per year. In 1984, development of the Miskar
,
field was not envisaged until the 1990s, and attention was drawn to the
presence of nitrogen and carbon dioxide comprising a third of the
field's reserves.	 The field, nevertheless, remains exploitable in
principle.
The history of the Isis oilfield has some parallels with that of
Miskar.	 It was discovered in 1974, some 200 kilometres (125 miles)
east of Sfax in 330 feet of water. With an output potential of 30 000
to 40 000 b/d, it was decided, in 1977, to put the field into
production.	 However, as with Miskar, development of the field became
stalled, although in Isis's case, the cause was the boundary dispute
with Tunisia.
The Isis field was only marginally exploitable, the original
discovery well having flowed only at 2 500 b/d, with reserves estimated
at only just over 100 million barrels.
	
Its development was, however,
a key part of a long-term plan to produce more oil, although the
field's location near the de facto equidistance line with Libya was
problematic; and once Agip's Scarabeo IV drillship had been evicted by
Libya from disputed waters, Total declined to continue its development
work until the I.C.I. had ruled on the boundary. 	 This was a
significant setback, and meant that Tunisia was more hampered by the
boundary dispute than Libya, the development of whose Bouri oilfield
was only partially delayed by the dispute.
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The apparent resolution of the boundary problem in 1982 left the
Isis field clearly in Tunisian waters, and appeared to give the go-
ahead for development. However, in May 1983, Total announced that, in
light of the failure of Tunisia and Libya to delimit their continental
shelf boundary in accordance with the I.C.J.'s ruling, development of
the Isis field would have to await formal delimitation. Despite this
it drilled a fourth well on the field in 1984, which duly found oil,
and thus appraisal work was begun.
	 The subsequent decision of the
I.C.J. in 1985 not to entertain Tunisia's request for clarifications
and amendments to its previous Judgement, would therefore appear to
confirm the development of the Isis field. 	 Indeed, early in 1987,
Shell took over from Total as operator on the Mann Centre Oriental
permit, announcing consideration of the exploitation of the Isis field,
Including the possibility of a fifth well being drilled.
Tunisia has had other oil and gas finds, some, but not all, with
as chequered histories as Isis and Miskar. Aquitaine Tunisia found oil
with its Didon 1 hole, 80 kilometres offshore in the Gulf of Gabs in
1976.	 The well, lying in 70 metres of water, flowed nearly 3 000 b/d,
and in 1980, a development feasibility study was undertaken.
	 This
showed that the field was commercial, although its location in waters
also claimed by Libya was problematic. The I.C.J. ruling in 1982, left
Didon within Tunisian waters, but it is not known whether the field has
been developed.
In June 1976, Buttes Gas and Oil tested 1 790 b/d from its Jasmine
1 well in the Gulf of Hammamet, about 40 miles offshore between Cap Bon
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and Pantellaria, in approximately 460 feet of water. 	 A second well a
mile away in 540 feet of water found 1 800 bid of 44 . API crude, but
from a different zone.	 However, the appraisal well failed to confirm
the viability of the original find, and a subsequent well, Mimosa I,
three miles south-west of Jasmine I, was abandoned dry, except for gas
shows.
In 1977, Elf-Aquitaine's Halk-el-Menzel I well in the Gulf of
Hammamet tested both oil and gas; and in 1980, an exploitation
concession was granted for this field, which lies in 85 metres of
water.	 Four wells have been drilled, but by the mid-1980s there had
been no subsequent efforts at exploitation of what is believed to be
about 1 million tonnes of "fairly heavy" oil reserves.
Nevertheless, this appeared to instill new interest in the Gulf of
Hammamet area.	 During 1979, BP became the operator of the Cap Bon
permit, although Buttes retained an interest in the area by acquiring
the neighbouring Enfida permit. 	 Shell-Tunirex was also active in the
area, drilling in its Hammamet Grands Fonds permit, where both of its
Pirsa wells found oil.	 Agip also found a reportedly significant oil
field with the Oudna NI well in the Gulf area. However, the future of
the Birsa and Oudna fields was less assured.	 Shell was reportedly
drilling on the Oudna structure in 1986, in an attempt to assess its
future, but there were no plans to drill further on the Birsa field.
Towards the close of the 1970s a feasibility study had commenced, but
the discovery of the Tazerka field in January 1980 led Shell to change
its priorities.
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The latter field lies 56 kilometres off Cap Bon and south-east of
Pantellaria in 1 000-2 000 metres of water, clOse to the continental
shelf boundary with Italy. 	 It is a small field of only 8-10 million
barrels; production began in 1982, but declined almost immediately in
line with a predicted field life of only five years.
Additional oil finds were made, however, in the Gulf of Hammamet
in the 1980s, Elf Aquitaine found 41 API oil with its South Cosmos I
well in 1983,	 drilled 50 kilometres offshore in its Gulf of
Hammamet/Cap Bon permit. This tapped three reservoirs which flowed at
rates between of 1 700 and 2 200 b/d. The find was quickly declared
commercial and, in 1984, further oil was found with a well drilled 800
metres to the east, resulting in an application for an exploitation
permit.
The effect of these finds in the Gulf of Hammamet was, however, to
divert attention away from the Gulf of Gabs, where the Ashtart and
Isis fields had been found in the early 1970s,
	
The boundary dispute
with Libya also probably discouraged exploration of the latter area,
and during the late 1970s most activity was concentrated on the Gulf of
Hammamet.	 Nevertheless, in 1979, Cities Service acquired the 210
square mile Gabès Septentrional East block, and Marathon, the 925
square mile Gabès Septentrional Ouest block. The granting of these two
blocks east of the Kerkennah Islands, was intended to maintain interest
in the Gulf of Gabès region and, in 1981, Total, Agip and Etap took on
the 8 732 square kilometre on- and offshore Sfax-Kerkennah permit.
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They reported a good flow of oil from the Mahores I well, but there
have been no further reports of development.
In 1982, Marathon found a total of 4 417 b/d of oil, 2 610 b/d of
condensate, and 4.3 million cfd of gas from four zones with its El-
Biban I well, situated 11 miles offshore and 96 miles south-east of
Sfax. However, by 1984, the future of the field had been declared
doubtful, although six tests at separate intervals had found oil or
condensate with gas. Several wells were drilled and an exploitation
permit granted, but by 1986 it appeared the reservoir was mainly gas-
oriented.
In 1987, Marathon's Ezzaouia 2 well drilled 4 miles north-west of
Zarsis, gave a combined output of 10 465 b/d of 41-42 API oil from
three tests, an exceptional flow by Tunisian standards. The field is
rated commercial, and appears compensation for the disappointment of
its El Biban find in the same area.
Marathon had also found gas in this permit in 1977, but the Bregat
1 well, drilled 33 miles south-east of Nerba, was abandoned, having
flowed over 30 million cfd of gas, but this contained relatively large
volumes of carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphide, which militated
against its development.
It proved to be one of several gas finds made in Tunisian waters,
although only Miskar has been of commercial value. Three "important"
finds were reported in the early 1970s, with combined reserves
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estimated at 50 billion cu. m., and a productive capacity of 3.5 billion
cu. m. per year. The largest of these was Hasdrubal near Ashtart, which
was believed to have reserves of 31 billion cu. m. 	 A second field,
containing about 11 billion cu. m. lay off Zarsis, whilst the third,
between the two, had reserves of approximately 10 billion cu. m. None
of these fields was, however, exploited.
Similarly, in 1974, Softrarep found gas with the Elyssa 1 well
about 40 miles south of Miskar, in the vicinity of the disputed
boundary with Libya.	 Nothing has come of this discovery, nor of the
Jugurtha gas find made in 1982. Half of Jugurtha's reserves is made up
of nitrogen and carbon dioxide, making the gas of poor quality;
nevertheless, the field, which lies about 25 kilometres north-east of
Ashtart, is described as commercially exploitable, although production
was unlikely to take place before the 1990s,
Exploitation of the Tunisian offshore is, therefore, best summed
by this 1977 statement:
"Seismic work has identified a number of potentially hydrocarbon
bearing structures offshore Tunisia, although most appear to be of
medium to small size. This makes them difficult to identify and
also difficult to produce commercially, if they prove to be oil
bearing."39
The wisdom of these words has been borne out by the number of small
fields which currently lie dormant.	 As a response, in 1986, the
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Tunisian Government announced a new law -to govern hydrocarbon
operations.	 This established special provisions for oil and gas
exploration and exploitation, in the hope that these would stimulate
exploration and speed up the development of existing undeveloped fields
and future discoveries. 	 Previously, less than generous development
terms had discouraged exploitation of small and medium-sized fields,
and in turn deterred new foreign participation in the Tunisian
offshore.	 The new law simplified the procedure for obtaining permits,
provided special incentives for gas development, and created a more
liberal tax regime.
Although some concessions have changed hands several times, there
is still considerable interest in the Tunisian offshore. By 1982, 85
exploratory wells had been drilled, 39 and many more have been drilled
since.	 The Gulfs of Hammamet and Gabes have already proved their
hydrocarbon potential, but no finds have yet been reported from the
Gulf of Tunis westwards, where exploration has still to reach
significant levels. The settlement of the boundary dispute with Libya,
(which left part of Sepeg's eastern Gulf of Gabes block under Libyan
control), has not prompted the expected surge of activity in the border
region, although, in 1983, exploration permits were given to Natomas
and Marathon for the Gabes Meridional and Zarsis blocks respectively.
Similarly, in 1984, a four-year permit was granted for a 400 square
kilometre area in the region of the Sidon and Elyssa finds. Further
permits were issued in 1985 for the Gulf of Gabes region for a 3 808
square kilometre area east of Mandia; and, in 1987, INA-Naftaplin
agreed to drill two wells in Conoco's 3 280 square kilometres Gabes
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Quest permit.	 An additional 1 920 square kilometre concession was
Rt.'
granted to Springfield Oil Services in 1985 for the Cap Bon concession.
Consequently, there is every indication that exploration activity
will intensify, as Tunisian oil production falls while domestic demand
increases.	 In the mid-1980s, oil represented 40 per cent of Tunisia's
export earnings, and the search for new oil and gas reservoirs was a
priority, which the 1986 legislation was designed to stimulate.
Algeria 
By contrast with its eastern neighbour, the Algerian offshore has
been virtually unexplored. Part of the reason for this is the success
of onshore exploration. However, offshore prospects are not promising.
The continental shelf is virtually non-existent, making the Algerian
offshore very deep, and the geology of the seabed is not regarded as
favourable for hydrocarbon accummulation, thereby discouraging its
exploration. 40
Of the exploration which has occurred, the first offshore well
(Habibas I) was drilled in deep water in 1977 by Total Algdrie, 115
kilometres off Oran, in a 50 000 square kilometre area acquired in July
1976. It proved to be dry. Total also acquired three narrow stretches
of the Algerian offshore during 1977, one of 5 195 square kilometres
covering the West Marine area, but no more drilling has been reported,
and there are no indications that it will resume in the near future.
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Morocco 	 4-•
The Moroccan Mediterranean offshore is also relatively unexplored,
Morocco preferring to concentrate its offshore activity off its
Atlantic coast.	 Esso was reported to be conducting drilling in the
Mediterranean in about 600 feet of water in 1972; and, in 1973,
negotiations began for exploration agreements.	 Concessions were
awarded to Anarep, the State company, and Chevron, but the latter
relinquished its concession in 1978.	 Amoco acquired a 10 000 square
kilometre concession in 1982, and announced it would drill east of
Tetouan on completion of its seismic work in 1983. The well, Nador I,
was duly drilled 20 miles (32 kilometres) offshore, just to the west of
the Algerian border, in 800 feet of water, but proved to be dry, as did
Amoco's second well, El Iebha I, drilled 33 miles north-west of
Hoc iema.
These failures would appear to confirm the low hydrocarbon
potential of Morocco's Mediterranean offshore, 4  although exploration
of this area may increase as Morocco's onshore reserves are minimal,
and exploration off	 its Atlantic coast has been similarly
disappointing.
Seabed Minerals 
The above survey confirms that with one or two notable exceptions,
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons from the Mediterranean has
been limited. Whether an upturn in oil prices will encourage States to
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explore the deep waters lying off their coasts is not known, but
clearly, at present, there is no great motivation for continental shelf
boundary agreements to be concluded between neighbouring Mediterranean
States.
There is, however, increasing commercial interest in a variety of
seabed minerals found in the Mediterranean, with several of its
bordering States (e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia,
and Turkey), plus the E.G., having undertaken research initiatives.4:2
The minerals	 involved include placer deposits, 	 metal-bearing
aggregates, metalliferous muds, and evaporites, and may have some
bearing on future continental shelf boundary delimitations, although
large-scale exploitation is unlikely in the near future, largely
because prices on the international market do not warrant it.43
(a) Placer Deposits 
Placer deposits, notably of chrome, are found in coastal
locations, where the weathered products of metal-bearing rocks have
been washed out to sea, e. g. in the central and southern Aegean.
Placers are mined along the coast of the Nile Delta, where iron, tin,
zirconium, titanium and monazite, are derived from the mineral sands
washed down by the Nile, but there are no reports of any other mining
of placers in the Mediterranean, despite the fact that they are known
to exist quite widely.
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The most important of these placers are those of iron along the
west coast of Italy, the north-east coast of Greece, the north coast of
Tunisia, and off Algeria; of titanium off the east coast of Corsica and
the north-east coast of Greece; and of chromite off the Greek and
Yugoslavian coasts, the north coast of Albania, the west coast of
Turkey and the north-east coast of Cyprus. In addition, the
continental shelf of Sardinia appears promising with respect to rutile,
titano-magnetites, ilmenite, zircon, cassiterite, monazite and cobalt,
whilst phosphates are found on the continental shelves of Malta, Spain,
Italy, and the Maghreb States."
In all cases, the deposits lie close inshore, and could only be
significant with respect to adjacent State delimitations. However,
boundary disputes concerning placer deposits seem highly unlikely,
because such deposits are not sufficiently extensive or commercially
valuable.4s
(b) Metal-Bearing Aggregates and Crusts 
Unlike many of the world's oceans the high rates of sedimentation
in the Mediterranean have not allowed the formation of anese
nodules. Nevertheless, geologists have become interested in the metal-
bearing aggregates and crusts associated with submarine volcanoes off
Sicily and in the Aegean, which, because they lie in relatively shallow
water (500-1 500 metres), and many close to shore, have been regarded
as a potential source of "industrially interesting" raw materials.46
These metal-bearing crusts mainly contain iron and manganese deposits,
-876-
with up to 48 per cent manganese in the Tyrrhenian Sea, and between 20
and 40 per cent iron content in the Aegean.	 The relatively small
amounts of manganese appear to militate against commercial recovery,
although Brambati suggests that the quantity of iron and manganese
found in the shallow waters off the Eolie Islands has raised hopes of
recovering nickel, cobalt and copper.47
As to the effect of metal-bearing aggregates and crusts upon
boundary delimitation, there is no reason to disagree with Blake's
conclusion that "surprisingly few potential disputes seem likely,"
owing to the location of the source volcanoes in non-contentious
locations.49
(c) Metalliferous Muds 
Metalliferous muds contain potential supplies of silver, lead,
copper, gold, cadmium and cobalt. The most promising areas lie south
of Rhodes and Crete, off Cyprus, and in the Aegean, mainly, but not
exclusively, in Greek waters.	 Nevertheless, the fact that the
commercial exploitation of these muds seems a remote possibility,
combined with their non-contentious location, makes boundary disputes
concerning these deposits unlikely.49
(d) Evaporites 
Evaporites are found in the Mediteranean seabed in large
quantities, and include rock salt, sulphur, and potash. They lie up to
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3 000 feet thick in places, but commercial exploitation is not yet
possible,
	 partly	 because
	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 underwater
eiploitation, and partly because they are overlain by thick marine
sediments.	 Moreover, land-based sources of these evaporites are
plentiful, e.g. in Sicily, where they are mined as the basic raw
material for the chemical industry.
	 Nevertheless, they have a long-
term potential, which may or may not influence boundary delimitation,
if at a very low level.°
Conclusions 
The above survey of exploration activity in the Mediterranean
offshore helps to explain why so few continental shelf boundaries, in
particular, have been delimited in the Mediterranean.
	 Narrow
continental shelves combined with limited, and technically difficult,
drilling activity, mean that much of the Mediterranean offshore remains
undisturbed, thereby removing the need for boundary delimitations to
determine respective States' rights of jurisdiction.
	 However, the
Tunisia-Libya and Libya-Malta disputes provide evidence that given the
right geological conditions, the prospects of hydrocarbon exploitation
in seabed areas which may be claimed by more than one State are a
powerful motivation for maritime boundary delimitations.
	 It is,
therefore, to be expected that such delimitations will be required at
some point in the future, if not in the next 10-20 years.
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APPENDIX 2 - GREECE-TURKEY: THE AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY 
DISPUTE 
The Legal Basis of the Dispute 
The facts of the Aegean continental shelf dispute are well-known:
the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 and the Peace Treaty of Paris of
10 February 1947, left Greece in possession of over 3 000 islands and
islets, and Turkey just the islands of Imroz (G8kceada) and Tenedos
(Bozca Ada), plus the Rabbit Islands.'
Under Article 1(b) of the Continental Shelf Convention, (signed by
Greece but not by Turkey), there is "no distinction whatsoever between
the continental and insular components of a state with regard to a
continental shelf." 2	 Therefore, Greece claims that a median line
delimits its boundary with Turkey, relying also on Article 6(1) of that
Convention, and the view of the I.C.J. that a median line delimitation
between opposite States usually results in an equitable division.3
Turkey, on the other hand, does not support full continental shelf
rights for the Greek islands because of the Aegean's special
circumstances as a semi-enclosed sea.
	 In particular, the fact that
many of these islands lie less than 12 miles from the Turkish coast
would mean that Turkey would be restricted to a a small strip of seabed
along its eastern shore, thereby completing a Greek stranglehold on the
Sea, which it regards as Inequitable. 4	 Instead, it relies on the
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natural prolongation aspects of the definition of the continental shelf
found in both the Continental Shelf and 1982 Conventions, together with
the dicta of the I.C.I. in the North Sea Cases, to argue that because
the natural prolongation of the Turkish land mass extends at least as
far as the median line drawn between the two mainlands, this should be
the Aegean continental shelf boundary.E.
This, therefore, would seem to deny the sovereignty of Greece over
those islands which fall on the Turkish side of the boundary, but
Turkey maintains these islands are "natural protuberances" from the
Turkish continental shelf and that any claims made from them cannot
supersede the natural 	 prolongation of the Turkish mainland:
consequently, the Greek islands have no shelves of their own, 6 but
should be limited to no more than their six mile territorial seas.7
Greece, however, denies that the Aegean continental shelf is the
natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland, and claims that geology
supports the view that the shelf is the natural prolongation of its
mainland and islands. 	 Hence, there is no Turkish continental shelf
west of the Aegean islands.'
Turkey nevertheless invokes its historical assertions of
sovereignty over the eastern Aegean islands as proof of its rights over
at least half of the Aegean. 	 In its view, the Aegean is of strategic,
political, and economic importance for both States, and because,
historically, its resources have been shared by the peoples of both the
Anatolian and Greek peninsulas, '° the same principle of equal sharing
should apply to the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf."
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Greece, however, argues that history supports the view that the Aegean
is the cradle of Hellenism, both nationally and culturally. 	 It denies
that Turkish occupation of the Aegean's islands was ever accompanied by
the acquisition of sovereign titles, whether historical, ethnological
or cultural, 17 and emphasises that the islands form a "political
continuity" with the Greek mainland."
Finally, Turkey argues that because Greece's Aegean islands have a
total area of less than 5 000 square kilometres and a population of
300 000, they cannot be entitled to a larger share of the continental
shelf than Turkey, whose Aegean coast comprises a much larger area and
a population of ten million. 14 Greek sources claim, however, that the
islands cover an area of 17 500 square kilometres, with a population of
at least 1% million. 16 They also stress the vital economic importance
of these islands, particularly for tourism, but also for fishing and
agriculture, and maintain that they must be seen as closely linked to
the Greek mainland, together forming a seaspace of strategic importance
and defensive necessity for Greece.'6
The U.N. Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III 
Further evidence of the States' legal positions were provided at
the U.N. Seabed Committee and at UNCLOS III.
	
At the former, Turkey
attempted to delete, jointly with Tunisia, paragraph (b) of a draft
article on the rêgime of the continental shelf submitted by Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela, which recognised the entitlement of islands to a
continental shelf.'' It also sought to gain support for draft articles
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on the regime of islands'''' that could have had %he effect of denying a
continental shelf to all Greek islands lying east of the notional
median line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands.
	 For example,
Article 1 of these provided that:
"Maritime spaces of islands shall be determined according to
equitable principles taking into account all relevant factors and
circumstances including inter alia:
(a) the size of the islands;
(b) the population or absence thereof;
(c) their contiguity to the principal territory;
(d) whether or not they are situated on the continental shelf of
another territory;
(e) their	 geological	 and geomorphological	 structure and
configuration."*9
Greece, on the other hand, reinforced its negotiating position by
submitting a draft article on the regime of islands which read:
"An island forms an integral part of the territory of the State to
which it belongs.	 The territorial sovereignty over the island
extends to its territorial waters, to the air space over the
island and its territorial sea to its seabed and subsoil and to
its continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting
its natural resources."2°
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These contrasting positions were maintained at UNCLOS III, where
Turkey's draft articles on the regime of islands contained the
following provisions:
"An island situated in the economic zone or the continental shelf
of other States shall have no economic zone or continental shelf
its own if it does not contain at least one-tenth of the land area
and population of the State to which it belongs.
Islands without economic life and situated outside the territorial
sea of a State shall have no marine space of their own.
Rocks and low-tide elevations shall have no marine space of their
own.
A coastal State cannot claim rights based on the concept of the
archipelago or archipelagic waters over a group of islands
situated off its coast.
In areas of semi-enclosed seas, having special geographic
characteristics,	 the maritime spaces of islands shall be
determined jointly by the States of that area."2'
By contrast, the Greek draft articles bore on the Aegean situation
in the following manner:
"The sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State extends to the
maritime zones of its islands determined and delimited in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to
its land territory.
The sovereignty over the island extends to its territorial sea, to
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the air space over the island and its territorial sea, to its sea-
bed and the subsoil thereof and to the continental shelf for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting it.
The island has a contiguous zone and an economic zone on the same
basis as the continental territory, in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention. 1122
Thus, each State sought the acceptance of draft articles framed
purely in relation to their domestic dispute: it is, therefore, not
surprising that were not regarded as having universal applicability.
The Historical Development of the Dispute 
The continental shelf dispute dates from 1 November 1973, when
Turkey announced its first Aegean exploration concessions to the State-
owned Turkish Petroleum Company (T.P.A.0.). These concessions, for the
north-eastern Aegean, were accompanied by a map which showed the
boundary of the Turkish continental shelf to lie west of Greece's
eastern Aegean islands, overlapping exploration licences granted for
both Greek mainland and island shelves since 1963.
In January 1974, commercially exploitable oil and gas were
discovered off Thasos Island in the disputed area, 	 prc=pting bc:zes
that the Aegean might be underlain by plentiful s4Flaes of
hydrocarbons. 24 Greece, therefore, issued a Note Verbale of 7 February
1974, setting out its claims to the Aegean continental shelf, in part,
to avoid acquiescence in the Turkish claim. 	 Turkey responded with a
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Note of 27 February 1974, which set out it „s claims and suggested
negotiations. 2E.
These Greece agreed to on 24 May 1974, 26 but four days later
Turkey announced that its oceanographic vessel gantarli was to make
magnetometric studies on "the Turkish continental shelf," in
preparation for oil drilling. 	 The vessel subsequently operated along
the western limit of the Turkish concessions for six days, accompanied
by 32 warships, an action protested by Greece. 27 The tension created
by this action29 was heightened on 2 July 1974, when Turkey issued
further exploration concessions in the eastern Aegean west of the Greek
islands close to the Turkish coast, 29 to be followed later in the month
by the invasion of Cyprus, which gave the Aegean dispute new
significance.
Greece responded by remilitarising her eastern Aegean islands in
contravention of the Treaties of Lausanne and Paris, and, against a
background of belligerent rhetoric, by proposing, (in a Note Verbale
dated 27 January 1975), that the two States should jointly take their
continental shelf dispute to the I.C.J. 9°	 This proposal	 was
apparently accepted by Turkey in a Note of 6 February 1975, although it
also emphasised settlement through meaningful negotiations. 9 ' However,
in April 1975, a change in Government led Turkey to advocate a
negotiated settlement; nevertheless, at a meeting in Rome in May, the
two States discussed and drafted a Special Agreement to submit jointly
the Aegean dispute to the I.C.J. 92 Subsequently, following a meeting
of the States' Prime Ministers in Brussels on 31 May, a joint
-888-
communiqué was issued in which the States agreed to speed up the work
of the legal experts preparing the agreement.
Progress was slow, however, and took place against a background of
rising tension between the States.	 In June, a hydrographic vessel
began prospecting near Greek territorial waters on behalf of a Turkish
concessionaire; and in July, Turkey established the Aegean army,
deploying it along its Anatolian coast, allegedly to defend Turkey in
the light of the remilitarisation of Greece's eastern Aegean islands.
Finally, in September, and under pressure from its Opposition, the
Turkish Government cancelled a meeting of the States' legal experts,
due to take place in Paris to draft the Special Agreement, in favour of
further negotiations to decide the principles to be applied, and the
outstanding issues to be settled, by the Court.'34
However, these proposals were overtaken when, in February 1976,
Turkey announced that the research vessel Sismik I was to prospect for
oil in disputed waters near the island of Thasos, where Greece had
discovered oil three years previously. Thus, in July, in an atmosphere
of war, Sismik I began its operations accompanied by a Turkish
minesweeper and naval aircraft. For three days in early August, Sismik
I operated on the Greek-claimed continental shelf west of Lesbos,
shadowed by the Greek navy. The incident passed off peacefully, 3s but
not before, on 10 August 1976, Greece had made three simultaneous
applications - one to the U.N. Security Council for an urgent meeting,
and two to the I.C.I. seeking Interim Measures of Protection, and
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Judgement with respect to the delimitation Of the continental shelf
between the two States.
The Greek Application to the U.N. Security Council 
In its application to the U.N. Security Council, Greece stated
that the seismological activities of the Turkish research vessel
constituted "repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign
rights of Greece in the continental shelf in the Aegean," and had
created a dangerous situation "threatening international peace and
security." °6 It also claimed that the Turkish action was designed to
"disrupt the unity of the Greek states."37
Turkey responded by denying that the actions of Sismik I were
illegal.	 Rather, in the absence of an agreed delimitation, it argued
that Greece had no sovereign rights over the area in question, which
lay outside of Greek territorial waters, and repeated its own claim to
sovereign rights where the continental shelf was the natural
prolongation of the Turkish mainland. 3e Turkey also pointed out that
Greece had remilitarised certain islands in the eastern Aegean in
contravention of the Treaties of Lausanne and Paris, and requested that
the Security Council "examine Greece's flagrant violations of its
international obligations" under these Treaties, and "take the steps
required to put an end to a threat to peace and security" in the
region.	 It further requested that the Security Council invite Greece
to enter into meaningful negotiations with a view to delimiting the
Aegean continental shelf,
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Subsequently, Security Council Resolution No. 395 of 25 August
1976, called upon the States to settle all their bilateral disputes
through negotiations, 4° inviting them to consider a judicial settlement
of the delimitation dispute, in particular, by the I.C.J. 41	It also
called upon them "to exercise the utmost restraint in the present
situation," and "to do everything in their power to reduce the present
tensions in the area so that the negotiating process may be
facilitated."42
The Greek Application for Interim Measures of Protection 
In seeking Interim Measures of Protection, Greece argued that the
Turkish action was an infringement of its continental shelf rights
under Articles 2(2) and 5(8) of the Continental Shelf Convention, which
require coastal State consent to undertake scientific research on the
continental shelf.	 No consent having been given,' Greece wished the
Court to direct that each State refrain from taking any further
military actions endangering their peaceful relations and, pending the
Court's Judgement on their respective rights, to refrain from all
exploration or scientific research of the continental shelf in dispute
between them, without the other's consent.	 In particular, Greece
argued that Turkey's grants of exploration concessions, and the
exploratory activities of Sismik I, constituted an "irreparable
prejudice" both to Greece's right to exclusive knowledge concerning its
continental shelf, and to the Court's future delimitation. 	 Turkey
should be obliged to refrain from any action that could aggravate the
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dispute, because any grant of concessions or exploration of the
continental shelf would undermine the States' "friendly" relations."
Turkey responded by denying that its activities prejudiced any of
Greece's rights over the disputed areas.
	
Alternatively, if the stated
actions were held to damage Greece's rights, compensation could be
given, and the Court's future boundary judgement would not be
prejudiced.'
In its decision of 11 September 1976, the I.C.J. found for Turkey
and denied the Greek request by a twelve to one majority. It decided
that neither the Turkish concessions nor its exploratory activities
were "creative of new rights" or deprived "the other State of any
rights to which in law it may be entitled;" and that the illegality of
Turkey's seismic activities depended on the Court's prior finding that
they were conducted in an area appertaining to Greece." Moreover,
seismic tests did not constitute physical interference with the seabed,
or an appropriation of its resources, so that the only detriment Greece
could suffer would be Turkish knowledge of the shelf's geological
properties. 47 Thus, whilst the Court accepted that:
"the alleged breach by Turkey of the exclusivity of the right
claimed by Greece to acquire information concerning the natural
resources of areas of continental shelf, if it were-established,
is one that might be capable of reparation by appropriate means
... [it was) unable to find in that alleged breach of Greece's
rights such a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights in issue
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before the Court as might require the exereise of its power under
Article 41 of the [Court's] Statute to indicate interim measures
for their preservation,"
The Ae ean Sea Continental Shelf Case 1978
In its third application, Greece asked the I.C.J. to adjudge the
course of the boundary between the two States' continental shelves, in
accordance with the principles and rules of international law which the
Court found to be applicable, submitting inter alia that, under those
rules, its islands were entitled to full continental shelf rights.49
Turkey, however, denied that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain
Greece's application, and repeated its objections to the unilateral
submission of the dispute to the I.C.J., first voiced in its Note of 30
September 1975.	 Arguing on the basis of the Court's decision in the
North Sea Cases, Turkey held that the States must first enter into
meaningful negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement, and that the
submission to the Court had to be made jointly by means of a Special
Agreement.'°
This led the I.C.J. to consider Article 36(1) of its Statute,
under which the source of its jurisdiction is the consent of the
Parties.	 In this context, the legal significance of the joint
communiqué issued by the States' Prime Ministers following their
meeting in Brussels on 31 May 1975 was crucial. This stated that the
States had decided to resolve their problems "peacefully by means of
negotiations, and as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by
-893-
the International Court at the Hague." s1	G1-eece argued that this
constituted an agreement to submit the dispute to the I.C.J., and that
It permitted unilateral referral should either State subsequently
refuse to conclude any Special Agreement required to implement the
obligation. Turkey, on the other hand, denied that this communiqué had
any legal force, and held that, in any event, it could not be
interpreted as contemplating recourse to the Court prior to the
negotiation of a Special Agreement, not least because it explicitly
referred to a future meeting of the legal experts charged with this
task .s'
In its Judgement of 19 December 1978, the I.C.J. established that
the Parties had discussed a joint submission to the Court at a previous
meeting in Rome, but that the Brussels meeting had not agreed upon such
a course of action.
	 The Court also found that the Parties had not
contemplated unilateral but only joint submission of the dispute to its
jurisdiction, and that the Brussels communiqué had explicitly referred
to a subsequent meeting of experts, thereby contemplating further
negotiations.	 Moreover,	 Turkey had always insisted upon the
negotiation of a Special Agreement, whilst, previous to the present
proceedings, Greece had not sought to argue that the communiqué alone
provided a basis for the Court's jurisdiction. ss Thus, the Court found
the communiqué did not give it a basis for jurisdiction.
However, the main basis of Greece's argument was that the Court
had jurisdiction to hear the case under Article 17 of the General Act
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on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 26 September
1928. This provided that:
"All disputes to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be
made under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent
Court of International Justice."
Greece argued that, coupled with Articles 36 and 37 of the I.C.J.
Statute, this gave the I.C.J. jurisdiction to hear such disputes; s4 but
Turkey denied that the 1928 General Act was still in force, and that
even if it was, Greece's 1931 reservation to the Act withheld the
Court's jurisdiction over:
... disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and in
particular disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece,
including disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its
ports and lines of communication,"
In Turkey's view, the present continental shelf dispute concerned
Greece's territorial status.
On this point, Greece pleaded that as the continental •shelf regime
does not give a State full territorial sovereignty, the Court's
jurisdiction could not be debarred by its reservation, and that at the
time of its reservation the reference to "territorial status" had a
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-very specific meaning limiting its application to land territory and,
therefore, did not include continental shelf boundary delimitation.
However, Turkey held that the reservation had to be interpreted
objectively, in which case "territorial status" included rights of less
than full territorial sovereignty.66
In its Judgement, the Court first rejected the very specific
meaning attributed to "territorial status" by Greece, finding the
reference to be a "generic term denoting any matters properly to be
considered as comprised within the concept of territorial status under
general international law."	 This included, therefore, "not only the
particular legal regime but the territorial integrity and the
boundaries of a State." s7 It then had to consider whether:
(i) the continental shelf is a part of a State's territory, and if so,
whether the 1928 General Act could have contemplated this possibility;
(ii) at the time of its reservation, the Greek Government could have
intended to exclude disputes relating to the continental shelf, given
that the continental shelf regime was yet to come into existence.
The answer to these questions would appear to be no in both cases.
The continental shelf is not a part of a State's territory, but simply
an area over which the coastal State has limited sovereign rights.69
Moreover, when considering the historical context of the Act and the
Greek reservation, it would seem unfair to suggest that Greece could
contemplate disputes about a legal entity not yet in existence.
However, the I.C.I. decided that as "the territorial status of Greece"
was a generic term, there was a presumption "that its meaning was
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intended to follow the evolution of the law and-to correspond with the
meaning attached to the expression by the law at any given time," for
to find otherwise would mean Greece could have no sovereign rights over
the continental shelf under the General Act of 1928. 6.9 Indeed, the
question was not so much whether continental shelf rights were
territorial rights, but whether the dispute related to the territorial
status of Greece.
Thus, having found that the term "territorial status" comprised
within its meaning "various legal conditions and relations of
territory," the Court declared that the dispute concerned not just
boundary delimitation, but also whether or not certain Greek islands
were entitled to their own continental shelf. However, even though the
delimitation of the boundary was a secondary question, the Court still
found it difficult to accept the view that "delimitation is entirely
extraneous to the notion of territorial status," finding that "any
disputed delimitation of a boundary entails some determination of
entitlement to the areas to be delimited," because 	 coastal State
entitlement to the continental shelf is derived from its sovereignty
over the land. Therefore, a dispute regarding continental shelf rights
did relate to the territorial status of Greece. s°
Consequently, given its findings on the Brussels communiqué, plus
its opinion on the continued applicability of the Greek reservation to
the 1928 General Act, the I.C.J. concluded, by a majority of twelve
votes to two, that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case,' However,
given that the Court refused to declare the Act to be still in force,
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it is difficult to see how it could uphold the continued validity of
the Greek reservation.62
Events since 1976 
In conformity with Security Council Resolution No. 395, the States
signed a declaration in Berne on 11 November 1976 agreeing to hold
sincere, detailed and confidential negotiations with a view to reaching
an agreement on the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.
Significantly, no proposals made during these negotiations were to be
used in any other context, thereby seemingly debarring recourse to
third-party arbitration. The States also undertook to refrain from any
act concerning the Aegean continental shelf which might prejudice these
negotiations, and to study State practice and international rules "with
a view to deducing certain principles and practical criteria that could
be of use in the delimitation."6'
However, subsequent developments have supported the conclusion
that this agreement reflected "outside pressure to keep the peace far
more than any move towards settlement by the two governments "64
Although	 confidential negotiations did take place, each State stuck
doggedly to its claims, wary of the other's intentions and unwilling to
concede any "territory" to the other. Indeed, the negotiations, which
"appear to have centred on technical formulae that might.somehow meet
at least part of the Turkish claim, while preserving the Greek position
with regard to islands," 6s ceased with the election of Mr. Papandreou
as Greek Prime Minister in 1981.66
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Consequently, the dispute remained dormant until 26 March 1987,
when Turkey again sent the research vessel Sismik I with a haval escort
to prospect in disputed areas, responding to what it saw as Greek plans
to violate the no drilling moratorium established in 1976, by allowing
licensees to drill in the disputed seabed off Thasos Island.
	 Greece
responded by sending her own warships to deter Turkey's planned
actions, and it was only the intervention of NATO's Secretary-General
which averted armed confrontation. Subsequently, Greece invited Turkey
to discuss drafting a Joint submission of the dispute to the I.C.T.:
the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Ozal, replied by stating that Turkey
might have to "reconsider" the question of arbitration, a course of
action it has always steadfastly opposed.
	 The respective Prime
Ministers then exchanged a series of letters concerning negotiations to
draft a Special Agreement, but this did not result in any concrete
proposals.	 Thus, the Aegean question remains open, unlikely to be
resolved until the related question of Cyprus is settled. 67
A Re-E:zamination of the Legal Basis of the Dispute 
The nub of the Turkish position is that:
"The principle asserting that the coastal State's continental
shelf is 'the natural prolongation of its land territory'
subordinates the consideration of small, offshore, or dependent
islands to that of mainland or major islands of an island or
archipelago State, in any continental shelf demarcation."
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However, the Turkish use of natural prolongation to deny Greece's
Aegean islands a continental shelf would seem now to be debarred by the
Judgements in the Anglo-French Arbitration and in the Libya-Malta Case.
In the former, the Court dismissed the argument that the Channel
Islands formed part of the Amorican structure of the French mainland as
irreconcilable with the entitlement of islands to their own continental
shelves based on the natural prolongation of their own land territory.
Thus, even if the Greek islands lie on the geological natural
prolongation of Turkey this cannot deny them their own continental
shelves, 6' More significantly, the Libya-Malta Case has made it clear
that in cases of delimitation between opposite States lying less than
400 miles apart, the entitlement to a continental shelf is based on
distance rather than natural prolongation. 	 Therefore, the Greek
islands cannot be denied a continental shelf by Turkish arguments based
on geology or geomorphology.
Turkey is also said to favour the enclave solution adopted for the
Channel Islands in the Anglo-French Arbitration, whereby the Greek
Islands would be given 6 mile enclaves of shelf rights on the Turkish
shelf, 7° coincident with their current territorial seas. However, the
sheer number of Greek islands, and their proximity to each other, makes
such a solution particularly unsuitable for the Aegean.	 The Aegean
islands stretch from coast to coast: they are not isolated near the
Turkish coast, as the Channel Islands were isolated off the French
coast, nor is there any broad geographical equality between the Turkish
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and Greek coasts, permitting a median line tntween mainlands to be
drawn as a first step.
With respect to the Greek position, Georgacopoulous points to the
fact that State practice indicates that only small and isolated islands
which have inequitable effects on equidistance line delimitations have
either been ignored, or given reduced weight in the delimitation of
continental shelf boundaries.
	 However, that same State practice, plus
the U.K.-France, Tunisia-Libya,
	 and Libya-Malta Cases, have all
evidenced that there is a difference between the entitlement of an
island to a continental shelf, and the weight to be given an island in
delimitation. Thus, although it seems fair to assume that the size and
economic life of the Greek islands distinguishes them from the "islets,
rocks and minor coastal projections," which, in the North Sea Cases,
the I.C.J. was willing to ignore in an equidistance delimitation, 71
 one
does well to remember that whilst these factors
	 may entitle the
islands to a continental shelf, it does not necessarily follow that
they will be given full effect.
	 Indeed, equidistance - whether
exclusively between mainlands or utilising islands - is not the only
means by which the Aegean continental shelf may be delimited.72
However, in the Libya-Malta Case, the I.C.J. identified as
equitable principles having a normative character, the fact that equity
did not mean equality, and that the court had no power to redress the
inequities of nature.
	 There is thus good reason to agree with
Georgacopoulous' argument that the fact that Greece has 3 000 plus
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islands compared with Turkey's two is a "natural inequality," which is
not to be remedied by equity.7'
Conclusions 
Wilson appears to conclude that an adjudicated settlement of the
dispute by the I.C.J. has been forever foreclosed by its 1978 finding
of lack of jurisdiction, 74 but this is far from so. 	 If the States are
able to formulate a joint Special Agreement to submit the dispute to
the Court, it will have the jurisdiction to hear the case. 	 However,
Turkey has always espoused a negotiated agreement as the equitable
means by which to solve the dispute.	 Since September 1975, it has
consistently - notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Ozal in 1987 -
rejected Greece's attempts to submit the dispute to the I.C.J., and
refused to accept that the two States' legal positions are so
"irreconcilable" that the dispute is not susceptible to negotiated
settlement.76
Nevertheless, a solution by bilateral agreement seems a remote
hope rather than a concrete possibility. 	 Despite the apparent
inequities, the Greek case appears faultlessly in conformity with
international law.	 Indeed, Wilson suggests that had the Turkish
Government been able to foresee how the law of the sea would evolve, it
would never have signed the Treaty of Lausanne. 77 If Greece is to be
forced into making concessions to achieve agreement, a zone of joint
economic exploitation for either part, or the whole, of the Aegean
would seem the most likely compromise solution. 79 However, because the
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dispute is not primarily one about resourtes, but rather about
political and territorial identity, any solution which does not involve
the delimitation of a boundary seems unlikely. Indeed, Greece appears
to have no intention of conceding anything that is rightfully hers"
and, therefore, if joint ownership is ruled out, a boundary must be
delimited to settle the dispute.
Four essential characteristics of such a delimitation have been
identified by Wilson:
(i) the weight given to islands in the delimitation must be less than
full effect;
(ii) the Greek islands must not be enclaved on the Turkish continental
shelf;
(iii) the delimitation must reflect the geographical relationship of
the two States to the delimitation area; and
(iv) it must be made explicit that the continental shelf rights of each
State have no effect on the "high seas" status of the superjacent
waters.°°
Based on these conditions he proposed that an equitable delimitation
would be an apportionment of the Aegean continental shelf according to
the States' respective coastal lengths, which allowed Turkey to have
"fingers" of continental shelf extending westward between but not east
of Greece's Aegean islands, thereby avoiding disrupting the political
continuity between the Greek islands and mainland.' However, although
this imaginative solution might be possible as a result of a negotiated
agre ment, no tribunal could delimit the continental shelf in this
mannet, as the method suggested has no basis in international law, the
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courts having made clear that delimitation lz not a question of
apportionment of seabed areas. 	 Moreover, a delimitation on this basis
would not reflect the geographical relationship of the two States with
respect to the area to be delimited, leaving the court open to the
accusation that it had refashioned nature.
Similarly, application of Karl's model of islands in continental
shelf boundary delimitation tends towards apportionment, and in a way
not designed to favour Greece.	 With its primary emphasis upon a
locational determination of the weight to be attached islands in
delimitation, Karl postulated that, in the northern Aegean, the three
Greek islands of Samothrace, Limnos and Aghios Eustratios - which lie
in the vicinity of the median line between mainland coasts - should not
be given full effect in delimitation, but rather allocated 12 mile
semi-enclaves on what would otherwise be the Turkish continental shelf.
In addition, in the central Aegean, Karl suggested that because the
islands of Lesbos, Chios, Psara and Antipsara lie "on the wrong side"
of a median line drawn between mainland coasts, they should be
allocated only 12 mile enclaves on the Turkish continental shelf. This
is because:
"use of these islands as basepoints would deprive Turkey of any
continental shelf areas	 a result not commensurate with the
length of Turkey's coastline in that area."92
Clearly, therefore, Karl's model upholds the Turkish view that the
appropriate delimitation is a median line between mainlands, and
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disavows the Greek view that all its islands should have full effect,
for in the southern Aegean not even the substantial island of Crete is
allowed full effect, the continental shelf in this area being divided
in the ratio 2:1 in favour of Greece. 	 Moreover, the model's reliance
upon coastal lengths as a Justification for such a division is but
apportionment and a refashioning of geography, as most explicitly shown
by the fact that having decided to divide the shelf area in this region
in the aforementioned ratio, Karl is then faced with allotting areas of
seabed in conformity with that ratio, rather than "delimiting" a
boundary on the basis of the States' coastal relationship to the area
concerned. 9' Indeed, he admits that under his model there is an almost
infinite number of ways in which the boundary line could be drawn to
divide the delimitation area to reflect the suggested ratio.94
Consequently, Greek analysts reject Karl's model as having no basis in
international law or State practice.96
If then the States remain unable to agree upon a boundary, a
solution can only result from a political compromise, perhaps motivated
by the need to find new sources of indigenous oil, as each State
currently spends 70 per cent of its annual foreign currency earnings on
crude oil. e6	 Alternatively, Turkey might agree to accept Judicial
settlement of the Aegean question in return for Greece removing its
opposition to Turkey's entry to the E.E.C.; however, even this seems a
distant prospect at present, unless nationalism can be set aside.
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